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I. INTRODUCTION
These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms,
gardens, forests, and homes – nonselective chemicals that have the power to kill
every insect, the “good” and the “bad,” to still the song of birds and the leaping of
fish in streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly film, and to linger on in soil – all
this though the intended target may be only a few weeds or insects. Can anyone
believe it is possible to lay down such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the
earth without making it unfit for all life?2
If Rachel Carson were alive today I believe she would give America a mixed grade.3
If you heard a strange rumbling sound in late 2004, it may have been Rachel Carson rolling over in
her grave in response to the National Audubon Society’s alarming “State of the Birds” Report.4 The
Report concludes that despite all of the environmental laws, regulations, polices, and programs established
since Rachel Carson first sounded the environmental alarm, a large percentage of avian species found in
the continental United States are in a significant state of decline.5 While pesticides are only one of the
many causes implicated in the bird declines,6 that fact cannot be ignored that despite Carson’s dire
warnings, and more than thirty years of intensive regulation, pesticides continue to pose significant risks
to birds, other wildlife and ecosystems in general.
One of the great ironies of environmental law is that the ecological consequences of pesticide use,
such as the devastating impacts DDT had on predatory bird populations, which fueled the environmental
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RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 7-8 (40th Anniv. Ed., First Mariner Books 2002).
E.O. WILSON, Afterword, in RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 362 (40th Anniv. Ed., First Mariner Books 2002).
4
In the fall of 2004, the National Audubon Society (“AUDUBON”) published its State of the Birds USA 2004 report in
Audubon magazine (hereinafter “Audubon Report”). A copy of the report may be viewed on the Internet at
www.audubon.org/bird/stateofthebirds/. In the Report, Audubon evaluated the status of 654 bird species native to the
continental United States. The species evaluated inhabit the nation’s four major types of natural habitat – grass, shrubs,
tree and water. The Report revealed a very disturbing trend, demonstrating that large percentages of bird species utilizing
all of these habitats are in significant decline. The declines range from 13 percent to 70 percent, depending on the habitat
type used by the species. Id. In addition to the Audubon Report, another significant report on the decline of bird species
conducted by researchers at Stanford University was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in
2004. Cagan H. Sekercioglu, Gretchen C. Daily and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Consequences of Bird Declines, PNAS
2004 101: 18042-18047. This report predicts that by the year 2100, ten percent of all bird species are likely to disappear
and that another fifteen percent could be on the brink of extinction. Id. Moreover, The Center for Biological Diversity
recently released a report that found that EPA has approved registrations for pesticides that put more than 375 Endangered
Species Act (ESA) listed species at risk. Brian Litmans & Jeff Miller, Silent Spring Revisited: Pesticide Use and
Endangered Species (A Center for Biological Diversity Report, 2004), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/ (Last visited, August 4, 2005).
5
Audubon Report.
6
The Report identifies habitat loss as the leading cause of bird declines, with other factors, such as pesticide poisoning
contributing to the declines. Id.
3
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movement of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, largely have been ignored for the past 30 years. Only very
recently has there been renewed interest in the ecological (as opposed to human health) risks posed by
pesticides.7 Moreover, the explosion of pesticidal genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture
has raised concerns regarding the novel risks to biodiversity posed by these new pesticides. Surprisingly,
however, the primary federal statute governing pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),8 has not changed significantly with regard to ecological matters since 1972 and
remains primarily a consumer protection statute not well suited for ecological protection. Moreover, the
manner in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented FIFRA has not kept pace
with developments in our understanding of the uncertainty, complexity, and changing nature of ecological
systems.
For years, environmental legal scholars have sought a middle ground between absolutist risk-based
approaches to environmental regulation and cost/benefit analysis approaches. In the past several years,
scholars have begun exploring the emerging field of eco-pragmatism – a framework for environmental
decision-making developed by Professor Daniel Farber -- as a way to achieve a workable middle ground.
At the same time, scholars have begun to look at environmental law through the lens of ecological science.
Common themes of complexity, uncertainty and change permeate both eco-pragmatism and ecological
science. Science has only scratched the surface of understanding complex ecological systems. What little
is understood about ecological science, teaches us that ecological systems are extremely complex, and
ever changing. Eco-pragmatism seeks to address concerns with complexity, uncertainty and the change.
By incorporating an understanding of ecological science into eco-pragmatism, these challenging issues can
be addressed more effectively. Accordingly, an integrated approach drawing on the discipline of ecology–
the study of the interactions of living organisms and their environments--and eco-pragmatism can provide
a comprehensive framework for environmental regulation to protect ecological resources. To date, no
significant attempts have been made to analyze FIFRA,9 and only a few attempts have been made to
analyze any other traditional pollution control law, comprehensively under eco-pragmatism or using
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See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004.
7 U.S.C. § 136 -136y (2004).
9
In fact, very few scholarly efforts have been made to analyze FIFRA in any comprehensive way at all. For one of the
more comprehensive scholarly works, see Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide Regulation on the
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. L. REF. 369 (1993) (using an analysis of FIFRA to
frame an argument for an alternative framework for environmental law reform, which more aggressively addresses the
causes of environmental problems, rather than relying on risk-based priority setting.).
8
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principles of ecological science.10 Pesticide law, perhaps more than any other pollution control law, lends
itself to such analyses.
Since 1972 when FIFRA was amended to take environmental concerns into account, considerable
advances have been made in the ecological sciences. Because regulation under FIFRA is accomplished
through a national registration of products, risks are assessed on a one-time nationwide basis.
Accordingly, localized ecological concerns are not considered. Moreover, the regulation of pesticides is
unique in that, unlike other areas of environmental protection where environmental laws can seek to
eliminate or minimize hazardous releases that result in unintended consequences of manufacturing or other
processes, pesticides are intentionally released into the environment for the express purpose of killing,
injuring or disrupting the behavior of living organisms in the environment. In other words, with
pesticides, simply keeping them out of the environment is not an option. Consequently, the complexity
and uncertainty manifest in ecological systems, as well as the disequilibria inherent in such systems, must
be addressed as part of any system designed to address ecological risks posed by pesticides. This Article
attempts to advance eco-pragmatism by consciously integrating principles of ecological science into an
eco-pragmatic framework. In addition, by employing the experiential approach inherent in ecopragmatism, this Article utilizes experience gleaned from over thirty years of U.S. policy on pesticide
regulation to propose improvements to pesticide regulation within an eco-pragmatic framework.
Part II of this Article provides an analysis of eco-pragmatic theory. This Part further demonstrates
the need for eco-pragmatic theory to be expanded to better integrate ecological concerns and shows how
ecological principles can be used to bolster and further develop eco-pragmatism. Part III lays out the
history of ecological issues in pesticide regulation and highlights the areas where current pesticide law
does not adequately address ecological concerns. The ecological risks posed by traditional synthetic
chemical pesticides and pesticidal genetically modified organisms are set forth. This Part further
demonstrates that for pesticide regulation, in particular, it is imperative to expand the role of ecological
considerations. Part IV of this Article describes current U.S. pesticide law and its application. Part V
evaluates FIFRA from an eco-pragmatic perspective and concludes that although some components of the
statute are surprisingly eco-pragmatic, substantially more could be done to use eco-pragmatic theory as a
means to improve FIFRA’s ability to protect ecological integrity. Finally, in Part VI, a new Eco10

One recent attempt to analyze the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 - 1387, using ecological principles is Robert
Adler, Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 Envtl.
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pragmatic approach to pesticide regulation is proposed.
II. ECO-PRAGMATISM
A. The Historical Roots of Pragmatism
The roots of eco-pragmatism can be traced back to the philosophical pragmatism11
movement of the early twentieth century. In its broadest sense, pragmatism can be described as a
philosophy that relies on action, experimentation and workable solutions, rather than theoretical
constructs.12 An aspect of philosophical pragmatism that is particularly relevant to integrating
ecological principles into environmental law is pragmatism’s flexibility, which is rooted in the
acceptance of indeterminacy and the limitations of human understanding.13 Pragmatists embrace
the idea that as more knowledge becomes available, and as society evolves, ethical concerns also
evolve. This philosophical acceptance of indeterminacy and change complements the ecological
principles of uncertainty and change, which are discussed in greater detail below.
Pragmatists also recognize that communities may hold many conflicting values. Pragmatic
methodology is designed to resolve conflicts in the way that best serves the community.14

L. 29 (2003).
11
Philosophical pragmatism has been applied over the years to a variety of disciplines. For example, Oliver Wendell
Holmes is credited with developing legal pragmatism, an attempt to apply pragmatism to legal theory. Legal pragmatism
grew out of Holmes’ belief that the law evolves out of experience rather than logic. Other proponents of legal pragmatism
included Benjamin Cardozo and Richard Posner. See Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a
Guide to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.REV. 1, 9-13 (2004).
12
For a good discussion of early philosophical pragmatism, see generally Mintz, supra note 11. Philosophical pragmatism
rejects dogma and particular outcomes in favor of a method of using experience and experimentation to determine what
“works.” Mintz, supra note 11, at 1. In pragmatism, decisions are measured by their consequences and the extent to which
they fulfill the needs of society. Pragmatism has been described as emphasizing “practice over theory.” See Ruhl, supra
note CC, at 531. Pragmatists believe that the value of an idea stems from its practical ability to benefit the community and
to solve society’s problems. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 14 (2003). One of the most influential philosophical pragmatists of the twentieth century, John
Dewey stressed the idea that knowledge is better gleaned from experience than abstract reasoning. See generally, JOHN
DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (Eugene Freeman, ed., 2d. Ed. 1971). Other traditional philosophical pragmatists
include William James, Charles Pierce, Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead. Mintz, supra note 11 at 1-2. Also, see
generally, THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS (Milton Konvitz and Gail Kennedy, eds. 1960). In keeping with this practical
measure of the value of ideas, pragmatists believe that ideas are valuable and true when they are accepted by what is
referred to as a “critical community of inquiry.” SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra at 16. In other words, only after a
community has analyzed, deliberated and vetted an idea and found it to be beneficial in solving a problem is that idea
valuable to the community. Further, the value of such ideas changes as the community changes.
13
Early twentieth century philosophical pragmatists were fascinated by the scientific developments of the time. Darwin’s
theory of evolution led these early pragmatists to view human thought in evolutionary terms, constantly evolving as a
“problem-solving capacity, oriented towards survival.” Id. at 15 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,
41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 796 (1989). Decisions may change as new experience or experimentation point to better ways to
meet such societal needs.
14
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 20.
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Conflicts over environmental policy and law are borne of the conflicting values of those who seek
to reduce environmental risks and those whose primary concern is economic efficiency.15 Thus,
pragmatism can serve as a useful tool to reconcile the inevitable conflicts, which environmental
policy must address.16
B. Farber’s “Eco-pragmatism”
Professor Daniel Farber’s 1999 book, Ecopragmatism,17 paved the way for the recent flurry
of scholarship attempting to use pragmatic theory as a guiding principle for environmental
regulation.18 Many environmental law scholars seemingly have been yearning for a theoretical
15

See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 522, 23 (2000) (book review).(stating that “[s]ince almost immediately after its statutory big bang in the
early 1970s, [footnote omitted] two extreme and opposing philosophies – one devoted to protecting the economy and the
other to protecting the environment – have waged a war of annihilation that has left in its wake a mish-mash of laws,
regulations, judicial opinions, and countless administrative decisions and policies that we today call environmental law”).
16
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 21, 52.
17
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35
(1999). Eco-pragmatism draws on the wider movement in legal scholarship known as legal pragmatism FARBER, supra
note AA, at 9. Legal pragmatism holds that decisions should be made by drawing on many sources. In the environmental
setting, these sources include scientific understanding and normative judgments, as well as economic considerations. Id. at
10. Professor Farber’s book starts from the premise that the legitimacy of environmental values is a given in the U.S. The
harder question, he maintains, is what priority to assign to those environmental values, and how to weigh them against
other values such as economic needs. A basic tenet of Farber’s approach is that for environmental law to be socially
sustainable, it must be pluralist, flexible and not overly draconian. In other words, to be socially sustainable, environmental
protection must proceed as “a marathon, not a sprint.” Id. at 13.
18
Although Farber was the first to develop the field of eco-pragmatism, the field of Environmental Pragmatism had been in
existence since the late1980s. See, e.g., ANDREW LIGHT AND ERIC KATZ, ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM (1996).
Environmental pragmatism was developed as a way to apply philosophical pragmatism to attempt to address environmental
concerns. Mintz, supra note 11, at 6. Although eco-pragmatism certainly derives much from environmental pragmatism,
Farber’s eco-pragmatism is an attempt to apply pragmatism to environmental laws and policies in particular. Id. at 14.
Farber’s book has been reviewed by a number of prominent environmental law scholars, generating varied reactions. While
some scholars have expressed reservations over Farber’s ideas, others have generally reacted positively to the overall thrust
of the book, if not to the specifics. See Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421
(2000) (book review) (criticizing Farber’s approach for being too modest and not sufficiently transformative); Christopher
H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1880 (2000) (book review) (describing
Farber’s book as containing “valuable discussion of [environmental] problems [and] offering important insights into
dealing with them.”); Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests and Pragmatists, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1065, 1097(2003)
(stating that “Pragmatism’s essential appeal is thus that it is the best bet for putting environmental policy on a glide path to
the goals that the [environmental] prophets wants, and indeed the steepest glide path feasible.”); J. B. Ruhl, supra note 15
(generally providing a very favorable review of eco-pragmatism, but expressing disappointment for its lack of passion).
See also Paul Boudreax, Environmental Costs, Benefits, and Values: A review of Daniel A. Farber’s Eco-Pragmatism, 13
TUL. ENVTL. L.J 125, 167 (1999) (book review) (stating that while Farber’s Eco-Pragmatism provides a good starting point
for broad-based thinking about problems in environmental law, it fails in its specific recommendations on how to apply
Pragmatism to environmental policy). Despite any perceived shortcomings in the book, it cannot be denied that Farber’s
ideas have been provocative and have led the way for a flurry of scholarly analysis of how pragmatic ideas could be applied
to environmental law. See e.g., THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC
VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, JIM CHEN, ED. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE (Environmental Law Institute 2003)(a
compilation of writing on eco-Pragmatism and related concepts including works by Jim Chen, Daniel Farber, J.B. Ruhl,
Dan Tarlock, Christine Klein, Jonathon Alder, Christopher Schroeder, Douglas Kysar, James Salzman, Richard Lazarus,
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framework to guide the development of an environmental middle ground between the two
extremes of absolute risk-based regulation, which does not adequately take costs into account and
cost/benefit analysis,19 which as described in section III.C.2.a below has many shortcomings in the
area of environmental protection. Eco-pragmatism, for many, provides the rationale for moving
beyond the goal of economic efficiency and focusing instead on attempting to reduce human and
environmental risks to the extent feasible.20 Nevertheless, despite the recent wealth of scholarship
on eco-pragmatism, very few attempts have been made to apply the approach in any systematic
way to an existing environmental regulatory scheme.21
In his book, Farber outlines the four most difficult questions that need to be answered in
developing an environmental regulatory system: 1) How we determine how much an
environmental rule is worth, which taps into the long-standing debate over risk-based approaches
to environmental protection versus cost/benefit approaches; 2) The appropriate baseline for
environmental decision-making, which raises the issue of whether there is some inherent value in
environmental protection such that we should err on the side of protection; 3) How we determine
how much it is worth to spend today to achieve a benefit that may not occur until decades into the
future, which raises the issue of what is the appropriate discount rate to use in environmental
valuation;22 and 4) How we know when to proceed in the face of imperfect information, which
Lisa Heinzerling, Holly Doremus, and Alyson Flournoy, among others); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 46
(arguing that pragmatism provides the rationale for regulating based on risk, which has been missing from debates on
environmental policy); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1037 (2003)(arguing that
eco-pragmatism’s middle ground compromise and flexibility must be tempered to include clear rules that can be adjusted
over time. Farber himself has continued to weigh-in on the subject. See Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over Troubled
Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 854 (2003).
19
FARBER, supra note 17, at 35.
20
See generally SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 (providing much of the justification for a pragmatic approach to
environmental law that Farber’s book was criticized for lacking.)
21
One of the few attempts to apply an eco-pragmatic approach to environmental law is J.B. Ruhl’s 2003 article, Is the
Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003). In this article, Ruhl identifies what he refers to as
the five pillars of eco-pragmatism: 1) drawing an environmental baseline; 2) institutionalizing the precautionary principle;
3) integrating impact assessment; 4) the importance of empiricism; and 5) adaptive management. Id. at 888-889. After
testing the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against these five pillars, Ruhl concludes that “all the eco-pragmatism pieces are
there.” Id. at 941. For example, Ruhl identifies the ESA’s jeopardy prohibition as providing an environmental baseline,
the ESA’s take prohibition as an institutionalization of the precautionary principle, the ESA’s incidental take procedure as
utilizing impact assessment, the ESA’s best available evidence standard as employing empiricism, and the recent
implementation of habitat conservation planning under the ESA as incorporating adaptive management techniques. Id. at
941.
22
There is much debate over the appropriate discount rates that should be used in environmental cost/benefit analyses or
other forms of balancing, such as constrained balancing. The higher the discount rate used, the more likely that the analysis
will conclude that the resource using or polluting activity is efficient. Whereas, a low discount rate affords greater value to
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raises the related issues of whether precautionary approaches should be used in environmental
decision-making and how to incorporate adaptive management ideas into environmental laws.
Farber sets out to answer these questions within a pragmatic framework, finding that the pragmatic
answers to the four questions are: 1) economics should be utilized in a hybrid approach which
bridges the gap between pure risk-based and cost/benefit approaches; 2) environmental law should
start with a presumption in favor of the environment (an environmental baseline); 3) a low
discount rate should be employed in the valuation of long-term environmental benefits; and 4)
flexible, adaptive approaches are necessary to allow regulation to adapt as new information
becomes available. Despite the strengths of eco-pragmatism, as described more fully below, the
theory could be strengthened considerably by more consciously incorporating into it principles of
ecological science.
C. Strengthening the Eco in Eco-pragmatism
1. Background Discussion
In his review of Farber’s work, Professor J.B. Ruhl has described eco-pragmatism as a
marriage of two themes: the “eco” theme, a scientifically based theme, which focuses on the
dynamic character of natural systems, and the “pragmatic” theme, which draws on the philosophy
of pragmatism.23 As Ruhl describes it, the fusion of the concept of ecological dynamism and
environmental pragmatism form eco-pragmatism, a new approach to environmental decisions
making in an uncertain world.24 Despite his general affinity for eco-pragmatism, Ruhl expresses
future benefits, and as a result, is more likely to conclude that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs. Cost/benefit
and other balancing analyses are influenced dramatically by the choice of discount rate. Eco-pragmatism argues in favor of
the use of a low discount rate. FARBER, supra note 17 at 89-90,133. Although a detailed discussion of the appropriate
discount rate to use in environmental decision-making is used is beyond the scope of this article, there are sound reasons
for adopting a low discount rate. For instance, the consequences of environmental decisions extend deep into the future.
The further out in time we attempt to predict environmental consequences, the more the accuracy of such projections
diminishes. FARBER, supra note 17 at 133. Using a low discount rate is a way to take the long view. Ruhl, supra note 15 at
539. A low discount rate does not devalue long-term environmental benefits. Moreover, our limited understanding of
environmental issues lends support to more cautious predictions of future benefits. As hard as it is to put a dollar value on
environmental values, it is almost impossible to put a dollar value on what they will be worth in twenty or thirty years. Our
limited understanding of natural systems suggests we may not even begin to understand the value that natural systems may
be found to hold in the future. High discount rates can make significant future benefits look insignificant today. FARBER,
supra note 17 at 151. Perhaps the most compelling rationale for employing low discount rates is what is known as “intergenerational equity.” There is so much that is not known about the value of natural systems today, that it would be reckless
to fritter away resources today which may later be found to have great value (utilitarian or otherwise) to future generations.
Id. at 151-152. Thus, we should be prudent in how much we discount the environmental benefits that natural systems hold
for future generations.
23
J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 523.
24
Id. at 524.
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disappointment that Farber’s work fails to address, except in a very cursory fashion, the “eco”
partner in the eco-pragmatism marriage.25 As Ruhl points out, the past thirty years have evidenced
dramatic changes in the study of natural systems.26 During this period, the field of ecology has
come into its own, and the new fields of conservation biology and ecosystem management have
been born. Moreover, unprecedented developments in our understanding of natural systems have
occurred. Our once-accepted view of the “balance of nature” has been challenged and we now are
beginning to see nature as being considerably more complex and dynamic than we once
believed.27 Accordingly, environmental decision-makers must accept, and incorporate into their
decision-making the continually changing nature of ecosystems.28
A close study of ecological principles reveals that these principles are consistent in many
ways with eco-pragmatism, and in fact, may serve to bolster and further develop Farber’s ideas. A
good starting point for an attempt to understand the complexity of, uncertainty and changing
nature of natural systems is an understanding of the numerous fields of inquiry and terminology
used to describe these systems. Ecology is the science of the interactions of living organisms with
each other and their physical environment.29 The field of ecology has existed for many decades;
however, it has only been in the last twenty years or so, that ecological study has advanced to the
point where we are beginning to understand the importance of biodiversity to natural systems.
“Biodiversity” has been defined as “the richness, abundance, and variability of plant and animal
species and communities and the ecological processes that link them with one another and with
soil, air and water.”30 The measure of biodiversity is not merely an accounting of the number of
species present in an area; it also has a functional component.31 Accordingly, a focus on preserving
individual species from extinction is not sufficient to preserve biodiversity unless ecological
processes are also maintained.32 Thus, an overriding goal of biodiversity protection is to maintain
all of the elements of biodiversity, including both structural diversity (i.e., forms and levels of
25

Id.
Id.
27
See generally, DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(1990) and Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994).
28
Ruhl, supra note CC, at 528.
29
RICHARD O. BROOKS ET AL., LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME at 7 (ASHGATE, 2002).
30
MALCOM L. HUNTER, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20-21 (1996) (providing the 1993 Wildlife
Society definition of biodiversity).
31
Id. at 21.
26

9

organization) and functional biodiversity (i.e., ecological and evolutionary functions).33
A relatively new applied scientific discipline, conservation biology, addresses the complex
relationship between human activities and the protection of ecological systems. Professor Michael
Soule, one of the founders of Conservation Biology has defined it as “a new stage in the
application of science to conservation problems, [which] addresses the biology of species,
communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed, either directly of indirectly, by human activities
or other agents. Its goal is to provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity.” 34
Although conservation biology is still a relatively young, and not well-defined, science,
certain postulates have been proposed. Professor Soule divides these postulates into two
categories: 1) functional postulates; and 2) ethical or normative postulates.35 He describes the
functional postulates as a set of fundamental rules gleaned from basic sciences, including ecology,
that are geared toward the maintenance of both the form and function of natural biological
systems.36 Perhaps most pertinent for legal analysis are Soule’s ethical or normative postulates,
which can be utilized as a fundamental ecological baseline for an environmental management or
regulatory system: 1) biological diversity is good; and 2) ecological complexity is good.37
32

See id. at 21.
Id. at 21, 28.
34
Michael E. Soule, What is Conservation Biology? In ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY ( R. Edward
Grumbine, ed., Island Press, 1994). Conservation biology has also been described as a “regulatory science that seeks to
develop scientific standards that can be applied to regulatory criteria and then to develop the management strategies to meet
these standards.” A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental
Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (1994). Conservation biology arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a reaction
to the unprecedented worldwide extinction crisis that many biologists believe is occurring due to the activities of humans.
HUNTER, supra note 30,at 14. Accordingly, conservation biology is an applied “crisis” discipline that is to biology what
surgery is to physiology Soule, supra at 35. The driving force behind conservation biology is the belief that without serious
efforts to reverse the trend of mass extinctions, millions of species may be at risk of extinction Id.at 48. The loss of species
may have devastating consequences for humans, as well as for the planet as a whole. Due to the permanence of extinction,
rare species are often the focus of conservation biology. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 228 (Harvard
University Press 1992). The seminal works on conservation biology include: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN
EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Soule & Bruce A. Wilcox, eds., Sinauer 1980) and CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY: RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT DECADE (Michael E. Soule & Cordon H. Orians, eds., Island Press 2001).
35
Soule, supra note 34, at 38-45.
36
Soule’s functional postulates include the following: 1) Many species are products of co-evolutionary processes – i.e., in
most communities, species make up a significant part of other species’ environment; 2) Species are interdependent – i.e.,
mutualistic relationships exist between many species and thus, there are always uncertainties about the impact that the
extinction of one species will have on another Species; 3) Many species are highly specialized. –i.e., the majority of animal
species depend on a particular host. Thus, if such a host becomes extinct, many other species may be adversely affected; 4)
Extinction of “keystone species” can have long-term consequences; 5) Introduction of generalist species may reduce
diversity; and 6) Many ecological processes have thresholds below and which they become discontinuous, chaotic or
suspended. Id. at 38-42.
37
Id. at 42-44.
33
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Most of the law and policy initiatives focused on conservation biology and biodiversity
protection have focused on deciding which lands to preserve based on their diversity, uniqueness,
connectivity to other lands, or other factors. While the importance of preserving significant lands
cannot be overstated, such preservation would be in vain if steps are not taken to address
contamination of air, water and land, both inside and outside of preserved areas. Environmental
pollution is the most subtle form of ecological degradation and despite the banning of numerous
pesticides over the past thirty years, pesticide pollution remains one the most serious forms of
ecological degradation.38 No matter how strictly protected an area is from human activity, it will
never be truly protected if contaminants, such as pesticides, enter the area through the water or air,
or if species that use the area are exposed to harmful contaminants whenever they leave the
confines of the protected area.39
Although some legal scholars have analyzed environmental law in a general sense from a
conservation biology perspective,40 to date the attempts that have been made to evaluate specific
management or regulatory schemes using such an approach have focused primarily on natural
resources management or the Endangered Species Act,41 rather than pesticide law or pollution
control law, more generally.
Another important ecological concept is that of ecosystem management. It has been said
that conservation biology leads to ecosystem management.

In other words, ecosystem

management is a tool to carry out the principles of conservation biology. Although environmental
literature is rife with varying descriptions and definitions of ecosystem management, there appears
to be general consensus that overriding goal of ecosystem management is to protect ecological

38

RICHARD B. PRIMACK, ESSENTIALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 145-46 (Sinauer 1993).
Although the primary threat to species and ecosystem diversity is habitat destruction, even when habitats are preserved,
many populations have been reduced in size to such an extent that they are extremely vulnerable to other environmental
stresses, such as hazardous pollutants. Moreover, the vast majority of land in the United States is privately owned, and it
would be naive to believe that enough property could be put into perpetual preservation to achieve true ecological integrity
on a large scale. Thus, it is necessary to complement land preservation programs with effective regulatory programs that
protect of widespread ecological integrity while allowing human activities to proceed.
40
See, e.g., Walter Kuhlmann, Making the Law More Ecoccentric: Responding to Leopold and Conservation Biology, 7
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 133 (1996); Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the Challenges
Ahead, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994), Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994); and William H. Rodgers, Adaptation of Environmental
Law to the Ecologists’ Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 887 (1994).
41
See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New
Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001).
39
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integrity over the long term.42 Ecological integrity has been defined as the total native diversity of
species, populations, and ecosystems, and the ecological patterns and processes that maintain such
diversity.43
Interestingly, at the same time that ecological science, conservation biology and ecosystem
management were developing in the scientific world, parallel ideas including many of those that
form the basis of eco-pragmatism, were developing in the legal arena. While not couched in terms
of “conservation biology,” eco-pragmatism, boiled down to its essentials, starts to look startlingly
like conservation biology. Parallels between the cross-disciplinary applied science of conservation
biology and the legal theoretical construct of eco-pragmatism exist in a number of respects. For
instance, both approaches articulate the need to start from an ecological baseline. Moreover, both
disciplines recognize the importance of adaptive management approaches to address the changing
nature of both biological systems and our ability to comprehend them. Finally, although both
systems argue in favor of taking costs into account in environmental-decision-making, neither
approach would elevate costs to the level of being the deciding factor.44
Perhaps most significantly, both disciplines acknowledge that although we can never
completely prevent all human disturbances, we do not necessarily need to. Human disturbances
that are similar in characteristic, magnitude and duration to natural disturbances are not as likely to
pose significant risks to species or ecosystems as are human disturbances that are substantially
different in characteristic, magnitude or duration from natural disturbances.45
2. The Role of Economics In Eco-Pragmatism
Professor Daniel Farber’s Eco-pragmatism, analyzes what role economic
considerations should play in environmental decision-making from a pragmatic standpoint.
42

See R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, Introduction, in, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY (R. Edward Grumbine, ed.,
Island Press, 1994)
43
See Id. at 8 (citing B. Norton, A New Paradigm for Environmental Management23-41 in R. COSTANZA ET AL.,
ECOSYSTEM HEALTH (Island Press 1992).
44
Leading conservation biologist, Professor Reed Noss, has described an approach to applying principles of conservation
biology to environmental law. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887, 898-900 (1994). Some of the guiding principles of conservation biology
can be summarized as follows: 1) ecosystems are more complex than science can understand; 2) the less data or more
uncertainty involved, the more conservative environmental decision-making should be; 3) ecosystems are not static, but
instead are constantly in a state of disequilibria; 4) conservation biology is by its very nature value-laden and goal-driven;
5) environmental management decisions must be concerned with ecological processes at multiple levels of biological
organization See id. at 898-900.
45
Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1130.
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Farber offers a sound rationale for reaching the conclusion that a hybrid, or feasibility,
approach is the most pragmatic. Significantly, when ecological principles are incorporated
into the eco-pragmatic analysis, they lend further support to Farber’s conclusions.
a. A Rejection of Pure Risk-Based and Cost/Benefit Standards
The past twenty years of environmental law scholarship is characterized by a struggle
between two opposite extremes – those who believe environmental values are paramount and those
who believe economic interests are paramount.46 Environmental regulation in the U.S. frequently
is criticized for being unrealistic because it is based on protecting the public or environment from
risks without considering the costs associated with such protection.47 Of course it would be absurd
to attempt to eliminate all environmental risks at all costs.48 Opponents of pure risk-based
approaches contend that environmental regulations seek to attain zero risk regardless of the costs
of attaining such a goal. For the most part these criticisms are unfounded. 49 Despite the outcry of
the opponents of risk-based regulation, the vast majority of federal environmental laws are not
purely risk-based and few if any are zero-risk statutes.50 Instead, most environmental laws allow
46

FARBER, supra note 17 at 35.
As Supreme Court Justice Breyer and Professor Cass Sunstein have described, some environmental risk reduction
requires expenditures of money that go well beyond the bounds of common sense. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 14 (1993) and Cass Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 CHI. L.
REV. 1533 (1996).
48
FARBER, supra note 17 at 3.
49
Although examples of environmental excesses certainly can be found, many if not most of such criticisms have been
demonstrated to be without merit. FARBER, supra note 17 at 22. In one of the most comprehensive analyses of the costs of
environmental regulation to date, Lisa Heinzerling, demonstrated that many of the oft-cited examples of the excesses costs
of environmental regulations are not accurate. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L. J.
1981 (1998). Heinzerling has shown that many of the examples used by cost/benefit proponents are either exaggerations or
are examples of regulations that were considered but never adopted for a variety of reasons Id. In this article, Heinzerling
scrutinizes the “Morrall table,” developed in 1986 by John Morrall, an economist at the Office of Management and Budget.
Id. at 1983, 1987-89. The table includes information on the costs of various risk-reducing regulations per life saved. Id. at
1987-88. The numbers from this table have been relied on extensively by scholars, environmental policy-makers and
politicians to support arguments that environmental regulations are not cost-effective and that taxpayer money could be
better spent elsewhere. Id. at 1983. Heinzerling demonstrates that the estimates of the costs of environmental regulations
developed by Morrall, and widely relied upon by proponents of cost/benefit analysis, are seriously flawed. First,
Heinzerling shows how Morrall included a large number of regulations that were never adopted by the regulatory agency.
Id. at 1999-2014. Heinzerling demonstrates that the alleged highest cost environmental regulations on Morrall’s table have
never taken effect. Id. at 1983, 1999-2014. In fact, some of these proposed rules were withdrawn by the agency
specifically because of the high costs associated with them. Id. at 2000-10. Moreover, Heinzerling shows how Morrall’s
use of cost estimates skew the results by being up to 1000 times higher than the agency estimates. Id. at 1983, 1991-1993.
Further, Heinzerling shows how Morrall’s estimates are misleading in that he used a high (10%) discount rate. Id. at 201824. Heinzerling’s analysis shows that by using the agencies cost estimates and a lower discount rate, the cost per life saved
for most of these regulations falls well within the accepted range. Id.
50
This is for good reason. It is impossible to eliminate all risk. First, as risks are reduced to lower levels, the costs of
eliminating remaining risks may be excessively high. Second, in many cases it is impossible to attain zero risk because
47
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or require the consideration of other factors such as the costs of regulation or the economic
feasibility of regulation. Even where zero-risk or absolutist risk-based environmental laws have
been tried, frequently the recognition of the illogical outcomes that these approaches can result in
have led to either the interpretation of the laws to take other factors into account, or the
amendment of the laws imposing these strict risk-based requirements.51
technology does not exist to measure very small amounts of pollutants or very small environmental disruptions that may
cause risk. Third, it is not uncommon for risk reduction measures that are employed to address one risk to cause some other
unintended risk. Finally, risk is inherent in nature. Id. at 72-74.
51
Perhaps the most notable absolutist zero-risk-based law was the Delaney Clause of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA). 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994). As one of the few environmental statutes to attempt to impose a zero-risk standard,
the Delaney Clause was highly controversial. In fact, EPA attempted to interpret into the statute, a de minimis exception,
despite the absolutist language contained in the law. EPA’s de minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause was struck
down by the Ninth Circuit in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d. 985 (9th Cir. 1992). After many years of controversy, Congress, in
1996, eliminated the zero-risk language in favor of the more flexible “safety” standard in the Food Quality Amendment
Act. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y and 21 U.S.C.A. §§ U301-381 (West Supp.
1996). Prior the 1996, food additives in or on processed foods were regulated under section 409 of the FFDCA, whereas,
pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities were regulated under section 408 of the FFDCA. Section 408
deemed any poisons or deleterious pesticide chemical that is not generally recognized as safe added to a raw agricultural
commodity unsafe unless a tolerance is established and the pesticide residue is within the tolerance limit. Section 408
authorized EPA to establish tolerances “to the extent necessary to protect public health,” and mandated that in making such
determination EPA give appropriate consideration to certain factors including the necessity for the production of an
adequate a, wholesome and economical food supply. Thus, the standard for setting a tolerance under section 408 included
economic considerations. The term “pesticide chemical” is defined as any substance which, alone, in chemical
combination or in formulation with one or more other substance, is a pesticide within the meaning of FIFRA and which is
used in the production, storage or transportation of raw agricultural commodities. 21 U.S.C. § 321(q). Generally
recognized as Safe, or GRAS, is defined as generally recognized among experts qualified by scientific training and
expertise to evaluate its safety as having been adequately shown trough scientific principles (or for a substance in food
prior to January 1958, based on common use in food) to be safe under conditions of its intended use. 21 U.S.C. § 3221(s).
For processed foods, however, a completely different standard applied. Pursuant to the pre-1996 section 402 of the
FFDCA, a food was deemed to be adulterated if it contained any food additive not authorized by a food additive regulation
under section 409. The standard for setting a food additive regulation, however, was far different from the standard for a
tolerance under section 408. Under section 409, to issue a food additive regulation, EPA would have to find that the use of
the food additive under the conditions of use specified in the regulation would be “safe.” Further, section 409 contained the
Delaney Clause which provided that no food additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when
ingested by man or animals of if tests show it induces cancer in man or animals. Accordingly, section 409 contained a
strict “safety” standard and a complete prohibition of any carcinogenic food additive in any amount. After many years of
controversy over the disparity and unsuccessful attempts by EPA to interpret the Delaney Clause as imposing a de minimis
risk standard rather than a zero risk standard, the 1996 FQPA amendments to FFDCA eliminated the absolutist Delaney
Clause. Further, the 1996 Act eliminated the prior standards in both section 408 and section 409 and substituted a standard
of “safety” in both sections. Accordingly, under the current law, tolerances must be established for pesticide residues in
food, whether in raw agricultural commodities or processed foods, at a level that is considered “safe.” Safe is defined to
mean there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue.
This “reasonable certainty standard” while still a risk-based standard, replaces the zero-risk Delaney Clause with a
negligible risk standard.
It should be noted that prior to 1970, the Food and Drug Administration regulated food additives as well as pesticide
residues in food under the FFDCA. Under the Reorganization Act of 1970, authority for the regulation of pesticides under
both FIFRA and FFDCA was transferred to the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency. Reorganization Plan No.
3 of 1970, 84 § 2086. Since 1970, EPA has regulated pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities under
section 408 of the FFDCA and pesticide residues in or on processed foods as food additives under section 409 of the
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At the opposite end of the spectrum from the pure risk-based approaches to environmental
regulation are those approaches that elevate economic efficiency above all other considerations.
Cost/benefit analyses involve balancing the “social benefit” of a regulation against the cost to
society to comply with the regulation.52 Cost/benefit standards are based on the premise that
maximum economic efficiency is the goal of any regulatory system.53 Proponents of cost/benefit
analysis often build their arguments in favor of economic efficiency by using examples of
environmental regulations that achieved minimum risk reduction for enormous costs.54
The cost/benefit analysis measure of value is the consumer’s willingness to pay for goods
FFDCA.
52
For a general overview of cost/benefit analyses, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).
53
The argument in favor of economic efficiency is that limited resources should be spent where they will do the most good.
This makes sense in the context of choosing between two technologies to achieve the same level of risk reduction. For
example, if, all else being equal, it would cost ten million dollars to install an end-of-pipe technology that would reduce
water pollutants, thereby saving five lives, but it would cost only one million dollars to use alternative raw materials in the
manufacturing process that would achieve the same risk reduction goal, no reasonable person would question the decision
to utilize the more economically efficient risk reduction method. However, the real world is rarely so clear-cut, and
typically environmental decisions are not a choice between two equally effective risk reduction methods. More often they
involve complex trade-offs in risk reduction, costs and normative choices that are not easily monetized. Consequently,
cost/benefit analyses reach far beyond the obvious and simple goal of achieving an environmental benefit for the lowest
cost possible. See FARBER, supra note 17 at 7.
54
Id. at 22. For example, the fact that an individual drives a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that gets poor gas mileage does not
necessarily imply that such person does not value clean air or energy efficiency. The individual may have purchased the
SUV with the primary consideration of safety and space for the family and its gear. Nevertheless, the individual may value
clean air and energy efficiency and may fully support the imposition of tougher fuel economy standards on SUVs.
The phenomenon of individual economic preferences frequently conflicting with societal desires is well illustrated by the
following exercise that Professor Scott Barrett of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University, uses in his classroom. Professor Bartlett’s exercise can be seen as a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma
to show individuals may make different choices when acting in a mode of consumer/wealth acquirer versus in a mode of
democratic citizen. Professor Barrett first hands out two playing cards, one black and one red, to each student in his class.
He then instructs the students that each player will receive five dollars for keeping a red card plus one dollar for every red
card handed in by any other player. Thus, if there are twenty students playing, and each player hands in her red card, each
of the twenty students will receive twenty dollars. If none of the twenty player hands in her red card, each student will
receive only five dollars. If six players hand in their red cards, the other fourteen students receive eleven dollars each, but
the six who handed in their cards, only receive six dollars each. The incentive for each individual player to keep her red
card is obvious. Accordingly, when Barrett’s class has played this game, typically less than two-thirds of the players turn
in their red cards. Barrett explains that this is what the economists call a public good. All players benefit, and no player
can be excluded from receiving that benefit.
When Barrett asks these same students to vote anonymously on whether to allow a government regulation that
would confiscate all of the red cards, thereby resulting the best possible outcome for all students (i.e., each student receives
twenty dollars), invariably, a majority votes in favor of the government regulation. In her article, What Makes
Environmental Treaties Work?, in which she describes Professor Barrett’s game, Frances Cairncross reaches the following
interpretation of this game: “[I]n other words, left to themselves, individual players are selfish, but they yearn for some
outside force to make everybody behave better and improve the outcome of the game for all the players.” Frances
Cairncross, What Makes Environmental Treaties Work? CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE, vol. 5, num. 2, 12-19 (2004)
(discussing Professor Scott Barrett’s book, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-
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or services.55 The concept of willingness to pay does not necessarily translate well to ecological
values.56 Moreover, relying on willingness to pay may skew cost/benefit analyses away from
protecting environmental values because embedded within the willingness to pay concept is an
assumption that industry has the right to utilize resources, and that if environmentalists want to
protect those resources, they have to be willing to pay for such protection.57
MAKING (1990)).
55
Id. at 36. The willingness to pay standard is a key component of welfare economics. For a good general discussion of
the Pareto Criteria, as well as other theories of economic efficiency, including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see generally Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization in FOUNDATION OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (Avery
Wiener Katz, ed., Foundation Press 1998). As Farber explains, welfare economics is based on the simple concept of the
Pareto improvement. Under this standard, a decision that results in at least one person benefiting and no one being harmed
is a sound decision. Of course, in real world decision-making, it is rare to find such a simple outcome. Thus, welfare
economics has developed the concept of economic efficiency whereby, an outcome is considered to be more economically
efficient than other outcomes if in an overall sense, the gains of the winners outweigh the losses of the losers. This is
accomplished if a hypothetical transfer of some of the gains from the winners to offset the losses of the losers would result
in a Pareto improvement (i.e., once the losers losses have been offset by some of the winners gains, the winners maintain at
least some gain and the losers now have suffered no losses). FARBER, supra note 17, at 44.
56
It can be difficult to determine how much people would be willing to pay for a given ecological service or benefit.
Although it may be a relatively easy task to determine how much people are willing to pay to for certain types of values,
such as how much more people are willing to pay for a safe product versus an unsafe product, in the environmental arena,
many values that are sought to be protected by environmental laws are what is known as “non-use” values. These non-use
values include “option value,” which is how much people are willing to pay to leave open the option of receiving a benefit
in the future. An example of option value is the value people are willing to pay to preserve tropical rainforests to preserve
the option of obtaining plants with medicinal value in the future. Id. at 48. Another type of non-use value is “existence
value,” which is how much people are willing to pay to protect something that they will never directly benefit from. An
example of existence value is how much people are willing to pay to protect an endangered species even if they will never
receive any direct benefit from that species, and in fact may never even see that species. Id. These non-use values are
much more difficult to monetize in a cost/benefit analyses than are other types of values that provide a more direct impact
to the person who is wiling to pay for them. Id. at 49. One way that economists attempt to monetize these values is through
a survey technique called contingent valuation. Cass Sunstein has criticized this technique as unreliable because surveys
asking people hypothetically how much they would pay to preserve a particular non-use value may be skewed by people
answering in a way that makes them feel morally satisfied rather than stating their real valuation. Id. at 49 (citing CASS
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 142-43 (1997). On the other side of the debate critics argue that
contingent valuation is not an appropriate way to value natural resources. John Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the
Trouble?, 62 CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995).
57
The question then becomes one of how much are the environmentalists willing to pay to protect the resources. If
instead, one assumes that environmentalists have the right to protect resources, and that industry must pay
environmentalists, or the public, if it wishes to utilizes those resources, the question becomes one of how much are
environmentalists or the public willing to accept to allow the resources to be used. The amount of money environmentalists
are willing to accept to allow a resources to be used is typically twice as high as the amount of money the same
environmentalists is willing to pay to protect the resource. Id. at 100. Nevertheless, most cost/benefit analyses use
willingness to pay. SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 57. This is but one example of how cost/benefit analyses are
not value-neutral. The value-based assumptions that underlie the analyses can dramatically alter outcomes. See also Id. at
56, explaining that willingness to pay and willingness to accept are typically different due to the distribution of wealth in
society. A person’s wealth does not tend to limit willingness to accept in the same way it limits willingness to pay. As a
result, willingness to pay tends to result in less regulation. Id. at 66.
An example of the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept provided in Farber’s book is the
example of whalers desiring to kill a pod of whales. If one assumes that the whalers have a right to kill the whales for their
own economic benefit, the question becomes how much are the environmentalists willing to pay the whalers not to kill the
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Proponents of cost/benefit analysis believe that sound decision-making is based on market
indicators, whereas, environmentalists believe that such decision should be based on political
indicators (Farber refers to this as “willingness to pay” versus “willingness to vote”).58 This
distinction has been described as follows: “social regulation expresses what we believe, what we
are, what we stand for as a nation, not simply what we wish to buy as individuals.”59 Moreover,
relying solely on consumer choices leaves out the possibility of decision-making based on
community analysis, deliberation and vetting of ideas.60 Critics of cost/benefit analysis focus their
arguments on the distinction between private consumer choices and public choices based on public
values.61 In the pesticides arena, an economic argument could be made that the fact that most
consumers purchase food that is treated with chemical pesticides means that consumers are making
a conscious choice to do so, based on economic and other factors. While it is true that consumers
may purchase such foods because they are generally significantly less expensive than foods that
are grown without chemical inputs, to assume that this consumer choice means that consumers
have consciously determined that the health and environmental risks of pesticides in food are
outweighed by the increased cost of organically produced food is overly simplistic.
whales. This willingness to pay then becomes the economic value of the whales. If instead, one assumes that the
environmentalists have the legal right to protect the whales, the question becomes how much are the whalers willing to pay
the environmentalists the right to hunt the whales. Under this scenario, it is likely that the environmentalists will demand a
much higher price from the whalers than they would be willing to pay in the first scenario. One explanation for this
phenomena is that by assuming the environmentalists have the right to protect the whales, and the consequent right to sell
the hunting rights to the whales, the environmentalists have been made wealthier and more powerful. Thus, the demand
curve is shifted in favor of a higher price to hunt the whales. Consequently, under the second scenario, the whaling that
may have been economically efficient under the first scenario, may no longer be efficient. Id. at 99. Another explanation
for the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, may be that people tend to be attached to the status
quo and that change can only be purchased at a high price. Id. at 100.
58
FARBER, supra note 17 at 42.
59
Id., quoting MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT at 17 (1988).
Professor Cass Sunstein made this point eloquently, when he explained human character as being more than simply the acts
an individual chooses to do at any given point in time. See Id. at 54-55.
60
See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, note 12 at 60.
61
Nevertheless, economists do recognize that there is a difference between private consumer choices and environmental
benefits. Economists consider environmental benefits to be a public good. Public goods cannot be provided solely through
the marketplace because all members of the public benefit from the good and there is no way to charge all members of the
public for the benefit they receive. The classic example of a public good in the environmental context is clean air. All
members of the public breathe air, and thus, there is no way for a private enterprise to charge the public for the air it
breathes. Accordingly, there is no way for the private enterprise to benefit financially by ensuring its operations result in
clean air. In recent years, Professor Cass Sunstein has introduced a modified form of cost/benefit analysis, in which public
values rather than private preferences govern environmental decision-making. See FARBER, supra note 17 at 95 (describing
the proposal in CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 139 (1996) involving a two-stage decision-making
process. A traditional quantitative cost/benefit analysis would constitute the first stage. The second stage would take into
consideration other non-quantifiable values.). FARBER, supra note 17 at 95.
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First, consumers may not be fully informed of the environmental and health risks
associated with pesticide use. The time and thought that go into sorting out technical risk
assessment information may be more than the average consumer can, or desires to, commit.
Moreover, as described at length in this article, many of the risks of pesticides use are not well
understood, even by the experts. Thus, it would be unreasonable for consumers to be able to make
decisions on preliminary or confusing data that experts are having difficulty grappling with.
Moreover, the price of food treated with pesticides do not reflect the true cost of growing the food
because of a failure to internalize what economists refer to as negative externalities. For example,
the price of purchasing food treated with pesticides does not reflect the price that society may have
to pay later to clean-up pesticide contaminated sites, the long-term costs of society of the loss of
insect pollinators, or the long term costs to society of the development of pest resistance due to
overuse of pesticides. Moreover, the price of the food is artificially low due to numerous
government programs that encourage the use of chemical inputs in agriculture.62 While these
numerous and complex programs are far beyond the scope of this article, the fact that crop
subsidies, crop protection insurance and other government programs provide economic incentives
for using pesticides and economic disincentives for growing crops without chemical pesticides,
results in artificially low food prices, which in turn, results in consumers perhaps purchasing more
food grown with pesticides than they would in a pure market.63 Accordingly, in the agricultural
pesticide arena, as well as many other arenas, a cost/benefit analysis that relies on market costs and
benefits does not reflect consumers’ true preferences. Moreover, this example makes clear that the
assumptions upon which cots/benefit analyses are based, including perfect information, no
externalities, and a truly free market, deviate so far from reality that cost/benefit analysis, standing
alone, are an unreliable guide.
One controversial issue in the cost/benefit debate is whether environmental values are
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For a detailed discussion of government policies that encourage pesticide use, see Kenneth A. Dahlbert, Government
Policies that Encourage Pesticide Use in the United States, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND
ETHICS 281 (David Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, eds., 1993) (discussing a wide range of local, state, and federal programs
including price supports, incomes supports, farm credit programs, crop insurance programs, export policies, and tax
policies) See also David Pearce & Robert Tinch, The True Price of Pesticides in BUGS IN THE SYSTEM: REDESIGNING THE
PESTICIDE INDUSTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 50 (William Vorley & Dennis Kenney, eds. 1998).
63
Id. For a good summary of agricultural price supports, see Robert L. Thompson, Agricultural Price Supports in the
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, available at http://www.econlib.org//library/enc./Agricultural Price Supports.html
(last visited July 18, 2003).
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significant only to the extent that they can be translated into economic terms.64 Opponents of
cost/benefit analysis maintain that economists “price everything and value nothing.”

65

Cost/benefit analysts tend to limit their view of the benefits of environmental regulation to human
lives saved or cancers averted.66 The true benefits of environmental protection extend far beyond
counting the numbers of lives saved. For example, non-lethal human health effects, including
subchronic neurological, behavioral or reproductive effects are not well understood, not easily
quantified, and rarely included in any meaningful way in cost/benefit analyses.67 Moreover, as
described in detail below, ecological systems are not well understood by science and the value of
such systems is not readily quantified. Consequently, human disruptions to ecological systems are
rarely part of cost/benefit analyses. Further, ethical, religious, aesthetic and other normative
values of environmental protection are not typically included in cost/benefit analyses. Finally,
even those components of the cost/benefit analysis that are more easily monetized, such as the cost
of compliance with environmental regulations, are difficult to estimate. Frequently, regulatory
agencies are asked to take industry at its word,68 and often in retrospect, the true costs of
compliance are not as high as the pessimistic estimates of industry would suggest.69
Another concern often raised by opponents of strict cost/benefit analyses is that even when
costs and benefits are balanced in an overall sense, what is left out of the equation is who pays the
costs and who gets the benefits. In other words, if a disproportionate share of the costs are borne
by segments of the population who do not share proportionally in the benefits, is there truly a
balance of the costs and the benefits? Environmental risks tend to be disproportionately borne by
vulnerable populations – frequently people of color, low income and/or weak political power–
64

FARBER, supra note 17, at 35.
See generally, FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND
THE VALUE OF NOTHING (The New Press 2004). See also, DAVID PEIRCE & DOMINIC MORAN, THE ECONOMICS OF
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN CONSERVATION BIOLOGY FOR THE COMING DECADE (Chapman & Hall 1998).
66
FARBER, supra note 17 at 88. Cost/benefit analyses typically rely on the concept of “statistical lives” saved, because
under most risk assessments, it is virtually impossible to identify the actual person that would have died but for the
environmental regulation. Typically people value a statistical life less than an actual life. This is illustrated by the lengths
that people will go, and the money they are willing to spend to save a child who falls into a well, as compared to how much
society is willing to spend to save an anonymous statistical person. See e.g., SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 64.
In the ecological context, there are many examples of people going to great lengths to save a beached whale, while only
being willing to spend a significantly lesser amount to save the statistical dolphin from the shrimper’s net. It is even harder
to predict how much people will be willing to spend to protect a statistical ecological service.
67
FARBER, supra note 17 at 88.
68
Id. at 90.
69
FARBER, supra note 17 at 167-68.
65
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who do not share in the benefits gained by industrial pursuits.70 The benefits of development and
industry typically go the advantaged segments of society who typically do not bear a great portion
of the risks resulting from such activities. Environmental Justice71 proponents point out that
cost/benefit analyses and other market-based systems can lead to the creation of risk “hot spots,”
where overall the cost/benefit analysis may weigh in favor of an activity going forward, but within
a given segment of society, typically economically and politically disadvantaged populations, the
cost/benefit analysis weighs in the opposite direction – i.e., hot spots of risk with very little
benefit. Accordingly, proponents of Environmental Justice reject strict cost/benefit analyses.72
A similar argument can be made with regard to ecological resources. Risk hot spots may
emerge in situations where, overall the cost/benefit analysis weighs in favor of allowing a
pesticide to be used, but in a particular geographic area, or with a particular species or ecosystem,
risk may be disproportionately high. This may occur with regard to sensitive species, including
threatened or endangered species, or with ecosystems with low resistance and or low resilience.
One example of such a risk hot spot is the global amphibian crisis, in which pesticides are
implicated.73 Although the cost/benefit analysis for a particular pesticide may reflect that the
benefits outweigh the costs overall, this does nothing to protect the highly sensitive and highly
vulnerable amphibian populations.74
70

See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND
REGULATION (Carolina Academic Press 2003).
71
Although a detailed consideration of Environmental Justice is beyond the scope of this article, it is a compelling issue in
environmental policy, and it provides one example of how cost/benefit analysis does not adequately address ethical, moral
or fairness issues that cannot be monetized. For an excellent discussion of how market-based approaches disproportionately
impact vulnerable populations see Id. at 33-37.
72
Proponents of cost/benefit analysis counter this argument by pointing out that segments of society that are disadvantaged
will not necessarily be better off under an inefficient system. However, Environmental Justice advocates do not argue in
favor of inefficiency for inefficiency’s sake, but rather they are willing to tolerate some level of economic inefficiency to
accomplish other important societal goals such as fairness.
73
See Carlos Davidson, et al., Spatial Tests of the Pesticide Drift, Habitat Destruction, UV-B, and Climate-Change
Hypotheses for California Amphibian Declines, 16 CONS. BIOL. 1588 (2002).
74
Moreover, the amendment of FIFRA by the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act to include a “safety” standard for human
food consumption may have resulted in a shift of risk away from food consumers to occupational workers and ecological
resources. For example, organophosphate pesticides degrade quickly into benign breakdown products in the environment
and on agricultural food products. Thus, the FQPA standard of “safety” for human food consumers may favor the use of
organophosphate pesticides over other pesticides that do not break down as quickly, and thus leave residue on foods.
However, as described above, organophosphates are highly acutely toxic to humans, other mammals, and birds and have
been implicated in thousands of bird deaths. Accordingly, relying more heavily on organophosphates to meet the FQPA
standard, while reducing risks to food consumers, may result in significantly increased risk to vulnerable farm worker
populations and to ecological resources. The risk to farmworkers for pesticide exposure is extremely high. Ivette Perfecto
& Baldemar Velasquez, Farmworkers: Among the Least Protected, in Rechtshaffen & Gauna, supra note 70, at 67-68.
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Finally, the values inherent in ecological integrity or biodiversity are particularly ill suited
to be reduced to a dollar value.75 Of course many ecological products and services have
instrumental value. Although, many species in nature can be eaten, made into medications, made
into clothing or shelter, burned for fuel or otherwise used in a market-based economy,76 what is
considerably more difficult to value are the aesthetic, inspirational, religious or spiritual reasons
that many people value ecosystems.77 And perhaps even more challenging is attempting to reduce
to dollars and cents the value that species have as members of ecosystems. For example, species
in an ecosystem may serve important roles as producers, consumers, decomposers, competitors,
dispersers, or pollinators.78 Each of these roles provides value to other members of the ecosystem,
including humans.79 Another concern with the strict cost/benefit approach is that the lack of
knowledge and uncertainty regarding biological systems, argues in favor of a cautious approach to
the cost/benefits analysis. Our current limited understanding of ecological systems and inadequate
methodologies for monetizing values, limit the ability of cost/benefit analyses to be sufficiently
precise to control environmental decision-making.80
In sum, the shortcomings of cost/benefit analysis are numerous. First, current data and
methodologies are not adequate for accurate and precise analyses. Second, cost/benefit analyses
do not adequately address ecological values, community values and other normative
considerations. It is impossible to reduce such values to monetary terms. Finally, far from being
value-neutral, cost/benefit analyses are laden with biases in favor of those who seek to use
resources and away from those who seek to protect resources. Accordingly, Eco-pragmatism
rejects the notion that cost/benefit analyses should control environmental decision-making.
Nevertheless, economic analyses are considered to be useful factors to inform environmental
Because the cast majority of farmworkers are minorities – primarily Latinos – theses risks raise significant environmental
Justice concerns. Id.
75
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 543.
76
HUNTER, supra note 30, at 43.
77
Id. Noted zoologist E.O. Wilson has coined the term “biophilia” to describe the deep emotional and spiritual relationship
that many people share with other living organisms and the related sense of awe that frequently accompanies experience
with the natural world. See generally, E.O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND WITH OTHER SPECIES (1984).
78
HUNTER, supra note 30, at 52.
79
Id. at 52.
80
FARBER, supra note 17 at 42. Farber estimated the costs and benefits of a number of environmental regulations from
1988 and determined that the costs ranged from 55 to 77 billion and the benefits ranged from 16 to 135 billion dollars. Id.
At 167-68. Thus, he concludes, the return on every dollar spent ranged between 21 cents and $2.27. Id. As Farber puts it
“we were either losing 80 percent of our investment or a more than doubling our money and we don’t know which!” Id. at
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decision- makers.81 In other words, cost/benefit analysis should assist rather than control
environmental decision-making.82
b. The Eco-Pragmatic Response: Embracing Feasibility
In contrast to strict cost/benefit approaches, eco-pragmatism attempts to grapple with the
complexities and lack of understanding of species and ecosystem values. Eco-pragmatism also
recognizes that, in the real world, public policy decision-making must occur within certain
unavoidable constraints. Accordingly, one of the foundations of pragmatism is a rejection of
comprehensive rationality in favor of bounded rationality.83 In a perfect world with perfect
scientific data on ecological risks and perfect cost/benefit methodologies that adequately value all
costs and benefits, a cost/benefit approach may be compelling. However, with the complexity
pervasive in ecological systems, the dearth of good data and the confused state of cost/benefit
methodology, all coupled with the need to act now, the pragmatist must find another way. The
pragmatist will look to what has worked best in the experience of environmental law to date, and
what has worked best is at least arguably, technology-based approaches.
All but the most staunch proponents of cost/benefit analysis seem to recognize that
cost/benefit analysis involves so many assumptions, judgment calls, values and unquantifiable
factors, that it is overly simplistic to view cost/benefit analysis as a clear-cut quantifiable test,
where all one has to do is plug the numbers in and the “right” answer comes out.84 Eco-pragmatic
theory recognizes that there are many ethical considerations that go beyond mere economic
efficiency that must be taken into account in making environmental decisions.85
For all of the reasons discussed above, eco-pragmatism rejects pure risk-based approaches
168.
81
FARBER, supra note 17 at 9; see also, SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 63.
82
Ruhl, supra note 15 at 538.
83
Bounded rationality recognizes that institutions that make policy decisions do not have complete information or
unlimited time so as to enable them to make some theoretically optimal choice in every case. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 12 at 23. The reality is that all institutional decision-making is “bounded” by limited time, limited costs and
limited information. Id. If these bounds did not exist, arguably cost/benefit analysis would be able to provide optimal
choices. Pragmatism does not ignore the existence of such bounds, but instead accepts these constraints and recognizes that
decision-making must take them into account, and adapt as new information becomes available.
84
FARBER, supra note 17 at 94. Although economists are quite adept at providing simplified examples of how market
efficiencies work in theory, for every clever example described by an economist, one can find an equally clever examples
highlighting the shortcomings of pure market efficiencies in the environmental arena describe by proponents of risk-based
approaches.
85
Id. at 9. As Shapiro and Glicksman have put it, we should be trying to do better than simply attempting to “achieve the
‘optimal’ level of injury, death or environmental destruction.” SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 21, 50.
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and cost/benefit analysis in favor of a hybrid approach based on the concept of feasibility.86 Under
the hybrid approach, environmental risks are reduced to the amount feasible and cost/benefit
analysis is used to assist, rather that control decision-making.87 This type of approach has been
described as “doing the best that we can.”88 In other words, while the goal is environmental risk
reduction, there is recognition that at some point the costs of further risk reduction become too
high to justify. Pragmatic risk regulation attempts to reconcile conflicting values by “striving to
achieve the maximum level of protection consistent with reasonable costs.” 89
Although there has been extensive debate in the academic world over the appropriateness
of utilizing a cost/benefit analyses or pure risk based approaches in environmental regulation, the
truth is that for the most part, Congress has rejected both pure risk-based and cost/benefit
standards and most of the substantial environmental regulatory programs involve “hybrid”
standards – i.e., risk based standard that take economic considerations into account but do not
require strict cost/benefit balancing. Professors Shapiro and Glicksman have surveyed existing
environmental regulatory statutes to determine which contain cost/benefit standards, which contain
feasibility standards, and which are pure risk-based. Their work demonstrates that the majority of
existing statutes contain standards that require risk to be avoided to the extent feasible or to the
extent that the best available technology can achieve. Accordingly, these statutes are referred to as
technology-based statutes. The most common examples of environmental statutes that utilize
technology-based standards include the Clean Water Act 90 and the Clean Air Act.91 While these
standards take costs into account, they are not cost/benefit balancing standards.
Shapiro and Glicksman describe constrained balancing as regulation whereby the
legislature establishes a level of environmental protection to be achieved by identifying regulatory
objectives based on some model technology.92 In this way, costs are considered in choosing an
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Farber has defined feasibility as where costs are “not grossly disproportionate to the benefits to be achieved.” FARBER,
supra note 17 at 94.
87
Id. at 122-123.
88
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 22, 50.
89
Id. at 147.
90
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (setting forth technology-based standards for point sources of water pollution).
91
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1) (specifying that existing stationary sources of air pollution in nonattainment areas
implement all “reasonable available control technology”).
92
Id. at 37.
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appropriate technology as the model, but costs are not directly weighed against benefits.93 This
approach is what is commonly referred to as “technology based”94 standard setting and is also
what Farber refers to as feasibility based decision-making. Under constrained balancing or

93

Id. at 37. Examples of this type of approach include: the Clean Air Act’s requirement for non-attainment areas that
existing stationary sources implement all “reasonably available control technology” as expeditiously as practicable, 42
U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1), the requirement of the Safe Drinking Water Act that EPA establish maximum contaminant levels as
close as feasible to achieving the level at which no known or anticipated health effects will occur. 42 U.S.C. § 300g1(b)(4).
94
Technology-based standards are credited with much of the pollution reduction that has occurred since the environmental
movement of the 1960s and 1970s. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. Ill. L.
Rev 83, 85 (2000). Technology-based standards are the dominant mode of controlling the amount of pollution released in
to the environment in the US. Id. at 88. These standards typically are developed by EPA in response to a Congressional
mandate for EPA to establish pollution limitations based on some prescribed standard such as the “best available
technology.” Id. at 89. Once Congress has mandated the use of a particular technology-based standard, EPA will conduct
a review of currently available technologies for specific industrial sectors and chooses the technology that best fulfills the
Congressionally-prescribed standard. Id. Typically, the specific technology chosen is not required to be employed.
Instead, EPA determines the level of pollution control that can be achieved using the chosen standard. Id. Industry is then
free to utilize any technology it chooses that complies with the numerical standard. Id. Accordingly, industry has an
incentive to develop the most efficient technology to meet the numerical standard. One drawback to using feasibility as a
standard is that feasibility will vary with the economic strength of the industry. FARBER, supra note 17 at 83. For example,
it may be feasible for a strong manufacturing sector may be able to install costly pollution control technology, while it may
be completely infeasible for a weak sector of the economy to install the same technology. As a result, more economically
successful industries are penalized for their success with the imposition of stricter rules that do not apply to less successful
industries. Id. Many justifications have been expressed for using technology based approaches to environmental protection.
These approaches tend to better address non-economic values, while still taking economic concerns into account. See
SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43 at 65. In addition, feasibility-based approaches recognize and account for bounded
rationality See id. at 65. See also, note 83 and accompanying text. A feasibility standard is pragmatic in the sense that it is
consistent with widely-shared beliefs that environmental protection is important to society. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 12 at 21. Feasibility approaches tend to prod industry toward environmental risk reduction, until the point is reached
where additional protection would be technologically or economically infeasible. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 537.
Moreover, some commentators maintain that technology based standards are the best standards available because we do
not have enough data to conduct true cost/benefit analyses for most environmental decisions Adam Babich, Too Much
Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119 (2003). Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, technology
based approaches have worked well in our thirty year history of environmental law implementation. See generally, Wagner,
supra. After conducting an extensive analysis of the role of technology-based standards in environmental law over the past
thirty years, Professor Wendy Wagner concludes that technology-based approaches are one of the most important
innovations in environmental law. Id. at 86. Wagner also lauds technology-based standards for being relatively easy to
promulgate, readily enforceable, even-handed, adaptable and efficient. Id. at 94-105 (finding that the rate of promulgation
for technology-based standards outpaces other standards from three to ten times and describing how technology-based
standards apply equally to all members of the regulated industry within a given category). Wagner explains that
technology-based standards are easily enforceable because the numerical level of pollution allowed is clearly prescribed by
rule. Id. Once emissions or discharges are sampled for pollutants, regulated entities either meet the numerical standard or
they do not. Id. How they choose to meet the standard is irrelevant. For the same reason, technology-based standards are
very predictable. Id. Regulated entities can readily determine what numerical standards they are expected to comply with
by looking at the EPA rule for that industry category. Id. at 100. See also, THOMAS O. MCGARITY, MEDIA, QUALITY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND COST/BENEFIT BALANCING STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159-199, N. 194 (1983). Wagner demonstrates that technology-based standards generally are very
efficient. See generally Wagner, supra. She also asserts that technology-based standards create incentives for regulated
interests to develop more efficient technologies. Id. Wagner describes technology-based approaches as fulfilling a moral
imperative for industry to “do the best it can” to reduce environmental harm. Id. at 92.
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feasibility approaches, risk reduction is sought to the point that additional reduction would result
in extraordinary or disproportionate costs.95
Shapiro and Glicksman refer to the second category of balancing approaches as “openended balancing,” which they describe as a type of balancing whereby the legislature prescribes
the factors that the agency must consider in making a decision, but does not dictate the weight the
agency must give to any particular factor.96 Interestingly, Shapiro and Glicksman describe FIFRA
as an open-ended balancing statute. And while it is true that a facial reading of the statutory
standard of “unreasonable affects effects” would lead one to believe that it is indeed an openended balancing statute, whereby the agency has been directed to consider a variety of risk and
benefit factors, but has not been directed as to how to weigh such factors, in practice, FIFRA has
been interpreted and applied by EPA as being a cost/benefit balancing statute whereby for a
pesticide to be registered its benefits must outweigh its costs. This interpretation has been
articulated in agency orders97 and upheld in many judicial decisions.98 Thus, despite the
significance of pesticides in the development of environmental law, FIFRA virtually stands alone
in its cost/benefit approach to environmental protection.99
3. The Necessity of a Baseline
One of the most significant concepts in Farber’s work on eco-pragmatism is the idea of
starting with an environmental baseline. Farber argues that there must be some overarching
principle to help guide decision-making and to serve as a “tie-breaker” in the close cases.100
Farber posits that environmental risks should be reduced to the extent feasible and that the
environmental baseline should be protected except in the case where the costs of protecting the
baseline” are grossly disproportionate to the benefits.”101 Eco-pragmatism’s baseline starts with a
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SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 52.
Id. at 39. .
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In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2,
1972).
98
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594 (1971).
99
The only other major environmental statute that employs a strict cost/benefit balancing approach is TSCA Section 6, 15
U.S.C. § 2605, which has been rendered impotent by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decisions in Corrosion Proof Fittings
v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991) (holding that EPA did not have a reasonable basis to conclude that asbestos presents
an unreasonable risk and that EPA failed to choose the least burdensome alternative to protect against such risk).
100
FARBER, supra note 17 at 93, 104.
101
Id. at 12.
96
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presumption in favor of the environment.102 However, Farber does not provide a comprehensive
explanation of what the baseline should be. Ecological principles can be used to assist in
developing an appropriate baseline.
Farber’s primary justification for starting with an environmental baseline is the long-term
commitment to environmental protection in the US.103 Farber posits that there is a general
recognition that nature has inherent value that goes far beyond the purely utilitarian uses of nature
for human purposes.104 Another justification for the environmental baseline is the limited scientific
understanding, enormous data gaps, complexity and uncertainty of environmental issues.105
Without a full understanding of the complex issues involved, prudence suggests a presumption in
favor of environmental protection. Consequently, environmental law should take a stance in favor
of environmental protection instead of attempting to be neutral. Under eco-pragmatism, there is a
presumption in favor of environmental protection, but the presumption can be rebutted where the
costs of protecting the baseline are disproportionately large.106
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Ruhl, supra note 15 at 537. As Farber explains, for any environmental regulatory scheme, there are at least three
possible baselines that could be employed. FARBER, supra note 17 at 103. The first such baseline would be a neutral
baseline in which there is neither a presumption in favor of the environmental nor one in favor of industrial/economic
pursuits. Id. at 103. The second such baseline in one that holds a presumption in favor of industrial/economic pursuits.
Under this baseline, regulated interests begin with a presumptive entitlement. Id. The third such baseline is one in which
the presumptive entitlement is assigned to those who stand to benefit from the regulatory program. Id. In other words,
under the third baseline, there is a presumption in favor of environmental protection. Farber asserts that the environmental
baseline is the appropriate baseline to use.
103
Id. at 94 . Farber has been criticized for overstating the public commitment to environmental protection. See Paul
Boudreaux, Costs, Benefits and Values: A Review of Daniel A. Farber’s Eco-Pragmatism, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 148
(1999) (asserting that Farber has “overstretched” and that although Americans like to label themselves as environmentalists,
the depth of their commitment is unclear). Nevertheless, there are numerous surveys and studies that consistency
demonstrate the existence of such a commitment. For a general discussion of American environmental values and public
opinion surveys regarding such values, see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER AND
JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (4th ed. Aspen 2003). One recent study
conducted by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, indicates that most Americans are seriously concerned
about the country’s environmental health and want more attention paid to environmental problems. This survey also
suggests that most Americans, whether they be Democrat, Republican or Independent, are as concerned with problems of
air pollution and toxic contamination of soil and water as they are with issues of jobs and the cost of gas. See The
Environmental Deficit: Survey on American Attitudes on the Environment, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy,
Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (May 2004).
104
Moreover, to the extent to which nature provides utility, it is a public good that should not be frivolously plundered to
benefit a few. FARBER, supra note 17 at 108-109.
105
Id. at 12.
106
Id. Although beyond the scope of this article, Farber also asserts that the ecological baseline should be adopted by the
judicial system as canon of statutory interpretation, which he refers to as a “green canon.” Id. at 124. Farber looks to
legislative intent, as well as to the more formalistic view of the statutory mandate of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (2004), for the government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy to achieve certain prescribed environmental goals, as bases for his green cannon. Id. at
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Deciding to establish an “environmental baseline,” raises the issue of what is an
environmental baseline, particularly in the area of ecological protection. Is the environmental
baseline a zero-risk baseline, or is some other measure of environmental protection more
appropriate? Farber does not attempt to answer this question. In the area of ecological protection,
establishing an environmental baseline takes on additional complexity beyond that of human
health protection.107 This article proposes the use of the maintenance of ecological integrity as an
environmental baseline. One significant component of ecological integrity is biodiversity – a
measure of species abundance and richness used by ecologists to assess the health of
ecosystems.108 In addition to having considerable scientific justification for protecting biological
diversity, it is important to keep in mind that the protection of biodiversity is mandated under
international law. The 1992 United Nations Environment Programme Convention on Biological
Diversity109 first created the international obligation to protect biodiversity. However, although
the United States is a signatory to the Convention, the convention has not been ratified, and
therefore, the United States is not formally bound by it. Nevertheless, Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a State that has signed a Treaty must refrain from
“acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.110 Accordingly, the United States
arguably is prohibited from taking any action that would defeat the purpose of the 1992
Convention to Protect Biological Diversity.
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Accordingly, there is at least some basis in

international law for arguing that the United States is obligated to have in effect programs that
conserve biological diversity.
Support for an ecological integrity baseline also exists in U.S. domestic law. A number of
124-127.
107
For example, in human health protection, a “no carcinogenicity” baseline could be established. Alternatively, a de
minimis risk baseline could be established (e.g., a baseline of one cancer death per million). Other approaches could
include establishing a baseline that is no greater than the risk from ambient pollutant levels. In the ecological arena,
however, the issues are more complex.
108
Professor Fred Bosselman has published a comprehensive analysis of scientific issues that biologists recognize as
inherent in the concept of “biodiversity.” He maintains that the term “biodiversity” lacks the precision needed for a
workable legal standard and sets out to provide a series of example to illustrate the various approaches that the law could
take to address these scientific issues. Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 354 (2004).
109
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. 20 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
110
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
111
Moreover, as Professor Daniel Tarlock has pointed out, Chapter 15 of Agenda 21, which was approved by the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, obligates States to develop strategies to conserve biodiversity and
for the sustainable use of biological resources A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation in the United States: A Case
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statutes express goals and policies directed toward maintenance of ecological integrity. For
example, the Clean Water Act provides the broad environmental objective “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.”112 Perhaps the strongest
support for such a baseline, however, can be found in the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).113 In particular, section 101 of NEPA provides, among other things that it is the
continuing policy of the U.S. to “create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony. . .”114
While biodiversity certainly is an important indicator of ecosystem health, ecosystem
health also relies on the integrity of the physical and chemical components of such systems, as
well as the relationship between species and the physical world. Of course, one measure of
ecological integrity is the presence of a diversity of species. Nevertheless, not all species within
an ecosystem provide the same level of value to the other members of the ecosystem.
Conservation biologists have identified certain types of species that provide greater value to
ecosystems, and accordingly should be afforded greater protection. One such type of species,
known as the “controller species,” plays a major role in controlling the movement of energy and
Study in Incompleteness and Indirection, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 10529 (2002).
112
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2004). See also, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2004)( expressing one of the objectives of the Clean Air Act
as being to protect the public health and welfare from adverse effects of air pollution). For further discussion of U.S.
authorities that support an ecological integrity baseline, see also BROOKS, supra note 29; Robert L. Fischman, Biological
Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 Envtl. L. 435 (1992). In addition to the specific
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989 (2004) (analyzing the National Wildlife Refuge mandate “to ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health of the (Refuge) System are maintained.”); and Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity
Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53 (1998) (arguing that ecological integrity should be a
guiding principle by which legislatures, courts and administrative agencies, interpret, and apply property rules).
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NEPA as an environmental baseline which can inform statutory interpretation, see generally, Mary Jane Angelo, Crouching
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UNWELCOME JUDICIAL CLIMATE (Michael Wolf, ed., 2005).
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nutrients within an ecosystem.115 Another type of species of special importance is known as the
“keystone species.” These species provide more value to the ecosystem than would be predicted
by their abundance in the ecosystem.116 Some conservation biologists believe that the extinction
of a keystone species has the potential to result in a domino effect, whereby numerous species go
extinct and the entire ecosystem is drastically altered.117 “Umbrella species” are species that
typically have very large home territories, such that protecting a keystones species habitat will
have the effect of protecting many other species as well.118 Finally, species that are very sensitive
to pollutants and other environmental stresses, such that the health of these populations serves as a
good indicator of overall ecological health, are known as “indicator species.”119 Of course, while
certain types of species such as controller species and keystone species may warrant greater
protection, due to our extremely limited understanding of the workings of ecological systems, it
would be imprudent not to assume that every component of an ecosystem has some value unless
proven otherwise.120
Both individual species and ecosystems exhibit a wide range of resilience to man-induced
changes.121 Because of the dramatic differences between species and between ecosystems and
because so little is understood about the ability of a particular species or particular ecosystem to
tolerate or bounce-back after damage from human activities, it is very difficult to determine
whether a particular change will result in significant habitat destruction.122 While it may be a
gross overstatement to say that all ecosystems are so delicate and intricate that removing one part
will necessary cause the demise of the entire system, it is not an overstatement that removing one
species from an ecosystem can negatively impact other species and, in the words of Princeton
conservation biologist, David Wilcove, “there is no way of knowing ahead of time where the chain
reaction will end.” 123
115

Controller species typically include decomposer species. HUNTER, supra note 30, at 52.
One commonly cited example of a keystone species is the red-cockaded woodpecker, which excavates cavities in living
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Moving beyond protection of individual species, even those of particular ecological import,
the protection of ecosystem124 diversity is crucial to the maintenance of overall ecological
integrity. Ecosystems themselves provide numerous services,125 some of which are easily
quantifiable, and others of which are not. As Professor Laura Westra has stated “[h]uman survival
depends on many of nature’s ‘goods and services’ that are invisible to markets and the economy;
some are no doubt invisible to scientists.”126 Natural resource economists have identified
numerous ecosystem services that, if humans had to replace them, would be extremely expensive,
if not technically infeasible. If fact, the value of global ecosystem services has been estimated at
33 trillion dollars.127 Of course, as with individual species, our lack of understanding of the
workings of these complex systems leaves open the very likely possibility that ecosystems perform
many other valuable services that we do not yet fully understand or that we are not yet able to
quantify.
Because ecology encompasses the relationships between the physical, the chemical and the
biological, ecological integrity necessarily includes physical integrity, chemical integrity and
biological integrity. To fully address ecological integrity, a variety of indicators of ecosystem
health must be considered including not only the number of organisms or species, or the status of
threatened or endangered species, but also the state of physical, chemical, and biological processes
which, together with biological considerations, comprise ecological integrity. Ecological integrity
can be measured by starting with a baseline condition found “at a site with a biota that is the
product of evolutionary and biogeographic processes in the relative absence of the effects of
modern human activity.”
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Then existing or predicted conditions can be compared to this

baseline to measure the extent of deviation. Numerous attempts have been made by scholars of
conservation biology to define qualitatively, if not quantitatively, biological or ecological
124

An ecosystem is defined as a group of interacting organisms, or a community, and the physical environment they
inhabit a particular point in time. HUNTER, supra note 30, at 62.
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One example of an ecosystem service is a wetland (a type of ecosystem) serving as a filter to treat water supplies.
HUNTER, supra note 30, at 69. Other examples include beach dunes buffering upland properties from the effects of storms,
and saltmarshes supporting fisheries, air purification, soil renewal, climate stabilization, and crop pollination. Id. at 69; see
also, J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 544 (citing NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)).
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integrity. For example, James R. Karr has developed an index of biological integrity (IBI) to
address the objective articulated in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2004), “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations Waters.”129
Whatever metrics are employed to evaluate whether an environmental regulatory program
preserves ecological integrity, some system of measurement is needed to take into account
diversity, health of significant species, and integrity of the physical and chemical world. By
clarifying that ecological integrity will serve as the environmental baseline in eco-Pragmatism, a
clear reference point can be established to which ecological changes of proposed man-induced
activities can be measured against. Accordingly, whenever an environmental regulation or other
risk reduction measure is proposed, an evaluation of the regulation will start with the presumption
that the regulation must be sufficient not to completely preserve the status quo, but to maintain
ecological integrity. Then the proposal can be evaluated to determine whether it will accomplish
the goal of maintaining ecological integrity.
4. Lack of Information and Changing Information
The fourth question sought to be answered by eco-pragmatism is, because our
understanding of environmental issues continues to evolve as new information becomes available,
how do we know when to proceed in the face of imperfect information and when to wait for better
information before taking action. This question raises the related issues of whether precautionary
approaches should be used in environmental decision-making and how to incorporate adaptive
management ideas into environmental laws.
The lack of scientific understanding of natural systems overshadows the entire
environmental decision-making process.130 The limited ability for science to provide clear
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Westra, supra note 126, at 23.
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answers to environmental questions, has been on ongoing problem in environmental law.131 As
Justice Breyer has described, there is scientific uncertainty involved in every stage of any risk
assessment. Thus, if there are ten independent steps in a risk analysis and each step involves an
uncertainty factor of two, the estimate of the total risk has an uncertainty factor of one thousand.132
Even beyond the complex field of risk assessment, uncertainty pervades virtually all
environmental decision-making.133 The regulated community has taken full advantage of this
scientific uncertainty.

Decisions to regulate, they assert, should wait until science can

conclusively demonstrate the need for such regulation.134 Of course, using a lack of certainty as an
excuse not to act can result in serious, and sometimes irreparable, environmental consequences.
Our very limited understanding of environmental issues, coupled with the complexity of
ecological systems, suggests a basis for proceeding cautiously when deciding whether to allow
potentially risky activities to occur. The precautionary principle, which has been adopted by a
variety of international environmental agreements,135 is one approach to proceeding cautiously.
The precautionary principle resolves doubts in favor of the environment.136
The precautionary principle recognizes that as predictions are made further out in time,
uncertainty tends to increase. Moreover, the precautionary principle takes into account the fact
that inherent in any scientific evaluation is the opportunity for scientific error to occur.137
Opponents of the precautionary principle contend that it is based on vague and baseless fears
regarding environmental risks. But, the same could be said to argue for a precautionary approach.
131
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Often the costs of regulation are based on vague and baseless fears about the potential economic
consequences of regulation, dire predictions of which rarely come true.138
Farber emphasizes the need to proceed cautiously. He maintains that when environmental
risks are still uncertain, we should take reasonable precautions. There are times when it is
necessary to make difficult regulatory decisions with very incomplete or inconclusive data.139 It
may not be prudent to wait until complete or conclusive data are available.

For many

environmental decisions, a decision to wait is a decision to irreversibly impact a resource. Such is
the case with a decision to withhold regulatory action on the protection of an endangered species
due to incomplete information. By the time complete information becomes available, the species
may be extinct or beyond recovery.
As described above, scientific uncertainty perhaps is even more profound in assessing risks
to ecological systems than in assessing human health risks.140 Once again, the incorporation of
ecological principles into eco-pragmatism lends further support to the theory. Moreover, with
regard to ecological issues, flexible and adaptive approaches are even more critical than with
human health concerns. The science of understanding how species and ecosystems work and how
human disruptions may impact them is still in its infancy.141 During the early years of ecology we
believed that natural systems were stable and that ecosystems evolved in a predetermined set of
stages (known as succession) toward a stable “climax community.”142 In the past twenty five
years, the paradigm that ecosystems exist in a state of equilibrium has been replaced with the more
complex nonequiblirium paradigm.143 In recent years, ecological science has discovered that
natural system have multiple persistent states and multiple “successional pathways.”144 Thus, the
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current paradigm rejects the “balance of nature” paradigm.145 To capture this concept, Professor
Judy Meyer has coined the phrase “dance of nature” to replace the outdated “balance of nature.”146
Ecologists also began to realize that natural systems are periodically and continually
disturbed by natural phenomena such as fire, flood, drought, and disease and pest outbreak, as well
as by similar types of disturbances resulting from human activity.147 Consequently, human
disturbances are not necessarily “bad” for natural systems.148 The goal for environmental
protection, thus, should not be to suppress all human-caused disturbances, but rather to prevent
human-caused disturbances that are not in line with the natural disturbance regime of the
ecosystem.149 To be able to proceed consistently with natural disturbance regimes, therefore,
requires knowledge of the historical record of an ecosystem.150 Unfortunately, this type of long
term historical monitoring data rarely is available.
The non-equilibrium paradigm, however, should not lull us into believing that, because
ecosystems naturally experience change, all anthropogenic change is acceptable.151
Anthropogenic changes frequently differ from natural changes in character, magnitude and
frequency.152 Moreover, natural systems frequently react to anthropogenic disturbances in
completely unpredictable ways.153 Even very small disturbances can “‘flip’ ecosystems into vastly
different behavioral states, sometimes well after the event that started the reaction.”154 Thus, as
Meyer concludes, ‘[a]nthropogenic change is acceptable only if that change is within limits.”155
The limits depend on the specifics of the ecosystems and its ability to keep pace with the changes
that occur.156
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In addition to precautionary approaches, eco-pragmatism argues in favor of developing
flexible regulatory systems that allow decisions to be modified as additional information becomes
available.157 One of the most significant aspects of pragmatism in general is the recognition that
the combination of limited information and an ever changing society cannot tolerate static
decision-making. Instead, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that as new information
becomes available or as society’s values evolve, the law must be able to adapt incrementally and
accordingly.158 Thus, eco-pragmatism suggests that environmental laws must have mechanisms
built into them to allow regulatory agencies to make incremental adjustment to regulation to take
into account new information, as well as to correct old mistakes.159 Under the existing regulatory
system, agencies such as EPA tend to be so concerned with making the “right” decision up front,
that any lack of information or controversy tends to paralyze them. Instead, a pragmatic approach
would favor agencies to make the best decision they have available based on the best information
currently available with a corresponding recognition that such decisions will need to be adjusted
over time.160 Of course, one of the reasons that agency’s are so concerned with making the perfect
decision on the front end is that under the existing regulatory system, it is generally extremely

effect. In ecological terms, “resistance” is the degree to which a ecosystem changes in response to a disturbance whereas
“resilience” is the degree to which an ecosystem recovers after it has been disturbed. HUNTER, supra note 30, at 74. Thus,
while not all human disturbance is detrimental to ecosystems, it is the frequency of the disturbance, the magnitude of the
disturbance and the nature of the disturbance that determine whether there will be long term negative effects on the
ecosystem. Meyer, supra note 27, at 882. Ecosystems tend to respond better to human disturbances that mimic those that
occur in nature. In addition, the overall health of an ecosystem will determine how well the ecosystem will respond to
disturbances. For example, species-rich areas may be both more resistant and more resilient to human disturbances than
ecosystems that do not possess a great abundance and diversity of species. HUNTER, supra note 30, at 86-91. It is well
established that genetic variability within a species improves the likelihood that the species will survive and evolve in
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diversity may cause problems even in ecosystems that are not experiencing change. For example, genetically uniform
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with the lack of genetic diversity in many zoos. HUNTER, supra note 30, at 88. Likewise, ecosystems that have not be
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difficult and time-consuming to change course in mid-stream.161
The inherent complexity and unpredictability of natural systems,162 coupled with our
limited scientific understanding of such systems has led to the ground-breaking development in the
field of conservation biology of adaptive management.163 Adaptive management was developed in
the context of natural resource management.164 Nevertheless, to date, it has not been used widely
in environmental regulation.165 Adaptive management requires both a willingness to make
environmental policy decisions even with limited scientific information, and the recognition that
such decision must be continually monitored and evaluated and adjusted as new information or
changed circumstances warrant.166
More flexible regulatory systems are needed to adapt to change or as new information
becomes available. In addition, more emphasis must be put on acquiring necessary data through
monitoring outcomes of environmental decisions. Based on information of the effects of a
particular regulatory action acquired through monitoring programs, adjustments to can be made to
produce better, more science-based, regulations.167 Eco-pragmatism calls for a more experimental
approach to regulation – i.e., in which regulatory actions are implemented, monitored and adjusted
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based on the results of the monitoring.168
The difficulties with these types of flexible or adaptive schemes is that neither the law, nor
the regulatory agencies that implement it, are quick reactors to change. Eco-pragmatism attempts
to address this problem by proposing more decentralized approaches, whereby decisions can be
modified on a local level and smaller scale more quickly to adapt to new information than could be
accomplished in a large centralized system.169 A decentralized system tends to be more flexible
and to respond more quickly to new information.170

One mechanism for accomplishing

decentralization is through a devolution of regulatory responsibility to state and local
governments. However, although there are certain advantages to localized decision-making,
delegation to too much authority to states or local governments could result in a “race to the
bottom.”171

Thus, safeguards are necessary to prevent a disintegration of environmental

protection. Such safeguards could include national minimum standards and national oversight of
state regulation.172
In sum, eco-pragmatism provides a useful framework for environmental decision-making.
Many of the shortcomings of eco-pragmatism can be overcome by consciously integrating it with
principles of ecological science. An eco-pragmatic evaluation of pesticide law must start with an
understanding of the history of pesticide use and the ecological risks posed by pesticides.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE PESTICIDE/ECOLOGY RELATIONSHIP
A. History of Pesticide Use
Scientists believe that pesticides have been used by humans for over two thousand years.173
Although metals, such as arsenic lead and copper were used as pesticides extensively in the early
168
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20th Century, most pest control up until that time was accomplished by means of cultural controls,
such as cultivation, 174 sanitation, 175 crop rotation,176 and sowing and harvesting practices.177 It
was not until the latter half of the 20th century that the development of synthetic chemical
pesticides led to an explosion of global pesticide use.178 Because these new synthetic chemical
pesticides were spectacularly effective at controlling a wide variety of pests, they quickly gained
favor and, before long, were ubiquitous. Estimates of global pesticide use are staggering. More
than 1600 types of pesticides are currently available.179 More than five billion pounds of
pesticides, with a value of over 30 billion dollars, are used annually in the world.180 Pesticide use
in the United States accounts for 27 percent of global pesticide usage, with U.S. exports to other
countries exceeding 450 million pounds of pesticides per year.181
The rapid worldwide adoption of synthetic chemical pesticides began during World War II,
with the development of two primary categories of chemical insecticides, the organochlorines and
the organophosphates. The organochlorines, which include the notorious pesticide, DDT,182 were
first considered to be highly desirable because, while they are very toxic to a broad range of
174
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invertebrates, they are not highly acutely toxic to humans or other mammals.183 These pesticides
also are extremely persistent in the environment, which makes them highly effective for long-term
effective pest control. However, their persistence in the environment became their downfall when
the long-term ecological consequences of these pesticides became apparent. Organochlorine
pesticides, such as DDT, are credited with saving thousands of lives from insect borne diseases
during World War II.184 Nevertheless, it soon became evident that these pesticides accumulated in
living tissues and bioconcentrated as they moved through the food chain. This resulted in serious
impacts to predators at the top of the food chain, including the American Bald Eagle. In
consequence, most organochlorine pesticides were either banned or severely restricted, at least in
the developed countries of the world.185
The other major category of pesticides that was developed during World War II is the
organophosphate pesticides. These pesticides were initially developed as wartime nerve gases.186
Although these pesticides have the environmental advantage of being far less persistent in the
environment than are organochlorine pesticides, the organophosphates tend to be highly acutely
toxic to humans, other mammals and birds.187 These pesticides became the pesticides of choice in
the United States after most organochlorine pesticides were banned or severely restricted.
Organophosphates remain the largest category of chemical insecticide in use in the United States
today.188 In addition to posing risks of acute poisoning to farm workers, these pesticides have
been implicated in a large number of avian and wildlife poisonings.189
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Although from an ecological standpoint, narrow-spectrum pesticides are preferable, broadspectrum synthetic pesticides continue to dominate U.S. pesticide usage.190 This phenomenon is at
least in part attributed to the time and costs associated with bringing a new pesticide to the market.
The average time to bring a new pesticide to commercialization is five to ten years, with an
associated cost of ten to twenty million dollars.191 Moreover, the average life-span of a pesticide
for a specific use is ten years.192 Accordingly, pesticide manufacturers may be inclined to adopt
research and development strategies that favor broad-spectrum pesticides with broad market
opportunities, in order to get the biggest bang for the buck during the limited life span of a
pesticide.193
In the past ten years, the fasting growing sector of the pesticide industry has been the
biotechnology sector. Naturally-existing microbes have been genetically modified to make them
toxic to insects and other pests. In addition, agricultural crop plants themselves have been
genetically modified to produce substances that have pesticidal effects. These pesticidal living
organisms pose novel ecological risks by virtue of their ability to reproduce and spread in the
environment.
B. Ecological Risks of Pesticides
Scientists estimate that as many as 10 million species, or 99% of the earth’s wild
biodiversity, not including cultivated and weedy species, are in a “precarious condition.”194 Causes
and contributors to the decline of so many species include indirect habitat destruction through
clearing for agriculture and development, the spread of non-native invasive species, pollution, over
harvesting of species and disease. Although there is no doubt that direct habitat destruction is the
leading contributor of species loss (estimated as being implicated in 85% of U.S. species decline),
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pollution, including pesticide pollution is implicated in 24 percent of U.S. species decline.195
Pesticide poisoning of fish and wildlife is a significant factor in species decline.196
Because pesticides are by definition intended to kill or disrupt living organisms, and
because they are intentionally released into the environment, often in large quantities over large
areas, it is not surprising that pesticides pose a wide array of risks to individual species as well as
to overall ecosystem function. Many pesticides are broad-spectrum, affecting diverse species,
including many non-target organisms.197 Others are more narrowly targeted to pest species.
However, even these may have significant impacts on non-target species that are closely related to
the intended targets.198 Some pesticides persist in the environment for weeks, months and even
years, while others breakdown relatively quickly.199 Moreover, living organisms vary significantly
in their susceptibility to pesticides.200 The potential ecological risks of pesticide use depend on a
number of factors including toxicity or other hazard of the pesticide, method of application,
persistence in the environment, amount used and susceptibility of non-target organisms.
Moreover, there are not many data available on the environmental effects of pesticide usage on
many species. Accordingly, the ecological risks of pesticides cannot be easily described or
quantified. Nevertheless, some generalizations can be made.
Many pesticides are highly acutely toxic to some or all non-target mammals, birds, reptiles,
amphibians, fish and invertebrates. Many pesticides in current use in the U.S., as well as in other
parts of the world, are highly acutely toxic and are known to cause adverse effects on non-target
mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish and invertebrates.201 Birds and other wildlife may be
195
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exposed through direct spraying, ingesting pesticide granules, drinking water that has been
contaminated by pesticides or eating prey organisms that have been contaminated by pesticides.
For instance, the pesticide carbofuran is highly toxic to avian species. While the banning and
severe restriction of certain pesticides such as DDT over the past thirty years has dramatically
reduced certain risks to wildlife, many risks remain.202 In addition to effects from direct exposure
to pesticides, birds and other wildlife may also be exposed to pesticides by ingesting prey animals
that have been contaminated.203
Other less visible species also are at considerable risk from exposure to pesticides. For
example, for the past decade, there has been considerable concern and debate in the scientific
community over the worldwide decline of amphibians. There are now significant data to support a
conclusion that certain pesticides, such as the herbicide atrazine, may be contributing to the worldwide decline in amphibian populations.204
Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, filed by Defenders of Wildlife and twenty-nine
other commenters, contained in a letter to Gary Frazer, Assistant Director for Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, and Phil Williams, Chief, Endangered Species Division, NOAA Fisheries, dated April 16, 2004.
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Although the most obvious adverse effects of pesticide use are those to humans and large
animals such as mammals and birds, it is likely that the most significant adverse effects of
pesticides are those to invertebrates, which are closely related to target pest species.205 Casualties
from this “friendly fire” are widespread in the invertebrate world.206
Perhaps equally if not more important than direct acute effects on nontarget organisms are
the chronic effects upon growth, physiology, reproduction and behavior.207 Much less is known
about these effects.208 Even where a pesticide is not toxic enough to kill an organism, it can have
very significant sublethal effects on the organism by affecting the organism’s life span, growth,
physiology, behavior and reproduction.209 Moreover, pesticides have been documented to have
significant indirect effects on nontarget organisms by reducing the populations of animals or plants
that serve as food or cover for other species.210
One of the most insidious risks posed by pesticides is the tendency of certain synthetic
pesticides to mimic hormones, such as estrogen in humans and wildlife. Only recently has science
begun to understand these complex effects.211 Estrogen mimicking substances include a number of
are in the sterile isolated confines of the research laboratory. Id.
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pesticides as well as a wide variety of other products in common use, such as toiletries,
spermicides and plastics.212 Exposure to these compounds, particularly when the exposure occurs
in the fetus or young children, has been correlated with a large number of effects in humans
including decreased sperm counts, breast and testicular cancer, endometriosis, deformed or stinted
reproductive organs, neurological defects and low birth weights.213 In addition to these human
health effects, these substances have also been implicated in numerous wildlife impacts including
deformed alligators and turtles, and reproductive difficulty in birds, fish and mammals.214 These
estrogenic effects can be extremely complex, unpredictable and difficult to understand.215
Another concern is the uncertainty regarding the potential effects of pesticides on
ecologically significant microorganisms. Very little is known about the complex ecology of
microorganisms.216 Although there are not many data to suggest that most types of pesticides pose
significant risks to microorganisms, soil fumigants, which are designed to destroy soil
microorganisms and are applied at very high does, may pose substantial risks to beneficial
microorganisms.217 For example, the killing of soil microbes and invertebrates resulting from
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 289 (1999); see also THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR STOLEN
FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SURVIVAL? A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996);
Matthew P. Longnecker, Walter J. Rogan, and George Lucier, Effects of DDT (Dichlorodiphylytrichloroethane) and PCBs
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pesticide use may actually cause crops to become more susceptible to disease and may thereby
reduce crop growth. In addition, populations of nitrogen-fixing organisms may be reduced
thereby requiring higher levels of fertilizer application.218 Critical ecological services provided by
microorganisms, including decomposition may also be impacted by certain pesticides.219
The problem of ecological risk from pesticide exposure is exacerbated by the tendency of
certain pesticides to undergo a phenomenon known as bioaccumulation. Bioaccumulation of
pesticides become widely recognized during the 1960s as a result of Rachel Carson’s book, Silent
Spring. In her book, Carson explained how DDT and other organochlorine pesticides have the
ability not only to persist in the environment for years if not decades, but also to accumulate in the
tissue of animals and humans.220 These pesticides accumulate in animals on the bottom of the
food chain and then are passed from prey to predator until they can be found in very high
concentrations in top predators. This phenomenon is known as biomagnification. Pesticides that
persist, accumulate, and biomagnify are especially insidious in that they can adversely affect
organisms far removed in both time and space from the original release of the pesticide into the
environment.221
Moreover, although agricultural systems in themselves are not natural systems per se, they
are generally located in close proximity to natural ecosystems and often contain within their
borders, sizable natural and semi-natural ecosystems.222 Thus, adverse effects from pesticide
usage in agricultural systems may negatively impact ecosystems within the farm boundaries as
well as nearby ecosystems that may be contaminated by pesticide runoff in water, drift through the
air, or movement of contaminated organisms.
As described above, invertebrate nontarget species may be a greatest risk from pesticide
use. Loss of invertebrate biodiversity, however, is not the only concern. Equally concerning, is
the ecological and economic disruptions that frequently occur as a result of nontarget predator and
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parasites being killed by pesticides. Many pest populations are kept in check in nature by the
existence of organisms that feed on pest species. Consequently, if these predators or parasites are
eliminated or greatly reduced in number, the population of pest species will experience a
population explosion. In addition to existing pest species population increases resulting from
pesticide usage, new pest species may also be created as a result of this phenomenon.223
In the past ten years, a completely new suite of risk concerns have emerged regarding the
use of pesticidal genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Although many of the risk

considerations for biotechnology pesticides are similar, if not the same, as those for traditional
chemical pesticides, these new pesticides pose a number of novel risks not presented by chemical
pesticides. One of the most significant novel risk considerations for pesticidal GMOs is the
potential for spread of the living organism or the organism's genetic material. For example, plants
can reproduce sexually and/or asexually, and as a result, the genetic material that was introduced
into the plant and that enables the plant to produce pesticidal substances could spread through
agricultural or natural ecosystems. Thus, if a plant that produces a pesticide has the capacity to
spread in the environment, or to spread its genetic material to other plants, there would be a greater
potential for increased exposure to non-target organisms than there would be for a pesticide
produced in plant that can only grow in a limited geographic area or does not have the ability to
cross-fertilize with other plants in the environment.224 This is a particular concern for pesticides
produced in plants that have wild relatives in the United States.225 If these wild relatives acquire
the ability to produce the pesticide, through cross-fertilization, many additional nontarget
organisms could potentially be exposed to the pesticide.226 One of the most cited concerns
223
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significant concerns regarding pesticidal GMOs is over the potential for the development of
"superweeds" through the out-crossing of pesticidal GMOs to wild relatives.227 Development of
such a superweed has the potential to result in substantial disruption of agricultural and natural
ecosystems.228
Perhaps the most serious concern with pesticidal GMOs stems from the fact that the risks
of GMOs are uncertain. Moreover, although the risk of a GMO organism released into the
environment creating a new superweed or disrupting the balance of natural ecosystems may be
small, the consequences could be disastrous and potentially irreversible.229 The precise nature and
magnitude of the risk is difficult to predict because of the almost infinite variety of potential
genetically modified organisms, the ability of GMO’s to reproduce and spread, the complexity

Harmonization of Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 1160
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inherent in natural ecosystems, and the dearth of long term data on the effects of GMOs.230
C. History of Ecological Issues in Pesticide Regulation
From its first introduction in the 1930's until its demise in the early 1970's, the pesticide
DDT serves as stark illustration of the meteoric rise of a pesticide based on significant economic
and human health benefits and subsequent dramatic fall of the same pesticide based on severe
ecological and human health risks. Starting in 1939, and continuing through World War II, the
military used DDT extensively to control insect vectors of deadly diseases such as typhus.231 DDT
is created with saving millions of lives from such diseases during the war.232 By 1945, DDT had
become a favorite agricultural pesticide, used in most of the world to control a variety of
agricultural pests, as well as biting insects such as mosquitoes.233 At its peak in the 1950's, an
estimated 6000 tons of DDT were released into the environment in the U.S. alone.234 Rachel
Carson’s 1962 book, Silent Spring, brought to the public’s attention for the first time the downside
of the seemingly miracle pesticide. In her book, Carson raised a number of significant ecological
concerns regarding the widespread use of DDT, including the concern that the pesticide killed
beneficial as well as pest insects, the disruptive effects of the pesticide in upsetting the natural
ecological balance, and the bioaccumulation of the pesticide in the food chain resulting in risks to
aquatic organisms, avian species and humans.235 Carson’s book led to a public outcry against the
threats of DDT and other persistent pesticides. Once the link between DDT and the dramatic
230

See Steen, supra note 228 at 764. This discussion of the risks of GMOs, is not intended to suggest that these pesticides
have no benefits. In fact, many scientists believe that GMO pesticides may provide a less risky alternative to chemical
pesticides. Many GMOs are less toxic than chemical GMOs, more narrowly targeted towards the intended pest and
released into the environment in smaller quantities. Nevertheless, the purpose of this discussion on the unique ecological
risks posed by GMO pesticides is merely to highlight the complex ecological risks at issue and the large amount of
uncertainty regarding such risks. It is worth noting that although there has not been any catastrophic damage caused by the
GMOs that have been in the marketplace for the past several years, the pesticidal GMOs which have been commercialized
to date are largely relatively innocuous from an ecological standpoint. All of the products in commercialization to date
include genes from bacteria and viruses that are non-toxic to humans, that are naturally ubiquitous in the environment and
have been applied widely to food crops in their microorganism form for decades. For example, the B.t. delta-endotoxin
produced by numerous plant incorporated protectants in wide use, is essentially the same B.t. toxin that occurs naturally in
soil and is ubiquitous in the environment. However, there are literally thousands of GM products in the research and
development stage that are not so innocuous or well understood. Research is being done on just about every GM product
that human ingenuity can conceive including corn plants that product a spider silk that can be used to make bullet proof
jackets and soy plants that produce a scorpion toxin. These new products must be approached with much greater caution.
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Morriss & Meiners, supra note 184 at 7.
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In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2,
1972).
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decline of numerous bird species, including the American Bald Eagle, was established, a
movement developed to ban the use of DDT. Images of avian egg-shell thinning, deformed birds,
and other ecological effects caused by DDT and its relatives fueled the public’s new concerns over
environmental issues and played a significant role in the development of the environmental
movement of the 1960's and early 1970's. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, then the
agency in charge of pesticide registration,236 cancelled certain uses of DDT and initiated an
intensive review of other uses. Shortly after its creation, the newly formed EPA began a formal
review under FIFRA of the remaining uses of DDT. In 1972 EPA issued the final order canceling
the registration for most uses of the pesticide DDT.237 In the final order, EPA concluded that the
long-range risks of continued use of DDT were unacceptable and outweighed any economic or
societal benefits it provided.238
The DDT controversy, which gained attention through the publication of Silent Spring,
became one of the primary motivators behind the establishment of the EPA in 1970. The
controversy also paved the way for a 1972 major overhaul of FIFRA, which had been on the
books in a somewhat less ambitious form for over 60 years. The origins of FIFRA can be traced
back to the federal Insecticide Act of 1910.239 The 1910 Act was a consumer protection statute
aimed at addressing concerns with false claims about the effectiveness of many pesticide products,
which turned out to be useless, and the converse problem of pesticides that were too strong and
thus caused crop damage.240 This consumer protection emphasis carried over into the first
enactment of FIFRA in 1947. The 1947 Act contained the first registration requirement for
pesticides (referred to by the Act as "economic poisons").241 The 1947 Act, however, did not
establish significant safety standards for pesticides. A pesticide could be registered if the
composition of the pesticide was such as to warrant the proposed claims for it and if the pesticide
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and its labeling complied with the requirements of FIFRA.242 The 1947 Act remained intact until
1972. The 1972 amendments to FIFRA completely overhauled the statute and included provisions
aimed at protecting environmental interests for the first time. The 1972 amendments form the
backbone of the current FIFRA.
Despite the focus on ecological risks that dominated the DDT controversy and paved the
way for the 1972 overhaul of FIFRA, ecological concerns played a much more modest role in the
implementation of FIFRA during the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, only a handful of cancellation or
suspension actions primarily based on wildlife or other ecological risks were brought by the EPA
during that period. The only reported judicial or administrative case in which regulatory action
primarily was based on risks to wildlife was Ciba Geigy v. EPA,243 in which EPA proposed
canceling of certain uses of the pesticide diazinon on golf course and turf due in large part to its
risk to wild birds.244 In addition to the diazinon case, EPA considered canceling certain uses of
pesticides based on risks to wildlife during the 1980s and 1990s. However, EPA failed to take any
significant action to address such risks.245
242

Id.
874 F2d 277 (5th Cir. 1989).
244
Id. at 278. This case involved the effects on birds of the use of diazonin on golf courses and turf. Id. Specifically, the
case addressed the question of whether FIFRA requires a precise determination of risk or harm (e.g. the chemical has
adverse effects 51% of the time it is used) in order to support cancellation of a registration. Id.
Another related point of
contention was whether devastating effect on bird populations or merely a significant adverse effect will justify
cancellation. Id. at 280. In this case, the chemical company’s contentions, that there should be more exact thresholds and
more significant effects on the overall bird population, were rejected by the court. Id. The fifth circuit held that FIFRA
gives the Administrator sufficient discretion to conclude that recurring bird kills are an unreasonable adverse environmental
effect regardless of whether they significantly reduce bird populations. Id. Ultimately, the case was remanded to the
Administrator to rectify the former administrator’s failure to read the word “generally” as meaning “usually”, “commonly”,
or “with considerable frequency.” The phrase “generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” is also
read to include any potential general causation of adverse effects. Id. at 279-280.
Further, despite suffering a stinging defeat in 1989 at the hands of environmental groups claiming that EPA’s
continued registration of the pesticide strychnine, was a violation of the federal Endangered Species Act, EPA continued to
register, and allow the continued registration of, pesticides that pose risks to threatened and endangered species. Defenders
of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). In Defenders, the court found that EPA’s continued registration of the
pesticide strychnine constituted a taking under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, even though there was no evidence
as to the chain of possession of the strychnine or other links between EPA’s registration of the pesticide and the ultimate
death of the listed species. Id. at 1301. The court held, in essence, that EPA’s decision to allow the registration to remain
in effect, rather than suspending or canceling the registration, subjected the agency to Section 9 liability. Id. In concluding
that “EPA’s decision to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue those registrations was critical to the
resulting poisoning” of the endangered species, the court clearly was influenced by the fact that the pesticide could not
legally be sold or distributed except under an EPA registration. Id.
245
For example, in 1991, EPA proposed the cancellation of the pesticide ethyl parathion, due to risks to both humans and
wildlife from the high acute toxicity of this pesticide. After negotiating with the manufacturers of ethyl parathion,
however, EPA accepted a settlement which involved the cancellation of only the ground application uses of the pesticide,
which posed significant risks to human farm workers, but did not include the cancellation of aerial application, which posed
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In the past few years, there have been a number of controversies over the adverse impacts
to wildlife species, including threatened and endangered species, from pesticides. One such
controversy started in 2002, when forty environmental groups, including the American Bird
Conservancy and Defenders of Wildlife, sent the EPA a Notice of Intent to Sue for Violations of
the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Administrative Procedures Act
Concerning the Registration of the Pesticide Fenthion due to the high risks the pesticide posed to
avian species. Later that year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended that EPA cancel
existing registrations for fenthion immediately due to unreasonable adverse effects fenthion posed
to avian species protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)246 and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA).247 When EPA did not take action to reduce the risks from fenthion, in
October of 2002 Defenders of Wildlife, the American Bird Conservancy and the Florida Wildlife
Federation filed suit against EPA in federal district court alleging EPA had violated the ESA and
MBTA. In 2003 the manufacturer of fenthion voluntarily canceled its registration of fenthion.
In addition, in September of 2004, environmentalists won a significant victory when the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision 248 affirming a district court’s 2004 order that
found that EPA had violated the ESA because it had failed to take steps to ensure that the
registration of 54 pesticides would not jeopardize the survival of listed salmon species. The Court
upheld the district court’s injunction, which imposed detailed buffer zones restricting the use of
more than 30 pesticides along listed salmon-supporting waters in California, Oregon, and
Washington states.249
the greatest risks to birds and other wildlife due to spray drift associated with this form of application. See 56 Fed. Reg.
65061-01 (Dec. 13, 1991), 57 Fed. Reg.3500-01 (Jan. 29, 1992), and 57 Fed. Reg. 6168-01 (Feb. 20, 1992). In fact, ethyl
parathion had been implicated in the deaths of thousands of birds. Nevertheless, EPA declined to take regulatory action to
prevent or minimize these risks. Id. Ultimately, the remaining uses of ethyl parathion were voluntarily cancelled in 2001,
after a concerted campaign led by the American Bird Conservancy in partnership with Defenders of Wildlife, the Pesticide
Action Network, and the World Wildlife Fund to pressure EPA and the manufacturer of the pesticide to end all uses. Ethyl
Parathion: Notice of Use Cancellation, 66 Fed. Reg. 47667-01 (Sept. 13, 2001). However, despite the fact that ethyl
parathion was considered to be one of the most toxic pesticides in current use and had been documented as the cause of
thousands of bird kills, and despite decades of study by EPA, the agency itself failed to take regulatory action to protect
wildlife.
246
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532 - 1544 (2004).
247
16 U.S.C. §§ 703 - 711 (2004).
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See Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004. This Order
was the third in a series of orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter. See Wash. Toxics
Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Orders issued July 16, 2003 and August 8, 2003. All of these
Orders are available on EPA’s website at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html (Last visited January 7, 2005).
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As these recent cases illustrate, EPA has been reluctant to take regulatory action to
prevent registration of, or cancel the registration of, a pesticide that poses significant ecological
risks. In fact, EPA has failed to take such actions even when challenged by environmental
organizations. Instead, such challenges have led to the manufacturers voluntarily canceling its
registrations, as in the case of fenthion, rather than EPA taking action to reduce ecological risks.
EPA’s reluctance to take action to address purely ecological concerns resulting from pesticide use
illustrates the broader problem that much of environmental protection law is focused
predominantly on human health issues, with ecological concerns receiving little or no attention.
It should not be considered a bold statement to assert that environmental protection law is
intended to protect the environment, yet it is. As the illustrations above show, implementation of
FIFRA seems largely to have ignored any such intent. And if environmental protection is the goal,
it would be logical to expect environmental protection law to be guided by the science of ecology
(the study of the interactions of living organisms and their environments). However, after more 30
years of significant public concern over environmental protection and more than 30 years of
implementation of numerous environmental protection laws, it is surprising how little these laws
have been used to address environmental concerns, and how little ecological science has informed
environmental law. Typically, environmental concerns are addressed only where there is a
sufficient, independent human health-related motivation. Moreover, many of the first generation
environmental laws were developed in an ad hoc way in reaction to the particular environmental
crisis of the moment.250 This collection of piece-meal laws have not kept pace with the scientific
world’s ever-increasing understanding of ecological systems.251
In recent years there have been greater attempts to incorporate ecological principles into
environmental law and policy decisions. Professor Dan Tarlock has argued that environmental
law derives its legitimacy from science.252 Toxicology, engineering and other sciences have
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See Brooks, et al., supra note 29.
For a proposal to create a single umbrella environmental statute, see Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways:
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See generally Tarlock, supra note 34. In this article, Tarlock explains how science not only has been used to identify
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justification for environmental protection policy. Without a scientific foundation, Tarlock states, “environmentalism would
be the marginal aesthetic movement that it was between the progressive conservation era and the late1960s.” Id. at 113637. But see Holly Doremus, Listing Decision Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better
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certainly played a significant role in environmental law. The role of the ecological sciences,
however, has been much more modest. Although the science of ecology has informed certain
areas of environmental law, such as endangered species protection, 253 most pollution-focused laws
have not undertaken to incorporate ecological principles in any significant way. Indeed, if
ecological sciences have significantly informed any area of environmental law, it is in the areas of
natural resource management, endangered species protection, and wetlands protection, rather than
the myriad of so-called pollution control laws that form the complex regulatory web of
environmental regulation. The manner in which EPA has implemented the classic pollution
control laws – the Clean Water Act (CWA)254, the Clean Air Act (CAA) 255, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)256 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)257 – tends to be highly focused on the protection of
human health and tends to treat protection of the environment as almost an afterthought.258 Of
course human health protection is of primary concern to most people, and few would place the
value of protecting a bird, let alone an insect, above protecting human life. Nevertheless, it should
not be forgotten that these environmental protection laws were intended to protect both human
health and the environment and that environmental concerns not related to human health provided
the impetus for the development of these regulatory programs. Even the bulk of scholarly literature
in environmental law has failed to adequately grapple with ecological concerns.259 In addition to

253
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33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387 (2004).
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42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (2004).
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Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435,
441 (1992) (stating that while virtually every statute that EPA is responsible for implementing contains language that would
enable EPA to address ecological concerns in its regulatory programs, EPA has failed to utilize these broad authorities to
address ecological concerns.) A few of the many examples of EPA’s broad authority to address ecological risks include the
following: 33 U.S.C. §1314(a)(1)directs EPA to develop water quality criteria that accurately reflecting the latest scientific
knowledge on the effect on the health and welfare including plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, plant life, shorelines,
beaches, esthetics, and recreation, as well as on the concentration and dispersal of pollutants, or their byproducts , through
biological, physical, and chemical processes and on biological community diversity. 42 U.S.C. §. 9605(a)(8)(A), EPA’s
national contingency plan for hazardous discharge clean-up, must take into account the potential for the destruction of
sensitive ecosystems. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to promulgate secondary national ambient air quality standards to
protect the public welfare. The statute defines the term “welfare” to include the effects of pollution on soils, water,
vegetation, animals, wildlife, and the climate. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(B) (2004). For a more comprehensive discussion of
EPA’s statutory authority to consider ecological concerns in its regulatory programs, see generally Fischman supra.
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Both Professors J.B. Ruhl and Lisa Heinzerling have criticized the scholarly discourse on environmental law as being
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the higher priority that human health concerns assume, it is probable that the limited attempts to
protect the environment may stem, at least in part, from the fact that despite years of study, the
ecological sciences have barely scraped the surface of understanding the complex machinery of the
natural world. What little is known teaches us that ecological systems are extremely complex, and
ever changing.260 Accordingly, it is difficult to design regulatory programs to protect what we do
not fully understand and what can be perceived as a moving target.
IV. FIFRA (A LICENSE TO KILL)
The regulation of pesticides in the U.S. is conducted primarily under the authority of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).261 FIFRA requires that all
pesticides262 that are sold or distributed in the United States be registered by EPA.263 Generally, a
pesticide may be registered only if it will not cause an “unreasonable adverse effect on the
environment.”264 Accordingly, in determining whether to register a pesticide, EPA engages in a
cost/benefit analysis, weighing the costs or risks associated with the use of a pesticide against the
economic and social benefits of the pesticide. A pesticide may be registered only if the benefits of
the pesticide outweigh the costs resulting from the use of the pesticide.265 To determine whether,
or the extent to which, FFIRA is eco-pragmatic, or in other words, the extent to which FIFRA
too focused on human health concern and not focused nearly enough on the important goals of protecting natural systems.
Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 459, 461 (1997) and J.B. Ruhl, Working Both
(Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 541 (2000)
(book review).
260
For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s understanding and use of ecological principles in its
decision-making in environmental cases, see Robert W. Alder, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science
in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L.REV. 249 (2003).
261
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004).
262
Id. § 136(u) provides that the term “pesticide” means “any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest. . . ” Id. § 136(u).
263
Id. § 136a(a). This subsection provides:
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not
registered under this subchapter. To the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under
this subchapter and that is not the subject of an experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency
exemption under section 136p of this title.
Id. § 136a(a).
264
Id. § 136a(c)(5). Section 136(j) provides that the term “environment” includes water, air, land, and all plants and man
and other animals living therein and the interrelationships which exist among them. Id.§ 136(j).
265
Under FIFRA, cost/benefit terminology is used the opposite way it is used in discussing most environmental regulation.
Typically, in doing a cost/benefit analysis, the regulatory agency compares the sots of regulation (e.g., the cost of installing
pollution controls) to the benefits of regulation (e.g., lives saved or cancers avoided). Under FIFRA, however, the “costs”
are considered to be the costs of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g. cancer deaths), whereas the benefits are considered
to be the benefits of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g., reduction in crop loss from pest insect damage).
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addresses the issues of uncertainty, complexity, and change, a close analysis of FIFRA, as well as
its implementation by EPA, is warranted.
A. Registration and Other Approval Mechanisms
FIFRA section 3(a) provides that the Administrator shall register a pesticide if the
Administrator determines that, when considered with any restrictions imposed its composition is
such as to warrant the proposed claims for it, its labeling and other material required to be
submitted comply with the requirements of FIFRA, it will perform its intended function without
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, and when used in accordance with widespread
and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse affects on the
environment.266 Unreasonable adverse affects on the environment is defined by FIFRA to mean
any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.267 Accordingly, when making the
determination of whether to register a pesticide, EPA must consider not only any risks the
pesticide poses to man or the environment, but also must consider the economic and social
implications of using the pesticide. Noticeably, however, in defining unreasonable adverse effect
on the environment, while Congress did direct EPA to take into account economic factors, it did
not explicitly mandate that EPA conduct a strict cost/benefit analysis.268 In fact, the legislative
history of FIFRA suggests that adverse affects were not intended to be tolerated unless there are
“overriding benefits” from the use of the pesticide.269 Nevertheless, for more than thirty years,
EPA has interpreted FIFRA to require a cost/benefit balancing, and this interpretation as been
upheld by the court.270
266

Id. §136a(c)(5) provides:
The Administrator shall register a pesticide if the Administrator determines that, when considered with any restrictions
imposed under subsection (d) of this section –
(A)its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;
(B)its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with the requirements of this subchapter;
(C)it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment; and
(D)when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse affects on the environment.
Id. § 136a(c)(5).
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Section 136(bb) defines the term “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as any “unreasonable risk to man
or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide. . . ” Id. § 136(bb).
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Significantly, although one prong of the test for registration requires EPA to determine that
the pesticide “will perform its intended function” without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment,271 FIFRA expressly states that EPA shall not make any lack of essentially a criterion
for denying registration of any pesticide and that where two pesticides meet the requirements for
registration, one should not be registered in preference to the other.272 Thus, to obtain a
registration, there is no requirement to demonstrate that a pesticide is essential. Moreover, the
availability of alternative pesticides for the same use does not preclude registration. Further,
FIFRA expressly authorizes EPA to waive all data requirements pertaining to efficacy and in fact
EPA has, by rule, done so.273
One of the most important requirements is that the registrant submit data in support of
registration.274 FIFRA gives EPA discretionary authority to register products in certain situations
431 U.S. 925 (1977) (stating that “to evaluate whether use of a pesticide poses an ‘unreasonable risk to man or the
environment,’ [EPA] engages in a cost-benefit analysis . . .”); In the Matter of Chapman Chemical Co., et al., FIFRA
Dockets No. 246 et al. (EPA 1976) (stating that “before any pesticide can be cancelled under FIFRA [EPA] must be
persuaded that the risks to man or the environment from continued use of the pesticide outweigh the benefits of its
continued use.”); In the Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989) (stating that “the
risk-benefit assessment involves a balancing of the risks . . . against the benefits . . . ).
271
Id. § 136a(c)(5)(B).
272
Id. § 136a(c)(5) provides that:
The Administrator shall not make any lack of essentiality a criterion for denying registration of any pesticide. Where two
pesticides meet the requirements of this paragraph, one should not be registered in preference to the other. In considering an
application for the registration of a pesticide, the Administrator may waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, in
which event the Administrator may register the pesticide without determining that the pesticide’s composition is such as to
warrant proposed claims of efficacy.
273
40 C.F.R. § 158.640(b)(1). The burden of providing EPA with the necessary information to determine whether the
standard for registration is met rests at all times with the registrant or applicant for registration. The procedures for
registering pesticides are set forth in the statute and regulations (primarily 40 CFR Part 152) .
274
7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2004) provides:
(a)Requirement of registration
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not
registered under this subchapter. To the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under
this subchapter and that is not the subject of an experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency
exemption under section 136p of this title.
Id. § 136a(c)(2)(a) provides:
(2) Data in support of registration (a) In general
The Administrator shall publish guidelines specifying the kinds of information which will be required to support the
registration of a pesticide and shall revise such guidelines from time to time. . . . In the development of these standards, the
Administrator shall consider the economic factors of potential national volume of use, extent of distribution, and the impact
of the cost of meeting the requirements on the incentives for any potential registrant to undertake the development of the
required data. . . .
Data requirements are found at 40 CFR Part 158, and provide for the submission of health and environmental effects data.
The applicant for registration must bear the cost of gathering and generating the necessary data. To avoid duplicative data
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even though not all data necessary to make a decision on registration have been generated. This is
called "conditional registration."

Conditional registration can be used for products with

composition and proposed uses identical or substantially similar to currently registered pesticides,
products with proposed new uses, or certain products with new active ingredient.275 For the first
two categories, EPA must determine that despite the lacking data, approval of the conditional
registration would not significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.276 For new active ingredients, EPA must determine that the use of the pesticide
during the period of conditional registration will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment and use of the pesticide is in the public interest.277
Most environmental risk reduction measures under FIFRA are achieved through labeling
restrictions. An applicant for registration must submit all proposed labeling with the registration
application.278 A FIFRA "label" is the written, printed, or graphic matter on, or attached to the
pesticide.279 The term "labeling" under FIFRA includes the label as well as all other written,
printed, or graphic matter that accompanies the pesticide or to which reference is made on the
label.280 All registered products must bear a label or labeling setting forth precautionary
generation, the statute encourages the joint development of data and provides that applicants seeking to reach agreement on
the terms of a data development arrangement may seek binding arbitration. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii). Data already submitted
to the Agency to support an existing registration, may be relied upon to support a new registration application provided the
applicant for the new registration offers to pay compensation to the registrant who originally submitted the data. Data
submitted to support a registration the first time a particular active ingredient is registered is protected by the "exclusive
use" provisions of FIFRA and cannot be considered by EPA to support additional registrations for a period of ten years. Id.
In addition, FIFRA § 10 generally governs the disclosure of information submitted to EPA pursuant to FIFRA
requirements. Section 10(d) provides that health and safety data must be made available to the public, except that § 10(g)
prohibits disclosure of health and safety data to multinational pesticide producers except during public proceedings under
law or regulation. Sections 10(b) and 10(d) provide that other confidential business information ordinarily may not be
released and provide specific protection for the formula and information on inert ingredients. Exemptions from these
confidentiality protections are provided to avoid imminent public health risks and when the Administrator determines that
disclosure is in the public interest during a proceeding to determine whether a pesticide causes unreasonable adverse
effects. Any such release of information is subject to procedural protections involving prior notice and opportunity for
district court review.
275
Id. § 136a(c)(7), registration under special circumstances, provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (5) -(A) The Administrator may conditionally register or amend the registration of a pesticide if the administrator determines
that (I) the pesticide and proposed use are identical or substantially similar to any currently registered pesticide and use
thereof, or differ only in ways that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment, and (ii) approving the registration
276
Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A).
277
Id.
278
Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C).
279
Id. § 136(p)(1).
280
Id. § 136(p)(2).
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statements, warnings, directions for use of the product, and an ingredient statement. A product
whose label or labeling does not contain the information required by EPA or which sets forth false
or misleading information is misbranded.281 FIFRA requires users of pesticides to follow all label
directions.282 The requirement for users to follow label instructions is the only obligation placed
by FIFRA on users of pesticides. Thus, the label is the only mechanism to regulate user behavior
to accomplish risk reduction goals.
Under section 3(d)(1), a pesticide may be classified for either general or restricted use.283 A
restricted use pesticide may be used only by or under the supervision of a certified applicator and
is not available for purchase by the general public.284 A pesticide is classified for restricted use if
it would cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment in the absence of such a
restriction.285 Certification of applicators is primarily a state function. State certification plans
must conform to certain standards enumerated in the statute.286
FIFRA provides for several forms of pesticide approval in addition to registration under
section 3. First, EPA may grant an emergency exemption under FIFRA section 18.287 Section 18
provides that the Administrator has discretion to exempt any Federal or State agency from any
provision (normally, the registration requirement) of the Act if emergency conditions require such
an exemption.288 An emergency condition means an urgent, non-routine situation and is deemed
to exist when: no effective pesticides are available under the Act that have labeled uses registered
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Id. §§ 136(q) and 136j(a)(1)(E).
Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to use any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with
its labeling.
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7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1).
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Id. § 136a(d)(1).
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Id.
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Id. § 136i, regarding the use of restricted use pesticides, provides:
Use of restricted use pesticides; applicators
(A) certification procedure
(1) Federal certification
In any State for which a State plan for applicator certification has not been approved by the Administrator, the
Administrator, in consultation with the Governor of such State, shall conduct a program for the certification of applicators
of pesticides. . . .
(2) State certification
If any State, at any time, desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor of such State shall submit a State Plan for
such purpose. The Administrator shall approve the plan submitted by any State [meets certain general conditions regarding
the state’s legal authority, funding mechanisms, etc.]
Id.
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Id. § 136p.
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for control of the pest under the conditions of the emergency; no economically or environmentally
feasible alternative practices which provide adequate control are available; and the situation
involves the introduction or dissemination of a new pest, will present significant health risks, will
present significant environmental risks, or will cause significant economic loss.289
In addition to federal pesticide registration under FIFRA, States may issue registrations of
pesticide products or uses of such products to meet special local needs under FIFRA section
24(c).290 A section 24(c) registration may be issued to allow use of a new formulation of a
federally registered pesticide, to amend federal registration to permit use on additional crops or
pests or at additional sites or to permit use of different application techniques, rates and
equipment, to amend federal registration with special label directions necessary to prevent adverse
effects or to ensure efficacy under local conditions, or for any other purposes consistent with
FIFRA. Valid State registrations are treated as federal registrations under FIFRA.291
FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue Experimental Use Permits (EUP's) for field
testing of unregistered pesticides.292 The Administrator may issue an EUP if she determines that
the applicant needs such a permit to accumulate information necessary to register a pesticide under
section 3 of FIFRA.293 Finally, Section 3(a) authorizes EPA, to the extent necessary to prevent
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, to issue regulations limiting the distribution,
sale, or use of any pesticide that is not registered under the Act and that is not subject to an EUP
under section 5 or an emergency exemption under section 18.294
B. Continuing Duties of Registrants
Once a pesticide is registered, registrants face a number of continuing responsibilities,
particularly with regard to supplying additional data. In 1978 Congress added a provision to
FIFRA (section 3(c)(2)(B)) giving EPA the authority to require holders of existing registrations to
provide data to support the continued registration of a pesticide.295 Section 3(c)(2)(B) allows the
Agency at any time to require additional data to support an existing registration. The penalty for
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Id. § 136v(c)(1).
Id. § 136c.
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failure to supply this data is suspension of the registration, which results in a prohibition on sale
and distribution of the product.296 Prior to suspension under section 3(c)(2)(B), a registrant has a
right to a limited adjudicatory hearing. The only issues to be considered at such a hearing are
whether "the registrant has failed to take the action," which is the basis of the suspension and
whether the disposition of existing stocks is consistent with the Act.297
In addition to information required to be submitted under section 3(c)(2)(B), registrants are
under a continuing obligation under FIFRA section 6(a)(2) to submit factual information regarding
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment of the pesticide, whenever the registrant has such
information.298 EPA has adopted a rule, which describes specifically the types of information that
must be reported, and the time frame for submission of these reports.299
The 1972 revisions to FIFRA included a tougher standard for initial registration of
pesticides and mandated that the Agency go back and reexamine previously registered
pesticides.300 This reexamination or "reregistration" reflects a congressional determination that
previously-registered pesticides ought to be as "safe" as newer ones and a recognition that the data
EPA had for these older pesticides was not as complete or up to date as that for newer pesticides.
Reregistration has proved to be one of the most critical and one of the most difficult regulatory
tasks for EPA's pesticide program.301 Because reregistration efforts were moving so slowly, in
1988 Congress enacted a new section 4 of FIFRA, which prescribes specific reregistration
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Id. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(iii).
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298
Id. § 136d(a)(2).
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40 C.F.R. Part 159. In addition to authority to require information reporting, EPA has broad enforcement authority,
which it shares with the states under FIFRA. EPA generally is responsible for manufacturer/producer enforcement, while
the States have primary responsibility for user enforcement. The manufacturer/producer enforcement provisions give the
Agency authority to register pesticide establishments, (7 U.S.C. § 136e). to inspect and to take samples, (Id. § 136g). to
inspect books and records, (Id. § 136f), and to issue "stop sale, use or removal" orders and to institute seizure actions (Id. §
136i-2). Pursuant to section 27 of FIFRA, a state must have adequate pesticide laws and regulations and must be
implementing such laws and regulations in order to maintain primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use
situations. Id. § 136v. The Agency can respond to an emergency requiring immediate action if a state is unwilling or
unable to respond. Id. § 136w-1. Under section 16(c), the Agency is authorized to seek an injunction against violations of
the Act in federal district court. Id. § 136n(c). A person who violates any provision of the Act may be subject to civil
penalties under section 14(a). Id. § 136l. The amount of the penalty is determined by a consideration of the
appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the business, the effect on the violator's ability to stay in business, and the
gravity of the violation. Id. § 136l(a)(4). Moreover, a person who knowingly violates any provision of the Act may be
subject to criminal penalties which carry larger fines and the possibility of a prison sentences. Id. § 136l(b).
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requirements intended to dramatically change both the pace and the nature of reregistration.302
The 1988 amendments require EPA to complete, over a 9-year period, the reregistration review of
each registered product containing any active ingredient initially registered before November 1,
1984.303 The amendments redirected the initial burden of identifying data gaps from EPA to the
affected registrants. Moreover, the amendment establishes a multi-phased process with a number
of deadlines that ensures that reregistration moves at a more accelerated pace. Failure of
registrants to meet the prescribed deadlines may result in suspension or cancellation of
registration.304
C. Cancellation and Suspension
EPA may cancel or suspend existing registrations based upon certain risk/benefit
determinations. FIFRA section 6(b), which specifically addresses cancellation, states that EPA
may issue a notice of intent to cancel if a pesticide or its labeling does not comply with FIFRA or
if when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, the pesticide
generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.305 Under section 6(b) there are
two types of cancellation actions: section 6(b)(1) -- notice of intent to cancel or change
classification; and section 6(b)(2) --notice of intent to hold a hearing to determine whether or not
registration should be cancelled or classification changed.306 For both sections 6(b)(1) and 6(b)(2),
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7 U.S.C. § 136a-1.
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Id. § 136d(b). FIFRA requires review of the proposed cancellation notice by the Secretary of Agriculture (USDA) and
the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP). The statute dictates that the notice must be submitted to USDA and the SAP
60 days prior to notification of the registrant or publication (whichever comes first). If USDA and the SAP do not submit
comments within 30 days, EPA may publish the notice. If USDA and the SAP do submit comments, EPA may, after
reviewing such comments, withdraw the notice, issue a final notice without modification, or modify the notice, as
appropriate.
Once the notice is published, persons adversely affected have 30 days to request a hearing. If no such hearing is requested,
the notice of intent to cancel becomes final. If a hearing is requested, the hearing is considered a formal adjudicatory
proceeding and is held before an ALJ. Such a. proceeding is governed by the Agency's rules at 40 CFR Part 164.
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Id. § 136d.
Administrative review, suspension
(b) Cancellation and change in Classification
If it appears to the Administrator that a pesticide or its labeling . . . does not comply with the provisions of this subchapter
or, when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment, the Administrator may issue a notice of the Administrator’s intent either(1) to cancel its registration or to changes it classification together with the reasons (including the actual basis) for the
Administrator’s action, or
(2) to hold a hearing to determine whether or not its registration should be canceled or its classification changed.
. . . In determining whether to issue any such notice, the Administrator shall include among those factors to be taken into
303
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EPA must make a finding that the risks appear to outweigh the benefits. For section 6(b)(2),
however, a hearing may be held when the Administrator's judgment concerning the risks and
benefits of a pesticide is only tentative.307 Before taking final action under section 6(b), the
Administrator must determine whether any unreasonable risks posed by a pesticide's use can be
sufficiently reduced by regulatory measures short of cancellation. Such measures include the
imposition of additional labeling restrictions and/or the classification of the pesticide for restricted
use. If the Administrator determines that adequate risk reduction cannot be achieved by such
regulatory measures, the registration of the pesticide for that use must be cancelled. An EPA Final
Order on a cancellation is reviewable in District Court.308
FIFRA also authorizes EPA to suspend the registration of a pesticide based on certain
findings. FIFRA provides for two types of suspension proceedings -- "ordinary" and "emergency"
suspension.309 Ordinary suspension is issued where such action is necessary to prevent an

account the impact of the action proposed in such notice on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food
prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy. At least 60 days prior to sending such notice to the registrant or making
public such notice, whichever occurs first, the Administrator shall provide the Secretary of Agriculture with a copy of such
notice and an analysis of such impact on the agricultural economy.
. . . The proposed action shall become final and effective at the end of 30 days from receipt by the registrant, or publication
of a notice . . . , unless within that time either (I) the registrant makes the necessary corrections, if possible, or (ii) a request
for a hearing is made by a person adversely affected by the notice. . . In taking any final action under this subsection, the
Administrator shall consider restricting a pesticide’s use or uses as an alternative to cancellation and shall fully explain the
reasons for these restrictions, and shall include among those factors to be taken into account the impact of such final action
on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy.
Id. § 136d(b).
307
There is no distinction between § 136d(b)(1) and § 136d(b)(2) hearing in the manner of conduct, burden of proof, or
nature of initial decision by ALJ. One issue generally considered as part of the cancellation process is whether the Agency
should allow the continued sale and use of existing stocks of the pesticide.
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Of the more than 60 pesticide cancellations and suspensions, only approximately one third have been judicially
reviewed. RODGERS, supra note 190, at 480. EPA’s refusal to initiate proceedings to cancel or suspend a registration is
considered a final order reviewable in District Court. See Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
309
7 U.S.C. §136d(c) (2004) - Suspension
(1) Order
If the Administrator determines that action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for
cancellation or change in classification proceedings, the Administrator may, by order, suspend the registration of the
pesticide immediately. Except as provided in paragraph (3) no order of suspension may be issued under this subsection
unless the Administrator has issued or at the same time issues, a notice of intention to cancel; the registration, or change the
classification of the pesticide under subsection (b) of this section. Except s provided in paragraph (3), the Administrator
shall notify the registrant prior to issuing any suspension order. Such notice shall include findings pertaining to the
question of “imminent hazard.” The registrant shall then have an opportunity . . .for an expedited hearing before the
Administrator in the question of whether an imminent hazard exists.
(2) Expedited hearing
If no request for a hearing is submitted to the Administrator within five days of the registrant’s receipt of the notification . .
. , the suspension order may be issued and shall take effect and shall not be reviewable by a court. If a hearing is requested,
it shall commence within five days of the receipt of the request for such hearing unless the registrant and the Administrator
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imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation proceeding. "Imminent hazard" is
defined as a substantial likelihood of serious harm during the duration of cancellation
proceedings.310 The term is not limited to a concept of crisis. The function of a suspension action
is to assess the evidence required to determine the risks and benefits for the period involved, not an
ultimate resolution of the cancellation issues.311 In an ordinary suspension, notification to the
registrant of the intent to suspend and an opportunity for a hearing is required prior to
effectiveness of suspension. Only a registrant may request an adjudicatory hearing. The order
becomes effective either after a favorable decision following a hearing, or 5 days after notification
if no hearing is requested.312 If no hearing is requested, the suspension order is not reviewable by
a court.313 If a hearing is requested, an expedited administrative adjudicatory hearing is held
before an ALJ, in which interested persons can intervene. The sole issue at the hearing is whether
an imminent hazard exists.314
An emergency suspension order, which is effective immediately, may be issued if an
emergency exists that does not permit even an expedited hearing before suspension takes place.315
Registrants have 5 days to request an expedited hearing and the hearing must begin within 5 days
of the Agency's receipt of such a hearing request.316 If an expedited hearing is requested, the
emergency order remains in effect until the issuance of a final suspension order following the
hearing.317 No party other than the registrant and the Agency may participate in the expedited
hearing, except for the filing of briefs.318 An emergency suspension order is subject to immediate
agree that it shall commence at a later time.
(3) Emergency order
Whenever the Administrator determines that an emergency exists that does not permit the Administrator to hold a hearing
before suspending, the Administrator may issue a suspension order in advance of notice to the Registrant. The
Administrator may issue an emergency order under this paragraph before issuing a notice of intention to cancel the
registration or change the classification of the pesticide under subsection (b) . . .In the case of an emergency order,
paragraph (2) shall apply except that (A) the order of suspension shall be in effect pending the expeditious completion of
the remedies provided by that paragraph and the issuance of the final rode on suspension, and n(b) no party other than the
registrant and the Administrator shall participate except that any person adversely affected may file briefs within the time
allotted by the Agency’s rules.
310
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review in District Court.319
D. Enter GMOs
Pesticidal GMOs are regulated under FIFRA in much the same way as are traditional
chemical pesticides. 320 For pesticidal GMOs, this means using FIFRA to regulate the “pesticide”
319

Id. § 136d(c)(4). The export of pesticides is regulated under section 17 of FIFRA. Section 17 reflects a somewhat
limited role for EPA in the export of pesticides. The primary emphasis of this section is on the provision of information to
foreign governments. Section 17 (a) provides that no pesticide intended solely for export to any foreign country shall be
deemed in violation of the Act if it is prepared or packaged according to the specifications or directions or the foreign
purchaser and in the case of unregistered pesticides, if prior to export the foreign purchaser signs a statement
acknowledging that the purchaser understands that such pesticide is not registered for use in the United States. In addition,
section 17 (b) mandates notice to all countries of certain regulatory control actions taken by EPA (section 17(b)).
Specifically, section 17(a) provides:
(a) Pesticides and Devices Intended for Export. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no pesticide or device
or active ingredient used in producing a pesticide intended solely for export to any foreign country shall be deemed in
violation of this Act (1) when prepared or packed according to the specifications or directions of the foreign purchaser . . .;
and (2) in the case of any pesticide other than a pesticide registered under section 3 or sold under section 6(a)(1) of this Act,
if, prior to export, the foreign purchaser has signed a statement acknowledging that such pesticide is not registered for use
in the Untied States and cannot be not sold in the United States under this Act. A copy of that statement shall be
transmitted to an appropriate official of the government of the importing country.
Id. § 136o(a).
Section 17(b) provides:
(b) Cancellation Notices Furnished to Foreign Governments. -- Whenever a registration, or cancellation or suspension of
the registration of a pesticide becomes effective, or ceases to be effective, the Administrator shall transmit through the State
Department notification thereof to the governments of other countries and to appropriate international agencies. Such
notification shall, upon request, include all information related to the cancellation or suspension of the registration of the
pesticide and information concerning other pesticides that are registered under section 3 of this Act and that could be used
in lieu of such pesticide.
Id. § 136o(b).
320
The decision to treat GMOs similarly to traditional pesticides is rooted in the early U.S. biotechnology policies of the
1980's. The United states Government's first systematic attempt to address the regulation of biotechnology in a
comprehensive fashion was with the publication of the 1984 document entitled "Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology.” Notice of Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed.
Reg. 50,8566 (1984). The purpose of this document was "to provide a concise index to U.S. laws related to biotechnology,
to clarify the policies of the major regulatory agencies that will be involved in reviewing research and products of
biotechnology, to describe a scientific advisory mechanisms for assessment of biotechnology issues, and to explain how the
activities of the Federal agencies in biotechnology will be coordinated.” Id. In 1986, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy ("OSTP") published in the Federal Register "Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology:
Announcement of Policy and Notice for Public Comment" ("the coordinated framework"). 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986).
This approach was based on a belief that rDNA technology in itself does not create risk. See Steen, supra note 228, at 766.
Instead, certain types of products of biotechnology may pose risks that can be addressed in the same fashion as regulatory
agencies address the risks posed by traditional chemical products. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the executive branch
of the US government was focused on promoting biotechnology as the US’s hope for strong economic future. The feeling
at the time was that the US how allowed Japan to beat it in the electronics industry. The federal government was
determined not to allow this to happen with the biotech industry. The message was clear that regulatory agencies were not
to stand in the way of biotechnology. There would not be any new biotechnology legislation and agencies would continue
to rely on existing regulatory programs. For pesticidal GMOs this meant FIFRA. Moreover, a raging debate ensued over
whether regulatory agencies should be regulating the “process” of genetic engineering or the “products” of genetic
engineering. At that time, it was determined that from a risk standpoint, the process was irrelevant and that agencies should
regulate only products of biotechnology. Under the coordinated framework, the regulatory approach taken by U.S.
regulatory agencies, including EPA, has been to rely on existing statutes and to focus on the “product” rather than the
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rather than targeting regulation at the process by which the pesticide is created.321 GMOs that are
intended to kill, disrupt, repel or mitigate pests are regulated in much the same way as traditional
chemical pesticides under FIFRA. As described above, section 2(u) of FIFRA defines the term
"pesticide" as: "(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying,
repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use
as a plant regulator, defoliator, or desiccant * * * ." This definition is very broad and can include
living organisms and substances produced by living organisms as well as traditional chemical
pesticides. The definition of “pesticide” in FIFRA does not depend on the process by which a
particular pesticide is produced. EPA has interpreted this definition to include biological
pesticides and genetically modified pesticides. Thus, pesticidal GMOs must be registered under
FIFRA prior to sale or distribution in the U.S. The standard for registration is the same for
pesticidal GMOs are for traditional chemical. EPA has developed some data requirements
specifically geared to address potential risks from microbial pesticides, including microbial
GMOs.322
One category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under FIFRA includes microbial
GMOs. EPA has regulated naturally-occurring microbial pesticides, such as B.t., for many years.
Microbial pesticides are regulated in much the same way as traditional pesticides at the large-scale
testing and registration stages. EPA has expressed concern about the potential for adverse effects
associated with small-scale environmental testing of certain microbial pesticides, both naturallyoccurring and genetically engineered. Small-scale testing of most traditional pesticides generally is
considered to pose very limited risks, and thus, typically is not regulated by EPA. Because
microbial pesticides are living organisms that have the potential to reproduce and spread in the
environment, however, even small-scale testing has the potential to present unreasonable adverse
“process” used to create the product. Id.
321
EPA's primary authority for regulating agricultural biotechnology products be found in two statutes: FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §
136-136y (2004), and FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2004). Under FIFRA, EPA has the authority to address all
environmental and human health issues associated with pesticide use. Under FFDCA, EPA has the authority to set
tolerances for pesticide residues in or on food. EPA also regulates biologicals and biotechnology products that are not
pesticides, food, or drugs under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2004). TSCA
grants EPA the authority to screen new chemical substances and impose controls to prevent unreasonable risks, and,
through rulemaking, to acquire information and impose restrictions to prevent unreasonable risks on existing chemical
substances. Although some agricultural biotechnology products may fall within the purview of TSCA, the majority of
agricultural biotechnology products regulated by EPA are considered pesticides under EPA’s broad definition of the term,
and thus, are regulated under FIFRA and FFDCA.

65

effects on the environment.323 Thus, EPA has promulgated a rule that requires notification prior to
any small scale testing of certain microbial pesticides, including microbial GMOs.324
Another category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under FIFRA are pesticidal
genetically modified plants, or “plant incorporated protectants.”325 In July 2001, EPA published its
long-awaited rule for the regulation of plant-incorporated protectants under FIFRA.326 The plantincorporated protectant rule took approximately 10 years to develop. Countless public hearings,
scientific advisory council meetings, Congressional hearings and interagency negotiations were
held.327 Despite all of the these efforts, however, the resultant rule is quite modest and does not
really tackle the complex and novel risks of GMOs. The thrust of the new rule is merely to define
the scope of what types of pesticidal GMOs EPA believes warrant regulation.328 EPA has identified
several categories that it has exempted from any FIFRA regulation because they are low risk.329
One such category is GMOs that so closely resemble the types of plants that could be created
322

The data requirement for microbial pesticides can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 158.740 (2005).
See 59 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 172).
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A plant-incorporated protectant is defined as a pesticidal substance that is intended to be produced in a living plant, or
in the produce thereof, and the genetic material necessary for its production. 40 C.F.R. § 152.3.
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66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 152 and 174). EPA does not yet have any rules governing GM
animals. For an historical discussion of the Plant-Incorporated Protectant Rule, see Angelo, supra note 224.
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Under EPA's definition of plant-incorporated protectants, all substances produced by plants and intended for a
pesticidal purpose are within EPA's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the plant is genetically modified. However, not all
plant-incorporated protectants within EPA’s jurisdiction warrant regulation under FIFRA. EPA believes that many plantincorporated protectants do not warrant any regulation under FIFRA because they pose low probability of risk and will not
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. For example, in 1982, EPA promulgated a regulation under FIFRA
§ 25(b) that exempted all biological control agents from the requirements of FIFRA, except for certain microorganisms. 40
C.F.R. §152.20(3). This exemption was promulgated because EPA found that macroorganisms used as biological control
agents were adequately regulated by other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
329
EPA’s first attempt to describe its plans to regulate plant-incorporated protectants was in early 1994. On January 21,
1994, EPA held a joint meeting of a sub-panel of the Agency's Scientific Advisory Panel and the Biotechnology Science
Advisory Committee to address certain scientific issues related to the regulation of pesticidal substances produced in plants.
For the meeting, EPA made available to the public a draft proposal of a comprehensive policy and four draft proposed
rules (together referred to as the "draft proposal") that were developed under FIFRA and FFDCA. On November 23, 1994,
EPA published in the Federal Register somewhat modified versions of these draft documents (together referred to as “the
proposal”). 59 Fed. Reg. 496 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,519 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,535 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,542
(1994); and 59 Fed. Reg. 60,545 (1994). The proposal was intended to clarify the status of plant-incorporated protectants
(referred to as “plant-pesticides” in the 1994 proposal and later renamed plant-incorporated protectants) under FIFRA and
FFDCA and outline the scope of what types of plant-incorporated protectants EPA believed warranted regulation based on
risk/benefit considerations. Under the proposal, many plant-incorporated protectants would not be subject to regulation
because they pose a low potential for risk to humans and/or the environment. Others would be subject to regulation, but
would be regulated somewhat differently than conventional pesticides because of the unique nature of plant-incorporated
protectants. The proposal outlined how EPA intended to assess plant-incorporated protectants at different stages of
environmental testing and at the sale and distribution stage. The final plant-incorporated protectant rule, promulgated in
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naturally or through traditional plant breeding. An example of this would be introducing a
substance normally produced by one variety of corn in to another variety of corn versus introducing
a substance normally produced only in bacteria into corn. This type of plant-incorporated
protectant would be exempt because it is not posing any new risks that would not have evolved
naturally or through traditional breeding.330 If a pesticidal GMO does not meet one of these
exemptions, however, the regulatory process, is virtually identical to the regulatory process for all
pesticides - namely, registration based on a cost/benefit analysis and labeling restrictions on use.331
EPA has not yet established specific data requirements for genetically modified plants that act as
pesticides.332
V. IS FIFRA ECO-PRAGMATIC?
Although the basic regulatory framework of FIFRA dates back to 1972, with some of its
provisions such as the misbranding prohibition dating back to the early consumer-protection
statutes of the early 20th century, and despite the fact that a statute with the word “rodenticide” in it
would hardly be expected to be cutting-edge, FIFRA is surprising eco-pragmatic. In fact,
somewhat ironically given the state of pesticide regulation today, the earliest applications of
FIFRA have threads of eco-pragmatism running through them. Even by today’s standards, the
1972 DDT cancellation decision represents a fairly sophisticated ecological analysis focused on:
the tendency of DDT and its metabolites to persist in the soil and aquasphere, the tendency of
DDT to be readily transported by leaching, erosion, run-off and volatilization, DDT’s fat soluble
characteristic which enables it to collect and concentrate in animal fat tissue, the fact that DDT can
bioaccumulate as it moves up the food chain, and the fact that once accumulated DDT is toxic to
animals and humans and inhibits the ability of fish and other wildlife species to regenerate.333
EPA did not shy away from tackling the difficult issue of how to take into account the risks may
occur in the future due to the persistent nature of the pesticide. EPA also was not paralyzed by a
lack of certainty in data. For example, even though EPA recognized that the degree of

2001, adopted some, but not all of the exemptions proposed in 1994.
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generally, 66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (2001).
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1972).
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transportability of DDT was unknown, EPA utilized data showing that DDT was found in remote
areas of the world and in ocean species, such as whales, as providing enough evidence from which
a logical reference could be drawn that DDT is readily transported in the environment.334
Moreover, EPA concluded that persistence and biomagnification in themselves were a “cause of
concern, given the unknown and possibly forever undeterminable long-range effects of DDT in
man and the environment.”335 Thus, even in 1972, EPA recognized the uncertainty surrounding
ecological effects data, while at the same time employing a precautionary approach to prevent
uncertain, possibly devastating effects that may occur in the long term.
When the group petitioners who opposed cancellation argued that DDT is only one toxic
substance in a polluted environment and that therefore whatever its laboratory effects, it cannot be
shown as the causative agent of injury to wildlife, EPA responded that this argument “does not
redeem DDT, but only underscores the magnitude of effect that will be necessary for cleaning up
the environment.”336 Persuaded by evidence showing metabolites of DDT cause eggshell thinning
in certain bird species despite some contradictory evidence, EPA found it sufficient that there was
“laboratory data and observation data, and in addition, a scientific hypothesis, which might explain
the phenomenon.”337 EPA further found that there were no label restrictions that could completely
prevent effects on nontarget organisms, persistence and transport in the environment, or
biomagnification. Accordingly, cancellation was the only available risk-reduction measure.
EPA’s analysis of the benefits of DDT in formulating its decision to cancel was also fairly
sophisticated and in some ways did a better job of considering benefits than many more recent
EPA decisions regarding cancellation or suspension of pesticides. The benefits analysis focused
on the availability of alternatives including non-chemical pest management programs and the fact
that the crops protected by DDT were not in short supply. EPA found that DDT was not necessary
to ensure an adequate supply of cotton at a reasonable cost, given that only 35 percent of the
cotton-producing acreage at the time was treated by DDT.338 In contrast to many recent EPA
decisions, where non-chemical pest control alternatives and emphasis on availability of crops are
conspicuously absent, or at least play a very minimal role, in the decision-making process, EPA’s
334
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1972 DDT cancellation decision takes a broader look at the cost/benefit analysis than merely
counting up dollars and cents on each side of the equation. In fact, EPA’s 1972 DDT cancellation
decision has other indicia of an eco-pragmatic approach. For example, in the final order, EPA’s
statement that “the risk/benefit equation is a dynamic one” can be viewed as a foreshadowing of
the arguments for flexibility and adaptive management that are at the center of eco-pragmatic
scholarship.
Subsequent to the DDT cancellation, EPA brought a number of cancellation and
suspension actions, through which the agency’s interpretation of the statutory standard,
“unreasonable effects on man and the environment,” was further developed.339 This series of
FIFRA cancellation and suspension cases cemented the interpretation of FIFRA as containing a
cost/benefit balancing standard, rather than the open-ended balancing standard that, at least
arguably, it was intended to be.340 As Professor William Rodgers has described the legislative
history of FIFRA, the “unreasonable adverse effects” language was intended to be an
environmentally stringent standard for registration.341 The Senate Commerce Committee, which
created the standard, described it as not tolerating any adverse effects, “unless there are overriding
benefits from the use of a pesticide.”342 Accordingly, it appears that the standard contemplated by
the Senate drafters of the 1972 FIFRA amendments intended that, although economic and social
factors should be considered and balanced against environmental risks, the balancing would not be
a simple accounting of dollars and cents on two sides of the equation, with the pesticide winning
the right to registration as long as the scale was tipped, no matter how slightly in favor of the
benefits provided by the pesticide. Instead, the Senate drafters appeared to intend that, where
environmental risks exist, the analysis would favor registration only where the risks were
outweighed by “overriding benefits.” An example of an overriding benefit might be where a
338
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particular pesticide is important to fighting a significant public health problem such as West Nile
Disease, and where other less risky control alternatives are not available or are too costly.343 Other
overriding benefits might include situations where a particular pesticide is necessary to the
maintenance of a segment of agriculture, where nonchemical or less risky alternatives are not
available and to grow the crop without the pesticide would result in severe economic losses or
dramatically increased food prices. However, an overriding benefit would not be found in a
situation where, if the pesticide were taken off the market, the evidence showed only that chemical
companies would lose money or farmers would have to switch to other existing alternative pest
control practices, which might involve some additional cost. If FIFRA were amended to make
clear that only overriding benefits could outweigh significant environmental risks, then potential
registrants would face a more stringent standard and pesticides that posed significant risk would
not routinely be registered.
Certainly there is much that can be done to mold FIFRA into a more eco-pragmatic law.
Nevertheless, eco-pragmatic themes such as adaptive management and an ecological integrity
baseline run throughout the existing statute. The concept of an ecological baseline can be found in
a numbers of places in FIFRA. Specifically, the standard for registration under FIFRA is designed
to address a large array of ecological concerns, as well as human health concerns. FIFRA’s
regulatory standard is aimed at preventing “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” 344
The word “environment” is defined very broadly by FIFRA to included water, air, land, and all
plants and man and other animals living therein, and the interrelationships which exist among
these.” 345 Thus, FIFRA not only broadly includes land, water, air and plant and animal resources,
within the definition of “environment,” but also includes the “interrelationships” among these
resources as encompassed within the definition.
Moreover, FIFRA contemplates an ecological baseline in its premarket evaluation. Under
FIFRA, a registration is required prior to the sale, distribution or commercialization of any
343
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pesticide product. Moreover, except for in limited circumstances qualifying for an exemption,
some level of regulatory review is required prior to the release of any pesticide into the
environment even if only for experimentation purposes. Unlike some other environmental
regulatory programs, such as the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA),

346

FIFRA imposes a

somewhat precautionary approach in that pesticides, in that they are by definition intended to kill
or disrupt living organisms, are presumed to pose unreasonable risks, and therefore, they cannot be
sold or distributed without a premarket environmental review. 347
Moreover, FIFRA’s precautionary approach is manifest in its allocation of the burden of
proof. While not expressly stated in the language of FIFRA, pursuant to a series or administrative
and judicial decisions, the burden of proof that a pesticide does not pose an unreasonable adverse
effect of the environment remains at all time on the proponent of registration or continued
registration.348 Thus, a proponent of registration is required to demonstrate it meets this burden
prior to a pesticide being registered. Further, if EPA proposes cancellation of a pesticide or use of
the pesticide, the burden of proof rests on the proponent of continued registration during any
cancellation or suspension hearing that may ensue.
With regard to adaptive management, FIFRA also shows surprising signs of being ecopragmatic. Many of FIFRA’s provisions are specifically designed to seek new information, to
adapt to new information or to tailor the level of regulation to the level of certainty of risks based
on the sufficiency of available data. For example, FIFRA establishes two different levels of
registration – full registration and conditional registration. EPA may conditionally register a
pesticide under certain circumstances, despite the fact that sufficient data have not been generated
to support full registration. As described above, such circumstances may be where a new use is
proposed for a pesticide that is already registered for another use. In such a situation, sufficient
346
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data exists to support the existing use, but additional data may be required to support full
registration of the newly proposed use. Under such circumstances, EPA may conditionally register
the pesticide for the new use if EPA determines that the conditional registration would not
significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
Accordingly, through the conditional registration process, a degree of flexibility is built into
FIFRA, allowing products to be used in new ways prior to full data generation.349
Other provisions of FIFRA that allow unique circumstances and changing information to
be taken into consideration include the emergency exemption provisions, the state registration
provisions and the experimental use permit provisions. The emergency exemption provision of
section 18 of FIFRA authorizes EPA to grant an emergency exemption to any state or federal
agency if emergency conditions – i.e., urgent non-routine conditions for which no economically or
environmentally feasible alternative practices that provide adequate control are available. Thus,
section 18 provides flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, which could include the
outbreak and spread of a new pest or the spread of a public health disease. In such circumstances,
EPA is authorized to act quickly to control the problem before the pest or disease vector is widely
disseminated and to minimize the harm, without waiting for a full data set to be produced to
support registration.
The state registration provision in section 24(c) authorize states to issue registration to
meet special local needs. Accordingly, this provision allows states to take into consideration local
circumstances that may warrant the use of pesticide products or uses that are not generally
approved under FIFRA for nationwide use. Thus, in a state where a particular pest causes more
severe harm than in other states, the cost/benefit analysis for the use of the pesticide in that state
may have a different result from the nationwide cost/benefit analysis for that use, and accordingly,
a special local needs registration may be granted for that state only. In this way, FIFRA’s
flexibility allows registrations to be tailored to the special agricultural, environmental, economic or
other needs of a state.
Finally, the experimental use permit provision continued in FIFRA section 5 is another
example of the flexibility afforded by FIFRA in tailoring the amount of data necessary to the level
349
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of risk resulting from a particular use. FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue permits for the
field testing of pesticides necessary to generate data to support full registration. Thus, as the risk
from exposure to a pesticide increases (i.e., as it moves from lab testing, to small-scale field
testing, to full-scale use), progressively greater data requirements attach to ensure that sufficient
data are available to make an unreasonable adverse effects determination for each level of use.
Similarly, the ability for EPA to classify a pesticide as either general or restricted use allows EPA
to adapt the amount of regulation required to the risks associated with the particular pesticide. By
classifying a pesticide as restricted use, EPA ensures that users of the pesticide will have at least
some level of training and supervision to reduce the risks associated with the use of that pesticide.
With regard to taking advantage of new information as it develops – or requiring new
information as new testing methodologies become available or new risk scenarios are understood–
FIFRA also contains some relatively eco-pragmatic approaches. Because hundreds of pesticides
on the market were registered prior to the current registration data requirements being in place,
FIFRA section 4 contains a detailed “reregistration” process designed to ensure that older
pesticides are reexamined in light of more stringent regulatory standards and more sophisticated
testing methodologies that have come into existence since the times of the early registrations of
many pesticides. The current reregistration provisions include a multi-phased process with a
number of deadlines, which must be met to avoid suspension or cancellation. This reregistration
approach has been an extremely time-consuming, burdensome and expensive process. If future
changes to the registration standard, data requirements or testing methodologies warrant another
round of reregistration, it also could be extremely costly in terms of time and resources.
Nevertheless, such a process may be the only way to comprehensively address significant changes.
While reregistration applied to all pesticides registered prior to 1984, there are a number of
FIFRA data requirements that apply to previously registered pesticides in a more targeted manner.
For example, FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B) authorizes EPA to require holders of existing registrations
to provide additional data support the continued registration of a pesticide whenever EPA finds
that “additional data are required to maintain in effect an existing registration of a pesticide.” 350
Finally, under section 6(a)(2) of FIFRA, if at time after the registration of a pesticide, the
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registrant obtains in any way factual information regarding unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment of the pesticide, the registrant is required to submit such information to EPA.
Unreasonable adverse effects information submitted to EPA may lead to EPA requesting
additional data under section 3(c)(2)(B), EPA initiating a cancellation or suspension action, EPA
reclassifying a general use pesticide as a restricted use pesticide, or some other form of regulation
to ensure that the pesticide will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. Thus,
FIFRA contemplates a process of ongoing evaluations of pesticide risks as new information
becomes available. With regard to pesticidal GMOs, EPA has taken the section 6(a)(2) approach a
step farther to require ongoing reporting of adverse environmental effects data, not only for
registered pesticides, but also for pesticides that qualify for a plant-incorporated protectant
exemption.351 In its plant-incorporated protectant rule, EPA requires that any person who
produces, for sale or distribution, a plant-incorporated protectant exempt under the rule, who
obtains any information regarding adverse effects on human health or the environment alleged to
have been caused by the plant-incorporated protectant, must submit such information to EPA.352
VI. REINVENTING FIFRA THROUGH ECO-PRAGMATISM
Notwithstanding all of these promising elements, FIFRA has not lived up to its ecopragmatic promise. As described more fully below, a combination of statutory shortcomings,
unfortunate interpretations, and problems with implementation and enforcement, have resulted in
FIFRA’s lack of success as an environmental protection statute.

Accordingly, there is

considerable room for improvement. By revising FIFRA to follow the eco-pragmatic approach
and to more consciously incorporate ecological principles, the statute could be improved
substantially.
A. Reinventing the Cost/Benefit Balancing
For FIFRA to be reinvented in an eco-pragmatic mold, a number of changes are indicated.
First, as described above, EPA’s cost/benefit approach to registration and cancellation under
FIFRA, must be replaced with and open-ended balancing approach, which appears to be Congress’
351
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intent in drafting the “unreasonable adverse effects on man and the environment” standard. Under
such an approach, although economic and social costs would be factors to be considered in
determining whether to allow a pesticide to be sold or distributed in the U.S., they would not be
used to “balance” away significant human health or environmental risks. Such risks would only be
permitted in cases where there are overriding benefits of the pesticide, taking into account a
number of specified considerations in the open-ended balancing.
The plain language of FIFRA, as it currently stands, does not mandate a strict cost/benefit
balancing. Instead, as Shapiro and Glicksman have suggested, on its face, FIFRA could be read to
contain a open-ended balancing standard.

As described above, FIFRA’s definition of

“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” means any unreasonable risk to man or the
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the
use of any pesticide. Congress’ only direction to EPA was to “take into account” economic and
social as well as environmental considerations.

Nevertheless, EPA has interpreted and

implemented this standard as more of a strict cost/benefit balancing.353 However, at least with
regard to the registration of pesticides, EPA does not really engage in a true cost/benefit analysis
because it does not require applicants to demonstrate the benefits of the pesticide. Moreover, as
described above, EPA generally does not require efficacy data prior to registering a pesticide.
EPA has, by rule, waived all requirements to submit efficacy data unless the pesticide product
bears a claim to control pest microorganisms that pose a threat to human health or a claim to
control vertebrates (such as rodents, birds, bats, canids, and skunks) that may directly or indirectly
transmit diseases to humans.354 Accordingly, at the time of a registration decision, EPA does not
know how efficacious a particular pesticide is. Further, at the time of registration, EPA does not
conduct an analysis to determine whether more efficacious alternatives, including non-chemical
alternatives, exist. Thus, at the time of registration, EPA does not know the extent of the benefits
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of the pesticide. Instead, benefits are assumed.355 When coupled with the limited cost data that
EPA considers, it can be seen that EPA’s cost/benefit analysis to support registration is not a true
cost/benefit analysis and is flawed in many respects.
Technology-based approaches, which have worked well in other areas of pollution control
law,356 may not work so well where the goal is to release substances into the environment with the
intent to kill living organisms. Thus, a different approach may be necessary. FIFRA differs from
many other environmental laws in that the environmental risks that are sought to be reduced by
other such laws are by-products of activities that are intended to produce some other product or
service (e.g., air pollution from energy production), whereas, with FIFRA, the pesticide that poses
the risk is the intended product. Accordingly, under FIFRA, the imposition of technology to
reduce risks would take a different form that with other technological controls that seek, for
example, to reduce air pollution emissions. The FIFRA analogue of the technology-based
standard, therefore, is an alternative reduced risk method of pest control. Such an alterative can be
either a lower risk chemical pesticide, or other non-chemical methods of pest control, such as
biological control or cultural control.357
FIFRA’s balancing standard should be revised to make clear that it is an open-ended
balancing rather than a strict cost/benefit balancing. In addition to the economic considerations
that the statutory standard directs EPA to consider in conducting this balancing, the statute should
be revised to explicitly direct EPA to take into consideration additional factors aimed at ensuring
that ecological concerns are adequately valued in the balancing. For example, considerations such
as the degree of uncertainty regarding risks, the level of probability or risk, the degree of harm that
could occur, the likelihood of a pesticide to spread or reproduce in the environment, either through
biological means as in the case of GMOs or physical means,358 are all factors that should be given
serious consideration in any open-ended cost/benefit balancing.
355
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Another recommended revision to EPA’s cost/benefit approach to FIFRA registration is to
require that the benefits provided by a pesticide actually be demonstrated. As discussed above,
FIFRA does not mandate, and EPA has opted not to require that efficacy data be provided when
registering a pesticide359. Nor does EPA require that applicants for pesticide registration provide
data showing that there are not cost-effective alternative pest control methods available. Likewise,
EPA does not require applicants to provide information demonstrating that their proposed
pesticide is relatively beneficial, either environmentally or economically over other existing
pesticides or pest control methods that are available to address the target pest. EPA merely
assumes that a pesticide manufacturer would not incur the costs of developing and marketing a
pesticide if it was not efficacious and did not have benefits and that any pesticides that are not
beneficial will be eliminated through market forces. Consequently, a manufacturer could obtain a
registration for a pesticide without ever having to show that the pesticide works for its intended
purpose, let alone that the pesticide is necessary for combating particular pests or that existing
chemical or non-chemical alternatives are not available. Virtually no chemical pesticide is without
at least some risk. Thus, it is at least possible, if not likely, that pesticides are being registered that
pose some risks, but have not been demonstrated to have any significant environmental, economic
or societal benefit.
It is not until EPA begins to consider whether to cancel the registration of a pesticide that
EPA evaluates the benefits of the pesticide and whether there are viable alternatives available. In
determining whether EPA should proceed with cancellation, EPA necessarily makes a threshold
determination that the risks posed by a pesticide are significant. Once that determination is made,
EPA conducts a full cost/benefit analysis. It is only at this point that EPA takes a look at the
economic benefits of the pesticide. However, when conducting a benefits analysis, EPA’s analysis
of alternatives is typically limited to looking at other registered pesticides for the same use (which
are assumed to be efficacious if they are registered). EPA’s consideration of non-chemical
alternative pest control techniques such as cultural control, biological control or organic farming
soil, water or air, and the tendency of a pesticide to bioaccumulate.
359
The lack of a requirement for efficacy data is in contrast to other licensing statues, such as the licensing provisions of the
FFDCA governing the approval of new drugs, which explicitly requires a finding that a drug is “effective” as part of the
premarket review process. A new drug is considered to be “effective” if there is a general recognition among experts,
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U.S.C. § 111 (2004).

77

practices has proven to be extremely limited and cursory. Moreover, when evaluating whether
existing chemical alternatives are available for the target pest, EPA does not conduct a
comparative risk analysis, which leads to the situation where a less risky pesticide may be
cancelled because other alternatives exist, but as more and more pesticides are cancelled, the
benefits of the remaining pesticides grow. Thus, the benefits of the “last pesticide standing” will
be very high because no alternatives exists. Accordingly, the last pesticide standing will have
benefits that outweigh the risks, even if the risks are relatively high. This problem could be solved
by requiring a true benefits analysis for each registered pesticide, including a consideration of nonchemical alternatives, and conducting relative risk analysis, that compares the risks of pesticides
targeted toward a particular pest.
It should be noted that although EPA does not routinely consider the relative risks of
alternative pesticides when making registration or cancellation decisions, EPA has implemented
certain policies to encourage the development and registration of lower risk pesticides. In 1997,
EPA issued Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 97-3, which sets forth EPA’s policy for the
expedited review of conventional pesticides under the reduced risk initiative and of biological
pesticides.360 The goal of the policy is to encourage the development, registration and use of
lower-risk pesticides products “which would result in reduced risks to human health and the
environment, when compared to existing alternatives.” To accomplish this goal, EPA offers the
incentive of an expedited registration review for qualifying products. Qualifying pesticides
include those that may reasonably be expected to accomplish one or more of the following: (I)
Reduce the risks of pesticides to human health; (ii) Reduce the risks of pesticides to nontarget
organisms; (iii) Reduce the potential for contamination of groundwater, surface water or other
valued environmental resources; and (iv) Broaden the adoption of integrated pest management
strategies.” 361
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This policy was developed partially in response to the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act mandates to develop
procedures and guidelines for expedited pesticide review. The policy supersedes EPA’s prior reduced-risk criteria
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Moreover, with regard to the costs side of the equation, EPA’s analyses, although more
complete than for benefits, does not fully address the suite of environmental risks posed by
pesticides.362 Most of the indirect environmental and economic costs of pesticide use are not
considered.363 Environmental and economic costs which are not typically addressed in any
meaningful way in pesticide cost/benefit analyses includes: domestic animal poisonings and
contaminated products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, honeybee and
wild bee poisonings and reduced pollination, crop and product loss, ground and surface water
contamination, fishery losses, adverse effects on wild birds and mammals, adverse effects on
microorganisms and invertebrates, and adverse effects on ecosystem services. In 1993, Cornell
Professor David Pimmentel estimated that if the full environmental and social costs of pesticide
use are taken into account, including indirect effects, the environmental and social costs of
pesticide use would be significantly greater than $8 billion/year. 364 Pimentel estimated that of this
$8 billion/year, users of pesticides in agriculture pay only approximately $3 billion, leaving the
remaining $5 billion/year to be borne by society.

365

Moreover, Pimentel points out that many of

the true costs of pesticide use are either not well understood or difficult to quantify. Thus, the true
cost of pesticide use many be even higher. Unfortunately, very few of these costs are considered
by EPA when conducting the cost/benefit analysis it relies on to register a pesticide. Moreover,
the way that EPA has interpreted FIFRA, even a very small risk may warrant cancellation of a

impacts; very low toxicity to fish; less toxicity/risk to fish than alternatives; potential toxicity/risk to fish mitigatable/
similar toxicity to fish as alternatives, but significantly less exposure; low potential for groundwater contamination; lower
use rates than alternatives, fewer applications; low pest resistance potential (i.e., new mode of action); highly compatible
with IPM; efficacy. PR 97-3 at 3-4.
362
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pesticide, provided that the benefits are very low.366 Conversely, presumably, even a very high
risk may not trigger cancellation if the economic benefits to be achieved are very high. By this
logic, if a pesticide poses a great economic benefit, high risks to vulnerable species or ecosystems
will be tolerated.
Another area in which EPA’s current approach to regulating pesticides is lacking is with
regard to threatened and endangered species. The Center for Biological Diversity recently released
a report that found that EPA has approved registrations for pesticides that put more than 375
Endangered Species Act (ESA) listed species at risk.367 In the past several years, EPA has come
under considerable attack for its failure to adequately address risks to certain species listed under
the ESA368 from pesticide uses. Since the 1989 Defenders of Wildlife case, in which EPA was
found liable for a take under the ESA for allowing the continued registration of pesticides
containing strychnine, which harmed certain listed species, it has been clear that EPA not only has
an obligation to comply with the consultation requirements under the ESA when making decisions
regarding pesticide registration, but the agency also has an obligation to ensure that the permitted
use of a registered pesticide will not result in an unauthorized take of a listed species.
Nevertheless, in the years since the Defenders of Wildlife decision, EPA’s actions with
regard to the protection of listed species from pesticides have been limited and have failed to carry
out the mandates of the ESA. EPA’s policy regarding pesticides and endangered species has
consisted of requiring certain pesticide products labels to direct users to County Bulletins, which
identify on a map the range of listed species in that County. In the past several years, EPA has
come under increasing criticism for is failure to fulfill its obligations under the ESA.369 In
366
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particular in September of 2004, environmentalists won a significant victory when the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming a January 2004 U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington order which found that EPA had violated the ESA, because it had
failed to take steps to ensure that the registration of 54 pesticide would not jeopardize the survival
of listed salmon species. The Court’s ruling upheld the District Court’s injunction, which imposed
detailed buffer zones restricting the use of more than 30 pesticides along listed salmon supporting
waters in California, Oregon, and Washington states.370
EPA’s response to the criticisms regarding its failure to fully comply with the ESA, as well
as its recent court loses, has been to amend the joint regulations for consultation under section 7 of
the ESA.371 On August 5, 2004, EPA published in the Federal Register Final Rules that in essence
allow EPA to avoid consultation with the federal wildlife agencies regarding whether new
pesticides could cause harm to species listed under the ESA. Under the new rules, EPA will
conduct its own reviews, which will simplify the process.372 The agencies’ purported rationale for
the new rules is to provide a more efficient approach to make decisions on whether new pesticides
will “adversely affect” a listed species.373 However, environmental groups fear that the new rules
will undercut the ESA and put listed species at greater risk. Consequently, a number of
environmental organizations have filed suit alleging that the new rules violate the ESA.374
Concerns with rare or sensitive species or ecosystems can be addressed by an open-ended
balancing approach, where the agency is directed to consider costs, but not in a strict cost/benefit
monetized balancing. Under such an approach, although costs would be taken into consideration,
the agency could be directed to afford greater weight in its balancing to other specified factors
370

See Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004. This Order
was the third in a series of orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter. See Wash. Toxics
Coalition, et al. V. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Orders issued July 16, 2003 and August 8, 2003. All of these
Orders are available on EPA’s website at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html (Last visited January 7, 2005).
371
EPA adopted the new regulation as a joint regulation along with the two ESA consulting agencies, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Joint Counterpart
Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 402).
372
According to EPA officials, the consultation process was not working. EPA frequently ignored the consultation
requirements because it the “complexity of considering thousands of chemical’s potential effects on 1,200 ESA-listed
species.” See Http://www.eenes.net/Greenwire/searcharchive (last visited December 1, 2004).
373
See id. FWS and NMFS have completely only approximately 12 consultations on pesticides in the past 10 years. Since
2002, EPA has sent the wildlife agencies approximately 30 pesticide consultations, but very few have been completed. Id.
374
On September 23, 2004, a coalition of eight environmental groups filed suit challenging the Joint Counterpart
Endangered Species Act Regulation. Id.
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such Environmental Justice concerns, risks to threatened or endangered species, risks to rare
species, or risks to vulnerable ecosystems. It should be noted, however, that under this proposal,
the analysis would not end with the open-ended balancing. A second step, described more fully
below, would require the consideration of local factors, such as the presence of threatened or
endangered species, which could be effected by the use of the pesticide in that location.375
FIFRA’s cost/benefit approach also raises concerns with regard to the pesticidal GMOs.376
EPA’s cost/benefit approach raises particular concerns with regard to pesticidal GMOs that are
exported, or that naturally spread, to other parts of the world. For example, one risk concern with
plant-incorporated protectants is whether a favorable ecological niche exits for the modified plant
in its new environment that will enable the plant to thrive, and perhaps become a pest or disrupt
the balance of ecosystems. EPA may evaluate a particular pesticidal GMO under FIFRA and may
375

Although the possibility of harm to threatened or endangered species should be considered and afforded weight in the
open-ended balancing analysis, it would be noted that under the ESA, jeopardy to listed species can not be “balanced”
away by cost considerations. Accordingly, in the second-step localized decision-making process, specific risk to listed
species from the application of the particular pesticide in that particular locale must be evaluated under the ESA. Pesticide
applications that do not comply with the ESA would be prohibited.
376
The world-wide concern over the safety of biotechnology products is evidenced by the significant role that
biotechnology played in the negotiations of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. The agreement that
was eventually reached contained a number of provisions that were relevant to biotechnology. Two provisions in
particular, Article 8 (In-situ Conservation) and Article 19 (Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits) were
directed at addressing international concerns with biotechnology products. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
Article 8 of the Convention requires that Contracting Parties establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the
risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting from of biotechnology that could affect the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Neither FIFRA’s export provisions nor EPA’s plant-incorporated
protectant rule are address the broader concern of risk to biological diversity internationally. It is conceivable that a
pesticide, particularly a plant-incorporated protectant, that does not pose an unreasonable risk in the U.S. could pose an
unreasonable risk in another country. As discussed above, many of the risk issues associated with plant-incorporated
protectants relate to their ability to outcrops to wild relatives. This is a very different situation than that of conventional
pesticides. For conventional chemical pesticides, the risks posed by the substance will tend to be the similar regardless of
the country or part of the world. For example, if a pesticide is highly toxic to humans or other mammals in the United
States, it will also be highly toxic to humans or mammals in other countries. The risks associated with plant-incorporated
protectants, on the other hand, may vary more with location depending on a number of factors such as the presence of wild
relatives. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for EPA to evaluate all risks of a plant-incorporated protectant
in every country in the world. Moreover, to conduct the unreasonable adverse effects analysis required by FIFRA, EPA
also must look at the societal benefits associated with the pesticide. It would seem infeasible for EPA to conduct such an
analysis for every importing country. EPA is not in a position to evaluate, and place value on, the economic and societal
benefits that an importing country derives from a particular pesticide or chemical substance.
Another impediment to EPA addressing risks of plant-incorporated protectants in countries other than the United States is
that FIFRA provides EPA with very limited authority to regulate exported pesticides. The export of pesticides is regulated
under section 17 of FIFRA. See 7 U.S.C. § 136o (2004). The primary emphasis of this section is on the provision of
information by EPA to foreign governments. Id. Section 17 mandates two systems of notification: a notice to the
government of an importing country of the export of unregistered pesticides, id. § 136o(a)(2), and a notice to all countries
of cancellation or suspension actions taken by EPA, id. § 17o(b). Beyond these notification provisions, FIFRA does not
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find that it will not pose an unreasonable environmental risk in the U.S. because a suitable niche
does not exist for the modified plant in the U.S. that would allow the creation of a pest. To
determine whether the pesticidal GMO poses an unreasonable risk in another country, however,
the exporting company (or EPA) would be required to identify the types of ecosystems that exist in
that country and the likelihood that the modified plant would thrive or spread in that environment.
To do this, the exporting company (or EPA) would have to address a wide array of issues to
determine whether the pesticide produced by the plant gives it a selective advantage in the new
environment. Such a determination would depend on a number of considerations such as whether
the modified plant has wild relatives in the new environment, how the modified plant is affected
by factors such as climate, what selective pressures (e.g., viruses or other pathogens that normally
keep the plant population in check) exist in the new environment, and how the modified plant
interacts with the types of species present in the various ecosystems of the importing country. It
appears to be unreasonable to require such a site-specific risk assessment for every country that
imports U.S. pesticides. Nevertheless, international concerns could be averted if the United States
were to participate in international efforts to provide advanced informed consent prior to exporting
GMOs to other countries. Such a process is contemplated by the Rio Convention on Biodiversity,
as well as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, to neither of which the United States is a party.377
B. An Ecological Integrity Baseline
As described above, one of the cornerstones of eco-pragmatism is an environmental
baseline. By incorporating ecological principles into eco-pragmatism, the notion of ecological
integrity as the environmental baseline emerges. With such a baseline, any action taken under
FIFRA can be measured against the reference point of the baseline. As with any baseline,
however, such comparisons cannot be made without good data and ongoing monitoring. To ensure
that pesticide usage does not undermine ecological integrity, a number of revisions to the FIFRA
program are necessary.
provide EPA with the authority to regulate exports.
377
Article 19(3) of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity provides: “The Parties shall consider the need for and
modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organisms resulting form biotechnology that may have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety
implements this directive by including a provision which requires advanced informed agreement by the Importing Party
prior to the first international transboundary movement of living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the
environment. Article 7(1) of the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety.
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Perhaps most importantly in this regard, EPA’s data requirements must be revised to
require data better designed to evaluate risks to wildlife species, and in particular ESA listed
species, as well as ecosystem services such as pollination, decomposition, nitrogen fixation, and
other ecological services provided by organisms that may be affected by pesticides. Currently,
EPA’s data requirements for pesticide registration only address a limited number of these
concerns.378 EPA’s data requirements for testing for ecological effects are limited and many such
data requirements have not yet been developed. In addition to substantial data requirements
related to product chemistry,379 much of EPA’s requirements regarding data necessary to support
the registration of a pesticide are focused on human health effects. For example, EPA has
extensive data requirements related to residue chemistry to estimate human exposure to pesticides,
acute human hazard, subchronic human hazard, chronic human hazard, mutagenicity, metabolism
studies, reentry hazard, spray drift evaluation, as well as oncogenicity, teratogenicity,
neurotoxicity, and reproductive effects in humans.380
EPA’s environmental fate data are designed to “assess the presence of widely distributed
and persistent pesticides in the environment which may result in loss of usable land, surface water,
ground water, and wildlife resources, and assess the potential environmental exposure of other
nontarget organisms, such as fish and wildlife, to pesticides.”

381

Environmental fate studies

include studies to determine the rate of pesticide degradation,382 metabolism studies to determine
the nature and availability of pesticides to rotational crops and to aid in the evaluation of the
persistence of a pesticide, 383 mobility studies pertaining to leaching, adsorption/desorption and
378

The minimum data requirements for registration, experimental use permits, and reregistration are set forth in 40 C.F.R.
§ 158 (2005). More detailed standards for conducting tests, guidance on evaluation and reporting of data and additional
guidance is provided in a series of advisory documents that EPA makes available to applicants and the public. See id. §
158.20(c). In its data requirement rules, EPA identifies some data as required and other data as “conditionally required.”
Conditionally required data are required only if the product’s proposed pattern of use, results of other tests, or other factors
meet the criteria specified in the rules. See id. §§ 158.25(a) and 158.101. EPA’s rules also allow certain data requirements
to be waived if that are not applicable to the particular pesticide or use. See id. § 158.25(b) (setting forth policy on
flexibility and waiver); 40 CFR 158.35 (describing the flexibility in data requirements) and § 158.45 (regarding waiver of
data requirements). In addition, EPA’s rules set forth varying data requirements for minor use of a pesticide (i.e., used on a
minor crop) and biochemical and microbial pesticides. See id. §§ 158.60 and 158.65, respectively.
379
See id. §§ 158.150, 158.153, 158.155, 158.160, 158.162, 158.165, 158.167, 158.170, 158.175, 158.180, and 158.190.
380
See id. paragraphs 158.202(a), (c), (e), (f), and (g) and id. §§ 158.240, 158.390, 158.440 and 158.340. See also, id. §
158.34 (providing that certain human health effects data d=submitted to EPA must be flagged as indicating potential
adverse effects).
381
Id. § 158.202(d)(1).
382
Id. § 158.202(d)(2).
383
Id. § 158.202(d)(3).
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volatility of pesticides, 384 dissipation studies 385 and accumulation studies.386 Perhaps because
environmental fate data are used to evaluate human exposure to pesticides, as well as wildlife
exposure, these data requirements appear to be fairly comprehensive. However, EPA’s data
requirements regarding effects on wildlife and nontarget organisms are considerably less
comprehensive.
With regard to ecological effects, EPA has, by rule, developed limited data requirements
designed to evaluate wildlife and aquatic organisms, environmental fate, and nontarget insects.
EPA’s data requirements for effects on wildlife and aquatic organisms, include avian toxicity
studies387 and freshwater fish and invertebrate acute toxicity studies388 for most pesticides intended
for outdoor use. Wild mammal toxicity, avian reproduction, simulated and actual field testing of
mammals and birds, acute toxicity to estuarine and marine organisms, fish early life stage, aquatic
invertebrate life cycle, fish life cycle and aquatic organisms accumulation and simulated or actual
field testing of aquatic organisms are only conditionally required389 for most outdoor uses. As can
be seen by EPAs primary focus on acute toxicity testing, EPA does not generally require data
related to potential adverse effects of pesticides on wildlife behavior, neurology, reproduction,
birth defects, or other non-acute effects. Moreover, EPA’s data requirements do not contain any
studies aimed at evaluating effects on other species, such as amphibians or reptiles or other species
not specifically identified in the rules. Accordingly, EPA’s wildlife data requirements should be
revisited to determine what additional data requirements should be included to more fully address
the wide range of potential effects on fish and wildlife that may result from exposure to pesticides.
Likewise, EPA’s data requirements for nontarget insects are limited.

EPA does

conditionally require acute toxicity testing for honey bees and other pollinators, if the proposed
use will result in honey bee or other pollinator exposure, however, EPA does not have any data
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Id. § 158.202(d)(4).
Id. § 158.202(d)(5).
386
Id. § 158.202(d)(6). See also id. § 158.290.
387
Avian oral LD50 and dietary LC50s are required using the preferred test animal species, the mallard and the bobwhite.
Id. § 158.490.
388
Freshwater fish LC50 studies are required, with the preferred test species being the rainbow and bluegill fish and acute
LC50 studies are required on freshwater invertebrates, with the preferred test species being Daphnia. Id. § 158.490.
389
Id. § 158.490. Conditionally required studies are required only on a case-by-case basis depending on the results of
lower tier studies, such as acute and subacute testing, intended use pattern and environmental fate characteristic or if certain
specified criteria are met.
385
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requirements related to honeybee subacute feeding studies,390 nontarget aquatic insects, or
nontarget predatory or parasitic insects.391 Moreover, EPA does not have any data requirements
whatsoever related to soil microorganisms, which provide critical ecological services, such as
decomposition and nitrogen fixation, or any data requirements designed to evaluate the effects of
pesticides on any other ecological services.
Although EPA’s data requirements do include some studies designed to evaluate risks to
fish, wildlife, aquatic organisms and nontarget insects, EPA’s primary purpose in requiring such
studies is not to determine whether to register a pesticide product, but instead is to “provide data
which determines the need for (and appropriate wording for) precautionary label statements to
minimize the potential adverse effects to nontarget organisms.” 392 However, label requirements
do not always provide sufficient protection against the environmental harms resulting from
pesticides use.
Despite all of the testing and labeling that EPA imposes, large numbers of birds, insects,
amphibians, and aquatic species, including threatened and endangered species, continue to be
harmed by EPA-registered pesticides.393 While many label requirements that EPA imposes are
aimed at protecting human users of pesticides,394 as well as other humans such as children 395 from
accidental poisonings, EPA does require certain environmental hazard information to appear on
pesticide labels. For example, if a pesticide intended for outdoor use contains an active ingredient
with a specified level of acute mammalian or avian toxicity, the label must bear a precautionary
statement, such as “This pesticide is toxic to wildlife.” 396 If either accident history or field studies
390

In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies this type of requirement as “reserved pending development of test
methodology.” 40 C.F.R. § 158.590 (2005).
391
In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies these types of requirements as “reserved pending further evaluation to
determine what and when data should be required, and to develop appropriate test methods.” Id. § 158.590.
392
Id. § 158.202(h)(1).
393
See Brian Litmans & Jeff Miller, Silent Spring Revisited: Pesticide Use and Endangered Species (A Center for
Biological Diversity Report, 2004), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/
(Last visited, August 4, 2005).
394

See id. §§ 156.10 (general labeling requirements); 156.60 (human hazard and precautionary statements); 156.62 (human
hazard toxicity categories); 156.64 (signal words for human hazard toxicity categories); 156.68 (first aid statement); 156.70
(precautionary statements for human hazards); 156.78 (precautionary statements of physical or chemical hazards); and §§
156.200 -156.212 (worker protection statements).
395
See id.§ 156.66 (child hazard warning).
396
The specified level of acute toxicity for mammals warranting such a statement is an oral LD50 of 100mg/kg or less.
The specified level of acute toxicity for fish warranting such a statement is an LC50 of 1ppm or less. The specified level of
acute toxicity for birds warranting such as statements an oral LD50 of 100 mg/kg or less or a subacute dietary LC50 of 500
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demonstrate that the use of the pesticide may result in fatality to birds, fish or mammals, the
pesticide label must bear the precautionary statement, such as “This pesticide is extremely toxic to
wildlife (fish).”

397

Similarly, if a product intended for certain uses contains an active ingredient

that is toxic to pollinating insects, the label must bear an appropriate label caution.398 Finally, if a
product is intended for outdoor use other than aquatic applications, the label must bear the
precautionary statement “Keep out of lakes, ponds or streams. Do not contaminate water by
cleaning of equipment or disposal of wastes.” 399
Although EPA does require these precautionary statements on labels, it is unclear what
effect they have in practice. For example, if a farmer intends to apply a particular pesticide to
combat a particular pest of her crops and the pesticide label indicates it is toxic to wildlife, how
will this information influence the farmers' behavior? It is unlikely that the farmer will choose not
to apply the pesticide, because virtually all of the major chemical pesticides use in agriculture
today are acutely toxic to at least some nontarget organisms. It is difficult to imagine that a
statement on a label indicating that a product is toxic to wildlife will have any significant influence
on user behavior. Without more specific directions about when, where or how it is appropriate to
apply the pesticide to minimize risks to wildlife, the farmer is left with an essentially useless
warning. The lack of more useful directions to minimize risk is likely due to the fact that because
most chemical pesticides are acutely toxic to at least some wildlife, it is impossible to release them
into the environment in large amounts, without creating the possibility for harm to wildlife.
C. Addressing Uncertainty and Change
As described above, eco-pragmatism argues in favor of feasibility approaches rather than
cost/benefit approaches. While this article proposes a modified cost/benefit analysis (open-ended
balancing) for the registration of a pesticide under FIFRA, it also proposes that a feasibility
analysis be conducted for significant pesticide “use.” Currently, there is no federal system in
place, and only very limited state or local systems in place, that regulate the “uses” of pesticides
registered under FIFRA other than the label instructions on each registered pesticide. These label
instructions generally are the same nationwide. Thus, there is not currently a widespread system
ppm or less. Id. § 156.85(b) paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
397
Id. § 156.85(b)(4).
398
Id. § 156.85(b)(5).
399
Id. § 156.85(b)(6).
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for considering local factors to determine what pest control method should be used in what
location under what circumstances.
As described above, for an environmental regulatory system to be eco-pragmatic, it must
be flexible and able to adapt to new information and changed circumstances. Transferring some
decision-making authority to a local level is one way to accomplish this goal. The consideration
of local factors in making the determination of whether or how to use a specific pesticide in a
specific location is of particular import. The benefit of local control over pesticide use is that
decision can be made based on local factors. Such factors could include presence of threatened,
endangered or otherwise rare species, presence of sensitive species, soil conditions, climatic
conditions, proximity to environmentally sensitive lands, types of crops grown, types of farming
practices used, severity of pest infestations, or other relevant site-specific factors.400
There are a variety of potential mechanisms available for achieving local decision-making
regarding actual pesticide use. One such mechanism is to encourage local government regulation
of pesticide use. Another mechanism is to provide better training to certified applicators in IPM
and non-chemical controls, and better information regarding endangered species, ecological
processes, the role of predators and parasites, and other local environmental conditions. Similarly,
better training could be provided to local agricultural extension agents. A variation on this theme
would be to empower local officials – whether they be local government officials or extension
agent officials to make case-by-case, or season-by season decisions on the actual use of pesticides.
For example, a local official could be required to evaluate the local conditions, including
the particular pest concerns, the climatic conditions and a wide variety of local environmental
factors, before “prescribing” that a particular pesticide be used. This idea is similar to that of a
medical doctor prescribing that a patient take a particular medication. Prior to issuing such a
prescription, the doctor would consider a number of factors such as the patient’s overall health,
other medical conditions, other medications the patient is taking, any allergies or sensitivities the
patient may have to certain types of medications, the patients age, the patient’s health and lifestyle
objectives ad the patient’s willingness to accept certain risks to achieve such goals. Moreover, the
doctor could adjust the type or amount of medication over time to fine-tune the treatment in
400

Because ecological impacts are necessarily contextual and local, whereas, human health impacts are not, EPA’s failure
to adequately address local ecological effects of pesticides may be further evidence of an institutional bias away from
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accordance with changing circumstances or new information. A prescription-type approach to
pesticide application could similarly be adjusted over time to take into consideration changed local
conditions, or new information about local environmental factors. Of course, the physicianprescribe pharmaceutical system is not without its shortcomings. High pressure sales tactics by
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, glossy advertisements on television and in
magazines promising a wonderful life can be achieved merely by popping a pill, the public’s
desire for an “easy fix” in the form of a pill, and industry-sponsored research all may contribute to
the trend over physicians over prescribing medications. It is likely that even with a pesticide
prescription system in place, pesticide manufacturers will be able to convince decision-makers to
prescribe their pesticides. Nevertheless, such a system, if properly instituted, could result in at
least some level of informed decision-making prior to the release of large amounts of pesticides
into the environment.
The likely criticisms of such a system would be that to institute such a system could entail
high costs and possibly the creation of a new bureaucracy. However, the possibility exists of
relying on existing infrastructure to facilitate such a system without the need for a completely new
institution or significant additional personnel. The existing agricultural extension services could
potentially be used to administer such a system. Alternatively, existing state requirements for
certified applicator training and certification could be expanded to better educate applicators on
local environmental factors that should be taken into account and on non-chemical alternative pest
control mechanisms that in many cases may be preferable to chemical approaches. additional and
expense. Such and approach might also be able to rely on existing extension infrastructure and
resources.
Although FIFRA provides a regulatory system that applies to any pesticide sold or
distributed in the United States, FIFRA does not generally preempt state or local government
regulation of pesticide use. In 1991, the right of a local government to regulate pesticide use was
clearly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier.401 In that case a Wisconsin local government had adopted an ordinance, which required a
permit from the local government prior to certain types of pesticide use. Prior to the Mortier
ecological protection. See infra note 362 & accompanying text.
401
501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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decision, only a small number of states had in place laws that preempted local governments from
regulating pesticide use. After Mortier, all but 11 states have laws preempting local regulation of
pesticides.402
Justice White, writing for the majority in the in the Mortier decision, recognized the
benefit of local decision-making for the actual use of pesticides when he wrote: “FIFRA nowhere
seeks to establish an affirmative permit scheme for the actual use of pesticides. It certainly does
not equate registration and labeling requirements with a general approval to apply pesticides
throughout the Nation without regard to regional and local factors like climate, population,
geography, and water supply.” 403 And yet, this is in practice what FIFRA does. Once a pesticide
receives a FIFRA registration, unless a particular state actively seeks to further regulate such a
pesticide, it can be used anywhere in the United States with the only limitation being that it must
be used in accordance with the FIFRA label instructions. As is described more fully below, most
states do not have detailed environmental permitting requirements for pesticide use.404 Although
EPA attempts to impose risk reducing measures on users through detailed labeling requirements, a
set of instructions on a container that have been drafted to apply to the entire United States is a
poor substitute for a site-specific, circumstance-specific decision on what pesticide to use where,
when and how.
The issue of localized decision-making regarding pesticide use has arisen in another
context in recent years. Beginning with the case of Headwaters, Inc., v. Talent Irrigation
District405 in 2002, the courts, as well as EPA have been grappling with the issue of whether and
under what circumstances a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES) permit is
required under the Clean Water Act for the application of pesticides into waters of the United
States.406 Historically, EPA had not required NPDES permits for such pesticide applications.
402

Haight, supra note 202, at 39. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed FIFRA preemption again in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, LLC., 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt claims for defective design, defective
manufacture, negligent testing, breach of express warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
remanding the issue of whether FIFRA preempts fraud and failure-to-warn claims).).
403
501 U.S. 597 (1991).
404
See infra notes 412-414 & accompanying text.
405
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that the application of an aquatic pesticide to irrigation canals in compliance with
the registration and labeling requirements under FIFRA, did not eliminate the need for an NPDES permit).
406
For a detailed discussion of the judicial decisions and EPA’s position on the issue of requiring NPDES permits for
aquatic pesticide application, see Kelly C. Connelly (case note), Pesticides and Permits: Clean Water Act v. Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2003) and Paul Herran, (case note),
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Thus, although EPA, at least arguably, had s the legal authority to require permits for applications
of pesticides to waters, which would take into consideration localized environmental factors, EPA
has chosen not to do so. Even after the Headwaters decision, EPA has steadfastly refused to
require NPDES permits for the application of pesticides directly to waters of the U.S. for the
purpose of controlling pests in or over such waters.407
In addition, as described above, nationwide decision-making regarding pesticides can lead
to disproportionate risks being place on vulnerable populations of people, as well as on vulnerable
species or ecosystems. While an overall cost/benefit analysis for a particular pesticide may weigh
in favor of use of the pesticide, geographic or ecological “hot spots” may occur where the risks
outweigh the benefits on those localized geographic areas or for those particular species. Without
some way to bring localized concerns into the decision-making process, risks will continue to fall
disproportionately on the most vulnerable human and ecological resources. Although over one
half of all registered agricultural pesticides are restricted use pesticides,408 which must be applied
only under the supervision of a certified applicator, the certified applicator requirement does not
provide the level of oversight, consideration of local ecological factors and consideration of lower
risk alternatives that would be needed to adequately address ecological risks. First, certified
applicators do not necessarily directly oversee the application of pesticides, but instead typically
serve as “arm chair” supervisors.409 Second, certified applicators are not required to receive any
particular training in local ecological systems and their vulnerability to particular pesticides.410
Finally, although FIFRA section 11 requires EPA and states to make available to certified
applicators at their request instructional materials concerning Integrated Pest Management (IPM),
the statute expressly states certified applicators are not required to receive instruction on IPM and
are not required to be shown to be competent with respect to such techniques.411 Thus, certified

Headwaters, Inc. V. Talent Irrigation District: Application of Aquatic Pesticides to Irrigation Canals, a Discharge, Which
Requires a Clean Water Act Permit?, 25 HAW. L. REV. 629 (2003).
407
See 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (August 13, 2003).
408
RODGERS, supra note 190, at 458.
409
See infra note 414 & accompanying text.
410
For a description of certified applicator training programs, see RODGERS, supra note 190, at 462-63.
411
7 U.S.C. § 136i(c) (2004), regarding instruction in integrated pest management, provides:
Standards prescribed by the Administrator for the certification of applicators of pesticides under subsection (a) of this
section, and state plans submitted to the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall include provisions for
making instructional materials concerning integrated pest management techniques available to individuals at their request in
accordance with the provisions of section 136u(c) of this title, but such plans may not require that any individual receive
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applicators are not required to know about less risky pest control techniques, let alone to consider
them in making decisions regarding which options to choose to control a particular pest. In fact, a
certified applicator’s job is not to decide what approach to take to control a pest, but is merely to
ensure that once a particular pesticide is chosen, it is applied properly in accordance with label
instructions.
Unfortunately, despite compelling reasons for considering local conditions in determining
what pesticides to use in what locations and under what conditions, and the fact that FIFRA allows
state and local governments to regulate pesticide use, state regulation of pesticides tends to be
minimal. Most states do not have regulatory systems in place that are much more environmentally
protective than FIFRA’s basic nationwide protections. Most states do not have any significant
regulations addressing the use of pesticides under localized conditions. For example, most states
do not require site-specific permits to be obtained before a pesticide can be applied, even for large
scale agricultural pesticide application into the environment.412 Likewise, most states do not
require anyone with specialized knowledge of the presence of threatened or endangered species or
rare or sensitive ecosystems to make any evaluation prior to the release of pesticides into the
environment. What state pesticide regulatory programs generally do is treat farmers as “private
applicators,” who are required to obtain a state certification that demonstrates that they have
attained a level of practical knowledge of pesticide use and hazards, before such farmer is allowed
to apply pesticides. Some states have more stringent requirements for chemigation, fertigation and
aerial application,413 but generally, once a farmer has obtained the required training and
instruction concerning such techniques or to be shown to be competent with respect to the use of such techniques. The
Administrator and States implementing such plans shall provide that all interested individuals are notified on the
availability of such instructional materials.
412
Some states do have limited permitting requirements for pesticide use, however these requirements generally apply only
to aerial application of pesticides and generally a permit is not issued for each application. For example, in Hawaii, a
permit is required prior to aerial application of pesticides. See HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 4-66-64 (2004). However, the
permit can be issued for repeated uses or for a specified length of time. Id. at § 4-66-64 (a)(4). Consequently, changing
local environmental conditions are not likely to be adequately addressed for each application. In Massachusetts, a permit is
required for the aerial application of pesticides, however, the permit is for a one-year duration and is not specific to the date
or time of application. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 13.05(3)(b) (2004). Nevertheless, a site inspection is required
prior to permit issuance, which presumably means that local condition are assessed prior to issuing the permit. Id. In
addition, in Massachusetts, a special permit is required for application of restricted use pesticides to an area greater than
twenty-five acres. See id. § 13.03(18). Similarly, in Vermont, one-year duration permits are required for aerial application
of pesticides. See VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 § IV (5) (2003).
413
See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5E-9.019(2)(a) (2005) (aerial applicators require a separate certification); HAW.
ADMIN. RULES § 4-66-64(6) (2004) (mandating a notice requirement prior to any aerial application); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE
02.03.03.310, 02.03.03.320 (2004) (placing specific restrictions on aerial application geared primarily toward minimizing
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certification, he is free to apply pesticides at will provided it is done in accordance with FIFRA or
state label directions and restrictions. What’s more, generally the certified private applicator can
“supervise” the application of pesticides by non-certified persons. In most states, “direct
supervision” means that the certified private applicator is within a telephone call away from his
supervisees.414 Some states do have specific pesticide regulations aimed at protecting groundwater
or surface water bodies. However, even these states do not generally require any form of sitespecific permitting evaluation prior to pesticide use. By establishing a prescription-type system to
large-scale pesticide use, not only will local environmental factors receive due consideration, but
the system would have the flexibility necessary to adapt to changing circumstances and new
information.415
spray drift); 302 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 27:050 § 2(8) (2003) (requiring separate certification for aerial applicators); LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, Part XXII § 145 (A)(iii-vii) (2005) (detailing specific requirements regarding aerial application,
including the requirement to adjust flight patterns to avoid sensitive areas and prohibitions on aerial application if wind
velocity exceeds 10 mph or if it is raining or rain is imminent); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 13.05(3)(b,c) (2004)
(requiring a permit for aerial application, as well as prohibiting aerial application within 400 feet of a water body and
requirements that aerial spraying cease if spray drift occurs); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 285.637.10 (2005) (detailing specific
requirements regarding aerial spray drift, including a requirement for applicators to have a written spray draft plan in place
and restrictions to protect sensitive areas including all water bodies); NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, chp. 2 005.03 (2002)
(mandating separate certification requirements for application of restricted-use pesticides via chemigation); N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 2, r. 9L.1002, 9L.1003 (2004) (detailing spray drift control regulations and a prohibition on aerial application to
restricted areas, including water bodies); VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 § IV (1)(b) (2003) (detailing rules regulating pesticide
drift); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-202-2001 - 16-202-2021 (2004) (detailing rules regulating fertigation); WIS. ADMIN.
CODE § 29.50(2) (2003) (listing restrictions to prevent significant spray drift).
414
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.021(64) (2004) (“under direct supervision” means that the licensed applicator is
available “if and when needed”); IDAHO CODE § 22-3401(34) (2004) (stating that a supervisory certified applicator must be
available as needed, even though the “certified applicator is not physically present at the time and place the pesticide is
applied”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2642(5)(c)(iv) (2002) (“direct supervision” defined as being available by voice or
electronic means and the ability to be physically present if needed); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.27 (2004) (“under the direct
supervision of” means the certified applicator is responsible for supervisees’ actions); and WIS. STAT. § 94.67(10m) (20032004) (allowing private applicators to “direct the use of” restricted-use pesticides, provided they are available if and when
needed during the application); MD REGS. CODE tit. 15.05.01.01(b)(23)(b) (2005) (stating that the supervisory certified
applicator must be available is needed); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 30-1.2(2005) (defining “available if and when needed”
to mean that the direct supervisor is in constant voice contact and no more than 3 hours away via ground transportation);
OR. ADMIN. R. 603-057-0001(10) (2004) (“immediate supervision” defined as no more than five minutes away).
Nevertheless, a few states do have more stringent supervisory requirements for certified applicators. See e.g., IND. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 355, r. 4-2-3 (2004) (stating that, if an applicator has never worked with a pesticide before or is not a “registered
technician”, the certified applicator must be both physically present and in direct voice contact during the application; for
registered technicians, the certified applicator can be available through telephone or walkie-talkie); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
333, § 10.07 (1996) (requiring that the supervision of non-certified applicators increase based upon the hazard of the given
pesticide being used); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 325.7 (2004) (defining “under the direct supervision” to
mean that the certified applicator must be physically present and within voice contact); and VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 §
I(7)(17) (2003) (certified applicators must be physically present and actively supervise non-certified applicators).
415
A possible alternative to a registration approach, would be imposing a reporting requirement on farm. Such and
approach would be similar to the Toxics Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2004). J.B. Ruhl has suggested such an approach as a way to provide regulators and
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As described above, one of the cornerstones of eco-pragmatism, as well as conservation
biology, is adaptive management. Because of the complexity and changing nature of ecological
systems, as well as our ever-increasing understanding of those systems, it is necessary that any
system designed to address ecological risks, be flexible and able to adapt to changed circumstances
and new information. Accordingly, a prescription approach, whereby a prescription for pesticide
use is written based on a feasibility analysis for each large-scale application (or perhaps series of
applications during a growing season), could serve as an adaptive management approach. Each
time a localized decision must be made to determine what pesticide to prescribe, current local
conditions can be evaluated to determine the pest control that would maximize ecological
protection to the extent feasible. 416 Moreover, as new pesticides and non-chemical pest control
techniques are developed, they can be considered when determining what to prescribe.417
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite its early successes in protection of ecological resources at the beginning of the
environmental movement in the United States, FIFRA has virtually lain dormant with regard to
protection of ecological resources for the past 25 years. Ironically, if any area of environmental
law should be tailored specifically to address ecological concerns, it is with pesticide law, where
substances that are intend to kill and disrupt species and natural systems are intentionally released
local communities with information on pesticide releases. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 Ecology L.Q. 263, 337-338 (2000). Although such an approach would not directly require the
consideration of local ecological factors prior to use of a pesticide, by providing bringing pesticide releases under the
scrutiny of regulators and communities, such an approach could result in long-term changes to pesticide usage.
416
For example, if in year two, an American Bald Eagle, or other listed species, builds a nest near the field to be sprayed, it
may not be appropriate to prescribe the same pesticide that was used on the field in year one, if that pesticide is toxic to
avian species. Likewise, if a listed species is no longer present near the field, it may be appropriate to go back to the more
toxic pesticide. Similarly, if new information about the surrounding ecosystem is discovered, it could effect the decision of
what pesticide to prescribe.
417
Although a detailed analysis of discounting environmental benefits is beyond the scope of this article, as described in
Part IV, above, many risks of pesticides are long-term risks. For example, the tendency of certain pesticides to
bioaccumulate as they work their way up the food chain, poses risks that may not be realized for many years after the initial
release of the pesticide into the environment. Similarly, the harms from certain pesticides that pose reproductive effects,
such as the endocrine disruptors, may not be to the animals exposed, but may instead be to the offspring, or even
subsequent generations of the animals exposed. Moreover, many of the potential harms to ecological systems and
ecological services that pesticides pose, including disruptions of predator/prey relationships, harm to pollinators, harm to
microorganisms that perform decomposition and nutrient cycling services, may not be evident in the short-term, but may
have significant long-term impacts. Accordingly, any pesticide regulation that reduces these long-term harms, may not
demonstrate have immediate benefits. Consequently, as Farber suggests, it is important to ensure that the long-term
benefits of pesticide risk reduction measures are adequately valued through the use of low discount rates. The idea of
intergenerational equity further supports this notion. To ensure that future generations inherit functioning ecosystems,
including functioning agricultural systems, it is incumbent upon this generation to ensure that the long-term benefits of
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in to the environment in large quantities. Moreover, pesticide law has failed to keep pace with
recent advances in ecological study and the field of conservation biology. The eco-pragmatic
framework proposed by Professor Daniel Farber, and elaborated upon by others may serve as
useful approach to reinventing pesticide law to better address ecological concerns. To accomplish
this, several steps are required. First, the prevailing interpretation of FIFRA’s “unreasonable
adverse effects standard” as mandating a strict cost/benefit balancing should be reevaluated and
readjusted to be more of an open-ended balancing standard, as contemplated by the drafters of the
standard. Related to this idea, EPA’s approach to evaluating whether a particular pesticide poses
an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment should be modified so that registrants are
required to demonstrate the true benefits of a pesticide, by demonstrating efficacy and by
evaluating the benefits of the pesticide in relation to the benefits provided by other pest control
methods that are available, including lower risk chemical pesticides as well as non-chemical pest
control methods. Moreover, a mechanism, such as the prescription approach, should be developed
to allow for localized decision-making on which pesticide is best for a given situation taking into
account local environmental factors to determine the maximum level of environmental protection
that is feasible for any given situation. Second, to account for the uncertainties and long-term
effects of pesticides on the environment, a low discount rate should be used in conducting the
open-ended balancing analysis. Third, to ensure that pesticides released into the environment do
not undermine a baseline of ecological integrity, the data requirements under FIFRA should be
strengthened to require information about the potential effects on a wider variety of wildlife
species, as well as ecological services such as pollination, decomposition, and nitrogen fixation.
Finally, an adaptive management approach should be developed to allow for flexibility and
adjustments to the choice of pest control method appropriate for a given situation. An adaptive
management mechanism could be based on a medical prescription model, which would allow for
fine-tuning and adjustment as circumstances change over time or as new information becomes
available. The eco-pragmatic approach may provide the necessary framework for modifying U.S.
pesticide law just enough so that we “do the best we can” to protect critical ecological resources.

pesticide-risk reduction measures are properly valued though appropriate low discounting.
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